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Abstract 
Committee Members: Charity Butcher, Chair; Maia Hallward; Marcus Marktanner; Emilia 
Justyna Powell (The University of Notre Dame) 
 
Transitional justice seeks to deal with legacies of the most brutal conflicts and political 
transitions within states; however, there is no one-size-fits-all approach. Post-conflict justice, as 
a subset of transitional justice, is concerned with justice mechanisms in the wake of armed 
conflict. Despite a growing literature exploring the conceptualization and effectiveness of 
transitional justice, less attention has been paid to the factors influencing the decision to adopt 
transitional justice and choice of mechanism(s). Further, theoretical understandings of how these 
choices ultimately contribute to the broader goals of justice, truth, and peace are limited. This 
study proposes domestic legal traditions as an explanatory factor influencing the pursuit of post-
conflict justice. More specifically, I expect to find that states have preferred, or congruent post-
conflict justice mechanisms based on their domestic legal traditions. To test this relationship, I 
develop a congruence variable to link domestic legal traditions to post-conflict justice 
mechanisms. I utilize the Post-Conflict Justice (PCJ) Dataset to test hypotheses regarding 
adoption and mechanism selection, finding that states prefer specific post-conflict justice 
mechanisms. More importantly, a survival analysis shows that the implementation of congruent 
post-conflict justice mechanisms increases the likelihood of longer-lasting peace in the post-
conflict period. These findings provide key insights into important factors that can inform policy 
and best practices when considering the adoption and implementation of post-conflict justice.        
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
“The past, unaccounted for, does not lie quiet.” 
-Naomi Roht-Arriaza 
In July 1995, during the Bosnian War, the enclave of Srebrenica in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina came under attack from the Bosnian Serb Army (Vojska Republike Srpske or 
VRS). Protected by roughly 400 Dutch peacekeeping troops, Srebrenica, the first United Nations 
declared “Safe Area,” quickly fell to the VRS. Rape and sexual abuse of women and girls were 
common. Women and children were forcibly removed from Srebrenica, leaving the men and 
boys of military age at the hands of the VRS. It is estimated that over 8,000 men and boys were 
systematically executed in Srebrenica that summer, the largest mass murder in Europe since 
World War II. 
Following the war, in an effort to prevent impunity for the perpetrators of these acts, the 
UN established an international tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), specifically for the events that took place in the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. 
Additionally, the newly independent Bosnian state instituted proceedings against Serbia and 
Montenegro at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), citing violations of the 1948 Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.1The outcomes of the respective 
courts demonstrate mixed results. While the ICJ found that the Serbian state had not committed 
genocide, many individual prosecutions at the ICTY have held high-ranking and commanding 
officers accountable for their actions with lifetime prison sentences. As examples of mass 
murder, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and abuses of civil and political rights of citizens 
 
1 It is important to note that proceedings were filed on 20 March 1993, two years prior to the events at Srebrenica. 
At the time of the application there had already been widespread and systematic violations occurring. 
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by those in power continue into the 21st century, the question of justice in light of conflict 
remains as relevant as ever. 
Since the Nuremberg Trials (1945-1946), there has been a call not only to end impunity 
for the perpetrators of grave crimes but also to deal with the legacies that remain from periods of 
conflict. The proliferation of ad hoc tribunals and international courts are one indication of the 
desire to see ‘justice’ in action. Redress for violations of human rights and systematic and 
widespread abuses carried out by states or agents of the state are generally not articulated in 
national legislation.2 Thus, the need to confront the past to build a more stable and peaceful 
future often requires specific actions addressing the conflict or interventions beyond the ordinary 
national capacity. The approaches and mechanisms available to address past wrongdoings are 
more widely known as “transitional justice” (Teitel 2000, 2003; Olsen, Payne, & Reiter, 
2010).  The United Nations defines transitional justice as “the full range of processes and 
mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale 
past abuses, to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” (United Nations, 
2010, p. 3). 
There are several options for transitional justice available to states at both the domestic 
and international levels. International courts, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), are 
one mechanism, however many post-conflict mechanisms for transitional justice are conducted 
within the state. Some examples include the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, the Gacaca courts in Rwanda, and the de-Ba’athification of the Iraqi political 
system. Justice in light of transitions from conflict to post-conflict can refer to both legal and 
nonlegal forms of redress for victims and also seeks accountability from wrongdoers 
 
2 The constitutions of Colombia (1991, revised 2013), Egypt (2014), and Tunisia (2014) are the only exceptions. 
Each of these constitutions include provisions for transitional justice. 
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(International Center for Transitional Justice, 2011). The most common mechanisms for 
transitional justice include trials, truth commissions, amnesties, reparations, and lustration 
policies3. 
Much of the scholarship on transitional justice is concerned with the effectiveness or 
impact of mechanisms for transitional justice, essentially asking, “does it work?” Moreover, little 
attention has been paid to the adoption of transitional justice, and more specifically, which 
mechanisms are chosen. That is, in a post-conflict state, why and when do states choose to utilize 
transitional justice more broadly? Or, more specifically, why and which mechanisms do states 
choose to adopt for transitional justice? Mechanisms for transitional justice are not automatically 
adopted by states in the wake of conflict or during the peacebuilding process. Olsen et al. explain 
that “not all countries enjoy the freedom from constraints and have the political will to adopt 
transitional justice” (2010, p. 13). Specifically, when referring to political transitions, the 
legacies of highly repressive regimes do not disappear overnight and, as such, will have lasting 
effects in the political and socio-cultural realms of life, potentially threatening efforts towards 
transitional justice. Further, the new regime may be lacking the institutional capacity or 
legitimacy from citizens to carry out such processes. 
Previous studies assume that the decision to adopt transitional justice is political and 
looks at the decision to adopt versus not adopt transitional justice, examining the political 
context in which this decision takes place. Historically, transitional justice scholarship has 
emphasized the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, while more recent studies refocus 
the analysis of transitional justice towards civil war and armed conflict. As such, there are a 
 
3 Lustration policies refer to the purging of government officials or public servants from positions of public service 
after a regime change. It was popularized after the Cold War in the countries of Eastern Europe that transitioned 
from communism to democracy. The goal of lustration policies is to ensure that members of the old regime no 
longer have any power after a conflict or political transition.  
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variety of factors that influence the adoption of transitional justice: leadership, regime type and 
duration, degree of repression, conflict intensity, and transition type, to name a few. Given that 
several popular mechanisms for transitional justice are largely legal methods (trials, for example) 
a logical extension is that the institutions, ideas, norms, and values of domestic legal traditions 
would influence the adoption of transitional justice mechanisms when a state is dealing with a 
transition from conflict to post-conflict. Non-legal methods of transitional justice, such as 
amnesties, may also be influenced by norms and values associated with justice in a given society. 
In this study, I suggest that the legal environment in which states operate, or their domestic legal 
tradition, influence whether or not states pursue transitional justice and how states investigate, 
prosecute, and punish violations associated with conflict and political transitions. 
The question driving this study is, how do domestic legal traditions influence the choice 
to adopt specific transitional justice mechanisms? There are many factors that may explain why 
states choose not only to adopt transitional justice but also which mechanisms they utilize to 
achieve justice. I propose that domestic legal traditions are one explanatory factor for choosing 
specific mechanisms for transitional justice. Characteristics associated with each of the major 
legal traditions in the world (civil law, common law, Islamic law) should ideally drive states to 
select a mechanism that is closely aligned with their domestic legal tradition.4 There are many 
reasons why a state would want to adopt a mechanism that aligns with their domestic tradition. 
One reason is that justice paradigms that are similar to or part of the domestic legal tradition are 
accepted within a given society; they are perceived as being legitimate. Cultural understandings 
shape conceptions of justice. While Western legal traditions often look to specific legal processes 
and judicial punishment as a means to settle conflict, other traditions emphasize ideas such as 
 
4 In this study, I adopt the Mitchell and Powell (2011) classification of the three major legal traditions in the world. I 
describe this in detail in Chapter 3.  
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reconciliation and harmony (Irani & Funk, 1998; Zartner, 2012). However, states do not always 
choose methods for transitional justice that are aligned with their legal tradition, and herein lies 
the paradox. 
Beyond my initial questions of adoption and choice of transitional justice, mechanisms 
are the question of efficacy. One of the primary questions driving the field of transitional justice 
is does it work? The limited, but critical, empirical analyses of the impact of transitional justice 
emphasize strengthening democracy and reducing human rights violations in post-conflict states 
as primary goals of transitional justice. Some studies even ask if there are negative consequences 
to transitional justice (Gibson, 2004, 2005; David, 2006). What the literature thus far fails to 
consider is the impact of the context of the domestic legal tradition in which transitional justice 
occurs. I propose considering how the selection of a specific mechanism impacts the efficacy of 
transitional justice. That is to say; I expect states that choose mechanisms that are aligned or 
“congruent” with their domestic legal tradition are more likely to have successful transitional 
justice experiences than states that choose non-congruent mechanisms.5 Zartner (2012, p.298) 
suggests that for transitional justice to be successful, more attention should be given to “local 
understandings of law” and “cultural understandings of justice.” Both of these concepts are 
expressed through domestic legal traditions. Thus, the examination of the effect domestic legal 
traditions on the adoption and effectiveness of transitional justice is a timely and useful 
contribution to the field. 
It is first important to provide context for the remainder of the study and lay out some of 
the conceptual challenges that any investigation of transitional justice presents. The following 
sections will provide a historical overview of the transitional justice evolution, discuss the 
 
5 In this study I define success as peace duration which is explained in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
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conceptualization of transitional justice, and finally, present a brief overview of some of the main 
challenges of transitional justice as a distinct field of study. These discussions will provide the 
foundation of the subsequent chapters of this dissertation. Following the introduction, the 
literature review will explore three important questions related to transitional justice – why do 
states adopt transitional justice? What mechanisms do they adopt? And finally, is transitional 
justice effective? Following the literature review, I present my main argument for congruence in 
transitional justice. Specifically, domestic legal tradition is an important factor to consider in the 
transitional justice process, and that congruent mechanisms lead to successful transitional justice. 
I then proceed to develop a congruence variable, legal traditions to post-conflict justice 
mechanisms, to test hypotheses.    
History of Transitional Justice 
 Transitional justice is often considered a product of the 20th century. Many point to the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals at the end of World War II as the beginning of transitional 
justice, and since the 1980s, there has been an increasing number of transitional justice efforts 
across the world. In addition to numerous state-level mechanisms, the establishment of 
international criminal tribunals in the 1990s and a permanent International Criminal Court 
established in 2002 have been tasked with ending impunity for humanity’s worst crimes. 
Transitional justice has also become the subject of scholarly inquiry from a variety of academic 
disciplines.  
Transitional justice in ancient Athens. 
While the tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo were indeed the catalyst for many of the 
later transitional justice efforts of the 20th century, transitional justice was practiced as far back 
as the beginning of democratic governance in the Western world. As early as 411 and 403 BC 
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during the Peloponnesian War, Athens experienced a series of political transitions as the regime 
changed between an oligarchy and democracy several times (Elster 2004; Lanni 2010). While in 
each case, democracy was eventually restored to Athens, with each political transition there was 
a notable difference in how perpetrators of violence and political upheaval were punished for 
their actions.  
 For Athens in the 5th century BC, transitional justice followed violent conflict and 
regime change. The first instance in 411 BC came after failed attempts to expand the empire 
encouraged oligarchs opposing the extant regime to stage a coup. After a short period of 
oligarchic rule, democracy was restored to Athens, though, according to Elster (2004), was a 
limited successor regime in which many citizens were disenfranchised. Retributive justice aimed 
at punishing the oligarchs was the main focus of transitional justice in this period (Elster, 2004). 
Many of the oligarchs responsible for the democratic overthrow were charged with treason, 
prosecuted and some executed, others were disenfranchised, and new legislation was enacted to 
prevent future overthrows. The process of justice consisted of “orderly legal proceedings” rather 
than simply victor’s justice, which demonstrates a degree of moderation and fairness rather than 
pure retribution (Elster, 2004, p. 8).  
The Athenian approach to transitional justice shifted from retribution to reconciliation in 
the next episode of post-conflict justice they experienced less than a decade later. In 403 BC, the 
oligarchs, this time a group supported by Sparta known as the “Thirty Tyrants,” once again 
overthrew the Athenian democracy after a violent civil war. Despite a rather brutal reign in 
which five to ten percent of the citizenry were killed and even more were expelled from Athens 
(Lanni, 2010), the transitional justice process that occurred was more moderate and deliberate 
than the previous attempt. The emphasis during this transitional period was on reconciliation 
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rather than retribution; it was forward-looking, whereas past attempts looked backward. That is 
not to suggest that there was no punishment for the oligarchs, but rather the Athenians were able 
to balance retribution and reconciliation as well as remembering and forgetting (Lanni, 2010). 
The restitution of property also played a significant role in this case. Amnesties and exiles were 
offered to those that participated in the oligarchy, and compensation was provided to victims and 
exiled democrats who suffered property loss. Courts allowed discussions of the atrocities that 
took place in an effort to memorialize or remember, but the reconciliation agreement aimed to 
move forward and forget the past (Lanni, 2010).   
The clear distinction in the approaches to transitional justice used in Athens suggests 
some learning occurred between the first and second transitions. In the second case in 403 BC, 
the Athenians changed their focus from punishing the oligarchs to seeking reconciliation among 
the various social groups in the Athenian society, suggesting that the Athenian state sought 
different approaches to achieve peace and justice, not wanting to repeat the violent conflicts of 
the past (Elster, 2004). We see many of these same goals in contemporary transitional justice. 
The Athenian case is important to consider when discussing later transitional justice efforts as it 
is the “first well-documented example of a self-conscious transitional justice policy” (Lanni, 
2010, p. 551). This example demonstrates that the Athenians considered the outcomes of various 
transitional justice approaches and tried different mechanisms to (presumably) improve their 
approach to dealing with the aftermath of political upheaval and conflict.    
The practice of transitional justice continued throughout the first millennium. Prominent 
examples include the English Restoration in 1660 and the restorations of the French monarchy in 
1814 and 1815, respectively (Elster, 2004). However, the 20th century marks the beginning of 
modern transitional justice. Teitel (2003) suggests there are three phases of transitional justice 
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“genealogy” in which the political context and conditions of the time are linked to the type of 
justice that is ultimately pursued. The three phases, discussed below, include the Post-World War 
II phase beginning in 1945, the third wave of democratization which was fueled by political 
transitions at the end of the Cold War, and the third and current stage of “steady state” 
transitional justice in which the practice has become the norm rather than an exceptional 
practice.     
Post-war transitional justice.  
 The tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo are significant for several reasons, including the 
administration of international justice in place of national justice (Teitel, 2003, p. 72). The 
Nuremberg Trials (1945-1946) were a series of military tribunals in which the Allied powers 
prosecuted prominent members of the Nazi party responsible for genocide and war crimes. 
Twenty four members of the Nazi party stood trial for their participation, planning, and 
execution of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Ultimately, 19 individuals were found 
guilty, 7 received prison sentences, and 12 received the death penalty.  
In 1946 the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) was convened to 
prosecute 28 members of the Japanese political and military leadership for various war crimes 
and crimes against humanity during World War II. Additionally, over 5,000 additional personnel, 
mainly lower-ranking, were charged with crimes and tried by the various Allied Powers around 
the world. While most were given limited prison terms, some received life sentences and even 
more received the death penalty. What is important to note is that both the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo tribunals set the stage for several tribunals and eventually courts later in the 20th and 21st 
centuries. Many point to these tribunals as the beginning of modern international criminal 
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jurisprudence as it was these proceedings that highlighted the need to define many of the crimes 
associated with international criminal law and war.  
Transitional justice in third wave democracies. 
 Another significant and more recent period of transitional justice was fueled by the many 
states that experienced democratic transitions between 1975 and 1990. Further, the collapse of 
the Soviet Union affected many political transitions in South America and Eastern Europe as 
states that were previously under authoritarian rule or aided by authoritarian regimes were now 
faced with prospects of democracy in addition to coming to terms with the abuses of their former 
regimes. This period, known as “the third wave of democracy,” was marked by questions about 
how successor regimes were to deal with their predecessors (Huntington, 1993).  
The second or Post-Cold War phase of transitional justice is distinct from the previous 
phase because of the use of varied mechanisms for dealing with the past (Teitel, 2003). During 
the first phase of transitional justice, mechanisms were both “extraordinary and international” 
(Teitel, 2003, p. 70). Mechanisms were extraordinary as they were beyond the scope of normal 
justice practices; they were international because they were occurring beyond the national level 
of jurisdiction. During the second phase, there are an increasing number of transitional justice 
measures administered at the national level and a shift beyond retributive justice seen in the 
postwar period. As early as 1982 and 1983, Bolivia and Argentina created national commissions 
to uncover the truth regarding the disappearances of people during periods of dictatorship. This 
was distinct from the criminal trials in the postwar period of the 1940s. 
Further, other mechanisms such as amnesty, reparations, and lustration policies became 
popular in post-conflict transitional settings. For example, lustration policies, or “purging,” were 
widely used in Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union in former Communist 
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regimes, in an attempt to remove members of the previous regime from state institutions. People 
that participated in the abuses and repression of the old government were disqualified from 
future public service and office. A more recent example is the de-Ba’athification of Iraq in the 
period following the regime of Saddam Hussein. Similar to the denazification of post-war 
Germany, this policy enacted by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in May 2003 
disestablished the Ba`ath Party in Iraq and removed party members from their public sector posts 
and banned future involvement in state leadership.  
Often in the transitional justice processes of Third Wave democracies, there are multiple 
mechanisms working together to achieve justice and encourage reconciliation. Much like the 
examples of transitional justice in ancient Athens, there are distinct differences between the Post-
War transitional justice period and the Third Wave period. The emphasis shifts from retributive 
justice in which punishment is sought for the perpetrators of crimes and members of the 
oppressive regimes towards reconciliation by including truth-seeking initiatives and policies 
aimed at minimizing the opportunities to repeat previous abuse and repression. Transitional 
justice takes place in two situations: post-conflict that involves armed conflict and political 
transitions from dictatorships or authoritarian regimes. While these situations are not mutually 
exclusive, for the purposes of this study, and given data limitations, political transitions are only 
included if they are part of armed conflict.    
Contemporary transitional justice.  
 Teitel (2003) refers to the third and final phase of transitional justice beginning at the end 
of the twentieth century as “steady-state” justice. In this phase, transitional justice has shifted 
from an exceptional practice to the expected norm in post-conflict situations; transitional justice 
has become normalized. Other evidence that points to this normalization include the 
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establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2002 and the establishment of research 
centers and programs dedicated to the study and practice of transitional justice. Further, 
discourse on transitional justice has now turned to considerations of the underlying assumptions 
and normative framework, recognizing that the exportation of transitional justice practices or a 
one-size-fits-all approach is neither useful nor valid. Mutua (2015, p. 5) suggests that “in matters 
of social transformation, close attention must be paid to context and location.” The consideration 
of legal tradition is one entry point to a more informed discourse on transitional justice and one 
of the primary contributions of this study.   
Conceptualizing and Defining Transitional Justice 
 Defining and conceptualizing transitional justice continues to be a significant challenge 
and source of scholarly debate. Often the phrase “coming to terms with the past” is used to 
describe transitional justice, indicating that whatever has transpired is too vast and grave to 
simply ignore or move past; that something must be done to acknowledge, punish, and ultimately 
heal from whatever occurred. The term is often tied to equally complex ideas of peace, justice, 
and reconciliation as transitional justice is considered a pathway towards achieving these goals.  
While there is no shortage of definitions that have been offered by scholars and practitioners 
alike, inconsistencies exist in terms of what events, mechanisms, and goals are or are not 
included in a given definition. It is generally accepted, however, that transitional justice occurs in 
instances of regime change (usually from a dictatorship or authoritarian regime towards 
democracy) and/or armed conflict. Further, transitional justice assumes some history or legacy of 
human rights or humanitarian abuses on a large scale that occurred in the context of the regime 
change and/or armed conflict. 
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In an effort to summarize and analyze existing definitions of transitional justice, I present 
the following table. The selection of definitions are drawn from either leading scholars (Teitel, 
Roht-Arriaza, Elster) in the field of transitional justice or organizations that work consistently in 
the practice of post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation (United Nations, International 
Center for Transitional Justice, United States Institute for Peace). I highlight whether or not 
specific situations, mechanisms, and goals are present in the offered definitions as a means not 
only to compare but also to highlight the varying interpretations of the concept.    
Table 1 
Transitional Justice Definitions   
Definition Regime 
Change 
War HR 
Abuse 
Specific TJ 
Mechanisms 
Outcome/Goal 
“Conception of justice 
associated with periods of 
political change, characterized 
by legal responses to confront 
wrongdoings of repressive 
predecessor regimes” (Teitel, 
2003). 
 
Yes No No No Justice 
“Set of practices, mechanisms 
and concerns that arise 
following a period of conflict, 
civil strife or repression, and 
that are aimed directly at 
confronting and dealing with 
past violations of human rights 
and humanitarian law” (Roht-
Arriaza, 2006). 
 
No Yes Yes No Confronting and 
dealing with 
past 
“Transitional justice is an 
approach to systematic or 
massive violations of human 
rights that both provides redress 
to victims and creates or 
enhances opportunities for the 
transformation of the political 
systems, conflicts, and other 
conditions that may have been 
Yes Yes Yes No Redress, 
transformation 
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at the root of the abuses” 
(United Nations, 2008). 
 
“The process of acknowledging, 
prosecuting, compensating for 
and forgiving past crimes during 
a period of rebuilding after 
conflict” (USIP, 2008). 
 
No Yes No Yes Compensation 
and forgiveness 
“Full range of processes and 
mechanisms associated with a 
society’s attempt to come to 
terms with a legacy of large-
scale past abuses, in order to 
ensure accountability, serve 
justice and achieve 
reconciliation” (United Nations, 
2010). 
 
No No Yes No Accountability, 
justice, 
reconciliation 
“The range of mechanisms used 
to assist the transition of a state 
or society from one form of 
(usually repressive) rule to a 
more democratic order” 
(Turner, 2013). 
 
Yes No No No None 
“Range of mechanisms and 
institutions, including tribunals, 
truth commissions, memorial 
projects, reparations and the like 
to redress past wrongs, 
vindicate the dignity of victims 
and provide justice in times of 
transition” (Buckley-Zistel, 
Beck, Braun, & Mieth, 2015). 
 
No No No Yes Redress, 
vindication, 
justice 
“The ways countries emerging 
from periods of conflict and 
repression address large scale or 
systematic human rights 
violations so numerous and so 
serious that the normal justice 
system will not be able to 
provide an adequate resource” 
(ICTJ, 2011). 
No Yes Yes No None 
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 The variety of definitions presented above point to several commonalities as well as 
inconsistencies. Half of the definitions specify regime change or political transition as a 
component of transitional justice. One possible explanation is that after the rapid democratization 
of the post-Cold War era, general governance trends have shifted. During the Cold War there 
were more autocratic regimes in the international system than democratic regimes. That trend 
reversed in the late 1980s and early 1990s when many states transitioned from autocracy to 
democracy. This does not suggest that transitional justice is no longer required or available for 
states in political transition, but perhaps that the trend has shifted from the need for justice in 
political transitions to a broader application of transitional justice. More definitions include 
conflict as a necessary condition for transitional justice than political transition. Again, this may 
point to general governance trends and the recognition and more far-reaching applications of 
transitional justice than previously thought.  
 The inclusion of human rights is inconsistent throughout the definitions presented above. 
While some definitions are explicit in the expectation that transitional justice should address 
violations of human rights, others are broad and vague enough include these violations if 
necessary. The explicit mention of human rights violations may be attributable to the normative 
values of the human rights regime.  
 More interesting, perhaps, is that relatively few definitions include the mention of 
specific mechanisms for the pursuit of transitional justice. Rather, a goal or outcome is stated in 
broad terms. While there is a generally accepted set of transitional and post-conflict justice 
mechanisms that are utilized by states and evaluated by scholars, the exclusion of specific 
mechanisms leaves room for interpretation and context-specific applications.  
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 For the purposes of this study, given the research methodology and available data, I adopt 
the definition that Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates, and Elster utilize in the study of justice practices 
related to armed conflict: “PCJ [post-conflict justice] includes the different ways in which 
governments and opposition come to terms with the wrongdoings of the past, including trials, 
truth commissions, reparations, amnesties, purges, and exiles” (2012, p. 732). Limiting this study 
to these specific mechanisms in the context of armed conflict allows for some degree of 
precision in a field that otherwise lacks clearly defined concepts. 
The State of the Field 
Transitional justice is both a practice and a field of academic inquiry. The study of 
transitional justice did not become of particular interest to academics until the 1980s and 1990s, 
a period in which political transitions from authoritarianism to democracy were plentiful and 
which saw some of the most brutal conflicts and crimes of the century. Transitional justice was 
originally situated in the field of law as it mainly dealt with issues of human rights abuses (Bell, 
2009). Over time, however, it has grown to include political science, sociology, psychology, 
history, and philosophy (Fletcher & Weinstein, 2015). While the widening scope of academic 
inquiry has certainly contributed to the development of the field, it has also been problematic. 
Bell (2009, p. 7), describing the field of transitional justice as a “fast field” argues that “unlike 
other fields of study, which have taken decades to reach this point, transitional justice can be 
argued to have experienced a dramatically compressed trajectory of fieldhood.” This suggests 
that not only is there a lot going on, but it also means there are many theoretical contributions 
happening at once.   
Questions regarding both the theoretical and practical aspects of transitional justice are of 
concern to scholars, practitioners, politicians, and donors. The transitional justice literature is full 
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of both single case studies and larger-n analyses; however, gaps exist in the causal relationships 
between complex social contexts and the broader goals of transitional justice, such as peace and 
democracy. Further, one of the challenges of the study of transitional justice is that it is 
undertheorized.  Fletcher and Weinstein (2015) point out that the transitional justice scholarship 
with the highest interest and most impact from 2003-2008 emphasized theory building in the 
field. The authors also find that significant attention is paid to issues of conceptualization, 
indicating that the discussion of defining transitional justice above remains a challenge for 
scholars and practitioners alike.   
Scope of Study and Map of the Project 
 This scope of this study is limited to transitional justice practices in post-conflict 
contexts, specifically in cases of armed conflict. As such, I adopt Binningsbø et al. (2012) usage 
of “post-conflict justice” in place of transitional justice. Given the broad definitions and 
conceptual scope of transitional justice, restricting the definition in this manner allows for some 
degree of precision in testing hypotheses. As this is a first attempt to empirically test the 
relationship between post-conflict justice adoption and mechanism selection, a broad approach 
may speak to generalizable results better than a case study approach. A quantitative methodology 
contributes to the growing “quantitative turn” in transitional justice literature while also 
attempting to be as inclusive as possible with the sample (Stewart & Wiebelhaus-Braham, 2017).  
 The remaining chapters in the dissertation are laid out in the following order. Chapter 2 
provides an overview of the relevant literature in both transitional justice and domestic legal 
traditions that are germane to this study. The transitional justice literature highlighted here 
demonstrates the scope of conceptual concerns as well as methodological approaches, ultimately 
showing that there is little consensus regarding the impact and efficacy of these practices. The 
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discussion of domestic legal traditions is included to highlight the utility of incorporating this 
concept to the study of transitional and post-conflict justice. Recent studies have examines how 
the concept of the legal tradition can tell us more about state preferences in their interactions 
with other states and international institutions. 
 Chapter 3 presents a theoretical argument for the relationship between domestic legal 
traditions and specific types of post-conflict justice mechanisms. Past applications of congruence 
and a rationale for applying this concept to the primary variables of interest in this study provides 
the foundation for the remainder of the chapter. A discussion of the concept of legal traditions 
followed by a description of the major legal traditions used in this study precedes a cultural 
argument for the inclusion of legal traditions in the study of post-conflict justice. The last part of 
the chapter lays out the new conceptual framework which links legal traditions to post-conflict 
justice mechanisms and the development of the congruence variable that will be used to test 
hypotheses in the remaining chapters.   
 Chapter 4 lays out the methodology for the empirical analyses that follow. All of the 
major concepts are defined and operationalized and the hypotheses are presented. The chapter 
concludes with a table that describes all of the variables of interest. The two empirical chapters 
describe the quantitative analyses employed to test the hypothesis presented in this dissertation. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the hypotheses related to the adoption of post-conflict justice as well as the 
mechanism selection. My findings indicate that while there is no statistically significant 
relationship between legal traditions and the initial adoption of post-conflict justice, that states 
do, in fact, have a proclivity for adopting congruent post-conflict justice mechanisms. The final 
empirical chapter illustrates the importance of including legal traditions in the examination of 
post-conflict justice. A survival analysis tests how the adoption of congruent post-conflict justice 
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mechanisms contributes to the broader goal of peace in the post-conflict period. The findings 
indicate that the adoption of congruence PCJMs lead to longer lasting peace than the adoption of 
incongruent PCJMs. In Chapter 7, I present a conclusion describing the limitations of this study 
as well as avenues for future research and policy implications of the findings presented in this 
dissertation.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
Introduction  
 The call for accountability and the end to impunity has become a global norm, and states 
are pressured both directly and indirectly to address past repression and abuse (Sikkink 2011; 
Orentlicher, 2007). Transitional justice has become an essential element in post-conflict 
peacebuilding contexts, and states face not only the decision to adopt transitional justice 
measures but have a variety of mechanisms at their disposal (Teitel 2003; Roht-Arriaza, 2006; 
Skaar & Malca, 2015). As scholars of transitional justice continue to develop the concept 
theoretically, there have been significant advances in the field, and contributions from various 
disciplines have led to a complex discourse of justice in transitional contexts (Skaar & Malca, 
2015).  
 This dissertation contributes to the transitional justice literature by examining the 
transitional justice choices states make and how those choices contribute to the broader goals of 
transitional justice in post-conflict settings. To address these questions, it is necessary to review 
previous work in the field to demonstrate the existing gaps in the literature. First, I present an 
overview of previous work on the choice of states to adopt transitional justice. The next section 
describes what scholars have determined to influence the decision to adopt some transitional 
justice mechanisms over others. The final section of the literature review presents various claims 
on the impact and efficacy of transitional justice related to peace, improvement in human rights, 
and the strengthening of the rule of law in post-conflict and transitional societies.    
I conclude that the consideration of domestic legal traditions in making decisions about 
transitional justice is lacking or at best minimal in the literature. Justice paradigms across 
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different contexts mean that more attention should be paid to local understandings of justice 
when choosing to adopt transitional justice and which mechanisms are adopted. This issue, 
which will be discussed in chapter 3, is further complicated in postcolonial contexts in which 
external legal systems have been adopted or imposed and do not reflect local legal traditions. I 
argue that this consideration or lack thereof, in some cases, ultimately influences how effective 
transitional justice practices are in post-conflict contexts.  
Adopting Transitional Justice 
 Dealing with the legacies of human rights abuses and repression in societies emerging 
from authoritarianism and/or violent conflict has become a norm in recent decades. There are 
international institutions, NGOs, and significant scholarship dedicated to the subject and practice 
of transitional justice. Teitel (2003), for example, describes the current phase of transitional 
justice as the “normalization” of transitional justice. Characterized by the creation and 
establishment of the ICC and the expansion of International Humanitarian Law, Teitel suggests 
that “what was historically viewed as a legal phenomenon associated with extraordinary post-
conflict conditions now increasingly appears to be a reflection of ordinary times” (2003, p. 90). 
Sikkink’s account of human rights trials across the world suggests that the trend away from 
immunity for perpetrators of human rights violations towards accountability for both individuals 
and states has resulted in a ‘justice cascade’ (2011). The development of regional and global 
treaties and conventions dedicated to supporting and monitoring standards for human rights 
indicates the desire to address these issues. The decision to pursue transitional justice and the 
particular shape that it takes in each case is one area that deserves additional attention. While 
there is an increased focus on accountability, at the same time there are calls to end impunity for 
perpetrators, states, and successor regimes that do not seek transitional justice. The absence of 
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transitional justice measures could mean international criticism, formal condemnation from 
international organizations, and pressure via aid conditionality on national governments to act. 
There is also the potential intervention of international institutions such as the ICC, though 
enforcement mechanisms have proven weak and ineffective thus far. For some, these threats may 
be insignificant. For example, the ICC issued arrest warrants for former Sudanese President 
Omar Al Bashir in 2009 and 2010, indicting him for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
genocide. Until his April 2019 ouster by military coup d’état and subsequent house arrest, Al 
Bashir continued to travel freely to many African states as well as Russia and China while 
managing to avoid arrest. Governments that hosted Al Bashir faced international criticism for 
failing to carry out ICC arrest warrants but encountered no material threats.6 In other instances, 
the implementation of transitional justice is a precondition for desired membership in 
intergovernmental organizations such as the European Union as is the case with several Balkan 
states (Spoerri, 2011, Touquet, & Vermeersch, 2016).    
 Many scholars point to the political context of states when looking at the decisions of 
states to adopt transitional justice mechanisms. This is especially prominent in authoritarian 
regimes transitioning to democracy, as “long-standing, institutionalized, and highly repressive 
regimes will effectively constrain the new democratic governments from adopting accountability 
mechanisms” (Olsen et al., 2010, p. 13). Long-standing repressive regimes in which the judicial 
system lacks independence are hard to break out of in a transition to democracy or after violent 
conflict. González-Enriquez, Aguilar, and Barahona de Brito (2001) explain that former long-
 
6 A primary criticism of the ICC is the lack of enforcement mechanisms. State parties are legally bound to the 
provisions outlined in the Rome Statute, specifically Articles 86-87 of the Rome Statute express the duty of member 
states to cooperate with the Court. However, the Rome Statute does not contain specific penalties for member states 
should they fail to cooperate. One exception is cases that are referred through the United Nations Security Council. 
In such an instance, the ICC may refer the lack of cooperation back to the Security Council. The overall lack of 
enforcement mechanisms highlight a major weakness of the ICC. 
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standing authoritarian regimes that were highly institutionalized face significant difficulties in 
carrying out accountability measures in their new democratic systems. The public has been 
socialized under the repressive regime, and many in positions of power will feel a sense of 
loyalty to the old regime. 
Further, any perceived successes of the old regime related to the economy or past conflict 
contribute to the “residual legitimacy” of the authoritarian state (González-Enriquez et al., 2001, 
p. 309). Huyse (1995) finds that in cases of post-communist transitions, political elites are 
hindered by political constraints. For example, to purge all members of the previous regime or 
party along with their collaborators could prove detrimental to the development of new 
institutions. Transitions that occur by compromise or negotiated settlement can constrain new 
political elites by trading punishments for pardons in order to ensure the previous regime will 
step aside or ensure a peaceful transition of power.    
 Some scholars pay closer attention to the extent of repression in authoritarian regimes to 
explain the adoption of transitional justice, arguing that the greater the repression, the more 
likely successor regimes will seek transitional justice mechanisms (Nino 1996; Huyse 1995). 
There is some evidence that high levels of repression by the old regime motivates groups like 
survivors or civil society groups to mobilize for transitional justice efforts (Olsen et al., 2010). 
The mobilization of civil society groups and the inclusion of international nongovernmental 
organizations result in increased calls for accountability for past abuses.    
 In addition to political constraints facing states in transition, economic constraints are 
also factored into the decision to adopt transitional justice, after all, “justice is not cheap” as 
noted by former ICTY prosecutor, Carla del Ponte (Integrated Regional Information Networks, 
2006, p. 23). The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia operated on a 
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budget of $179,998,600.00 in 2014-2015. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda cost 
around two billion dollars during the 20 years of its operation. This was at the time the court 
concluded its work before transitioning to the International Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals.7 
These only reflect the operating costs of the courts. In other cases in which reparations are paid 
to victims, costs can be astronomical, especially for states that have suffered under repressive 
regimes or have been impacted by violent conflict. For example, South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) operated on an annual budget of $18 million USD from 1995 
to 2002. One of the recommendations of the TRC was reparations in the amount of $3,500 USD 
to each victim or family for six years (USIP, 1995). The same USIP summary states that 
approximately 21,000 victims provided testimony to the TRC. If each of those individuals were 
entitled to the recommended reparations over a course of six years, the state would spend 
approximately $441,000,000.00 on reparations to victims. In states where poverty and 
unemployment are significant challenges, the pursuit of accountability measures may be too high 
a cost for justice (Elster, 2004).   
 International factors also play a part in the decision to adopt transitional justice. Many of 
the most widely recognized mechanisms for transitional justice are international ad hoc tribunals 
such as the ones for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The establishment of the International 
Criminal Court in 2002 is one example of the extent to which states accept the idea of 
accountability for perpetrators. The United Nations has sponsored truth commissions in Latin 
America, assists the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), and has 
supported efforts in Timor-Leste, to name a few examples. Additionally, international non-
 
7 The International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals was established in 2010 to complete the remaining 
functions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and The International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda. Residual functions include appeals, oversight of sentencing, and remaining trial work. The Mechanism 
will continue to shrink and size and function as work is completed.  
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governmental organizations (INGOs), such as the International Center for Transitional Justice 
(ICTJ), work not only to advance the cause of transitional justice but also to fight impunity by 
assisting and advising stakeholders in the transitional justice process.  
        More recently, Reiter, Olsen, and Payne (2013) examine various factors that lead to the 
adoption of different transitional justice mechanisms. Focusing their study on transitional justice 
in light of civil wars, they hypothesize that factors such as conflict severity, duration, 
termination, and international intervention are more or less likely to lead to the adoption of a 
specific method of transitional justice. They find that amnesties are the most widely used 
transitional justice mechanism and that deadlier conflicts are more likely to result in a trial. 
However, they find little support for the effect of mechanism choice on conflict recurrence.  This 
is an important contribution to the examination of what choices states make regarding 
transitional justice mechanisms. This dissertation argues for the inclusion of domestic legal 
tradition as an additional explanatory variable when considering appropriate and effective post-
conflict justice choices.  
Choosing Mechanisms for Transitional Justice 
 One significant question in the transitional justice literature is which mechanisms for 
justice do states utilize? As there are a variety of options to choose from, states must decide 
which mechanism or combination of mechanisms will best serve their desired goals in the post-
transition or post-conflict period. Much like the decision to adopt transitional justice, there are 
several factors that can influence which mechanism is ultimately pursued.  
 Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003) suggest that three logics of action determine how states 
make decisions on which transitional justice mechanism they adopt. The logic of 
appropriateness, consequence, and emotion all contribute to this decision making. However, it is 
POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE AND LEGAL TRADITIONS 26 
 
the logic of consequence that is the most significant and acts as a deterrent to future atrocities. As 
the authors point out regarding the logic of consequence, “decisions about prosecution should be 
weighed in light of their effects on the strengthening of impartial, law-abiding state institutions” 
(Snyder & Vinjamuri, 2003, p. 14). Specifically, trials signal accountability, strengthen rule of 
law and emphasize guilt (Snyder & Vinjamuri, 2003). Ultimately, Snyder and Vinjamuri find 
that trials can contribute to the termination of human rights abuses when there is already in place 
a strong domestic judicial system and that truth commissions are less effective than proponents 
may have suggested. Finally, amnesty, while quite controversial, can set the stage for peace, but 
requires significant backing from strong institutions (2003, pp. 19-20).  
 When considering the selection of transitional justice in post-conflict settings, 
DeTommaso, Schulz, & Lem, 2017 find that conflict termination characteristics influence 
transitional justice mechanisms. For example, conflicts that end by negotiated settlement are 
more likely to seek mechanisms that emphasize restorative justice such as truth commissions, 
reparations, and amnesties. Further, they conclude that UN intervention plays a significant role in 
the post-conflict period as they observe an increased frequency in the utilization of transitional 
justice mechanisms (DeTommaso et al., 2017). 
 While some studies emphasize specific mechanisms, others simply offer thoughts on 
additional considerations when making transitional justice choices (Zartner, 2012). Zvobgo 
(2019) examines the role of transnational advocacy networks in the adoption of truth 
commissions, finding that truth commissions are more likely to be adopted where there is a 
strong domestic civil society with access to their international counterparts in international 
nongovernmental organizations. This relationship encourages truth commissions by leveraging 
both information and moral authority through “naming and shaming” (Zvobgo, 2019).  
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 Other examinations of transitional justice choices look deeper to the institutional design 
of specific mechanisms. For example, Stahn (2005) emphasizes that while there is no one-size-
fits-all approach to transitional justice, rarely are there situations that are beyond the existing 
toolbox of mechanisms. Instead, a consideration of how to best design existing mechanisms to 
meet the needs of specific contexts may better serve the aims of transitional justice. Specifically, 
Stahn suggests that domestic and international approaches to transitional justice may 
complement one another if designed correctly; domestic approaches should be flexible enough to 
allow international approaches to fill in gaps in capacity while international approaches should 
be mindful of local needs and ownership in the transitional justice process (2005).  
 While many scholars note that one-size-fits-all transitional justice policies are ill-
conceived and instead should be context-dependent, the fact remains that many transitional 
justice policies are transferred or transplanted from one experience to another. Kritz (2009, p. 14) 
suggests that a “government’s decision to pursue a particular mechanism often depends less on 
well-grounded and proven policy considerations than on whether the junior staff member writing 
the policy has some experience with the South African TRC or another transitional justice 
process.” Muvingi (2016) examines the powerful role that transitional justice donors play in 
shaping post-conflict justice practices. Despite the contextual nature of transitional justice, 
“invariably the local is positioned as subservient to international norms and standards” to attract 
investment to support transitional justice practices (Muvingi, 2016, p. 10).  
 Global versus local justice debates in transitional justice also addresses the issue of 
mechanism choice, though often framed through an evaluative lens of the process in question. 
The transitional justice toolbox that has been developed and implemented by Western states does 
not necessarily translate well on the ground. Many scholars argue for increased attention to local 
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practices of justice and reconciliation (Millar 2011, 2017; Fletcher & Weinstein, 2018). Without 
taking local conceptions of justice into account, the success of a justice process may be at risk. 
For example, Millar (2011, 2011b, 2017) assesses the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
Sierra Leone and finds that although truth commissions are practiced across different contexts, 
they are fundamentally built on Western conceptions of justice and reconciliation. As a result, 
the TRC failed the same people it meant to serve. While Millar’s case study of Sierra Leone is 
not representative of every transitional justice process, it does highlight one important concern 
when it comes to selecting transitional justice mechanisms. Transitional justice practitioners and 
policymakers should carefully consider any implicitly held assumptions regarding justice and 
reconciliation when recommending specific justice initiatives.     
 Many scholars are engaging in the so-called “local turn” in conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding (Lederach, 1997; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015). 
Without diminishing the significance of local or customary justice practices, prioritizing needs in 
especially fragile and divided societies is no easy task. Isser (2011) engages with the 
practicalities of justice efforts where there are customary and state-level justice systems at play. 
Noting that it can be remarkably difficult to understand the nuances of local conceptions of 
justice, she argues that legal pluralism “can enable the development of strategies that yield more 
direct and practical benefits for a wider swath of society, while promoting the legitimacy of the 
state” (Isser, 2011, p. 342).   
Impact and Efficacy of Transitional Justice 
Much of the empirical literature tends to emphasize the impact or success of transitional 
justice, asking does transitional justice work? This can be attributed to the fact that transitional 
justice focuses on overcoming the past and moving towards a better future aimed at restoring 
POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE AND LEGAL TRADITIONS 29 
 
dignity to victims, promoting psychological healing, respect for and protection of human rights, 
and the creation of stable and legitimate regimes (Van der Merwe, Baxter, & Chapman, 2009). 
For these reasons, many stakeholders are interested in assessing the efficacy of these efforts. 
More specifically, scholars have posed essential questions regarding the capacity of transitional 
justice to promote peace, human rights, and the rule of law in post-conflict and post-transition 
societies. 
        Individual case studies have been and continue to be a popular method for examining the 
impact of transitional justice mechanisms; results, however, are mixed.  Gibson’s (2004, 2005) 
examination of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and David’s (2006) 
study of lustration policies in Iraq both conclude that these mechanisms do not result in any harm 
to the societies in which they serve. At the same time, they are unable to suggest any positive 
impacts as a result of these efforts. Similarly, examinations of post-war Bosnia find that 
transitional justice mechanisms have an unclear effect or no effect, in the aftermath of the 
conflict (Mayer-Rieckh, 2007; Meernik, 2005). These studies examine lustration policies and the 
criminal trials from the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) respectively. 
Lustration policies implemented after the Dayton Accords seemed to result in some 
improvements in police performance and public confidence in the judicial system, but it is 
unclear whether or not this was the result of lustration policies or international pressure and 
involvement in the peacebuilding process (Mayer-Rieckh, 2007). Meernik (2005) finds that the 
ICTY trials had no statistically significant impact on peace in post-war Bosnia. These findings 
do not promote much confidence in the transitional justice process or the ICTY, which has been 
operating for over 20 years. 
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        Empirical analyses that move beyond single case studies towards comparative case 
studies seem to find greater positive effects of transitional justice mechanisms. Examinations of 
the ICTY, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and hybrid trials in Timor-Leste 
and Sierra Leone have found more encouraging results. Akhavan (2001, p. 9) concludes that the 
tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda have allowed for the emergence of more moderate political 
leaders who support “multiethnic coexistence and nonviolent democratic process[es],” while at 
the same time delegitimizing former leaders responsible for violence and conflict. Stromseth, 
Wippman, and Brooks (2006) also find that international tribunals and mixed or hybrid trials 
contribute to discrediting and marginalizing former leaders. 
        Several studies (Long & Brecke, 2003; Kenney & Spears, 2005; Sikkink & Walling, 
2007) demonstrate a positive effect of truth commissions or public truth-telling on peace and 
reconciliation and strength of democracy. Each of these studies focuses primarily, if not 
exclusively, on countries in Latin America. Barahona de Brito, González-Enríquez, and Aguilar 
(2001), on the other hand, do not find any clear evidence of truth commissions supporting 
democratic reforms in transitional states in Latin America, Europe, and South Africa. 
        While there is no shortage of single, comparative, or even multiple case studies that 
examine the impact and efficacy of transitional justice mechanisms, large N analyses are rare. 
Only recently have scholars begun moving towards more quantitative and data-driven 
examinations of transitional justice. Kim and Sikkink (2007) ask whether holding human rights 
trials after a transition will lead to an improvement in human rights practices. Their findings 
suggest that both trials and truth commissions have a positive impact on human rights practices. 
Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003) examine the impact of trials, truth commissions, and amnesties on 
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in 32 cases of post-conflict justice. Their findings 
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suggest that amnesties, when applied appropriately, are the most successful “strategy for justice” 
as very few lasting peace settlements implemented trials or truth commissions. These 
mechanisms seemed only to be marginally successful when used in conjunction with other 
mechanisms such as amnesties. 
 Overall, the literature suggests that criminal trials in post-conflict and political transitions 
have a positive effect on the status of human rights while also delegitimizing leaders of the 
former regime. Trials provide punishment and accountability for perpetrators. In many systems, 
this is the norm for dealing with those who break the law and commit heinous acts. Trials can 
instill a sense of trust in the legal institutions of the state by reinforcing and ensuring the rule of 
law in post-conflict or post-authoritarian states (Teitel 2000; McAdams 1997; Mendez 1997). 
The high visibility of trials can have a preventative effect on future violations of human rights 
when “leaders engage in some form of rational cost-benefit calculation, the threat of punishment 
can increase the costs of a policy that is criminal under international law (Akhavan, 2001, p. 12). 
Trials or tribunals can discredit or marginalize leaders seeking to capitalize on existing socio-
ethnic conflicts and, as such would want to avoid any stigma that may threaten their future power 
(Akhavan, 2001). Some scholars suggest that trials have a positive effect on democracy because 
they fulfill their obligations to seek accountability for the victims of atrocities and society 
(Méndez, 1997). Further, trials discourage victims’ groups from exacting revenge as justice is 
being pursued through a legal method (Akhavan, 2001).  
 While there seems to be broad support for criminal trials or tribunals, some scholars 
identify the limitations of trials. Fletcher and Weinstein (2002) point out that there are several 
groups of people that are largely ignored through the criminal trial practice in transitional justice 
settings. These include unindicted perpetrators, community members who profited from the 
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event(s) in question (either directly or indirectly), other states that may have contributed to the 
violence in question either directly or by “acts of omission,” and bystanders who may not have 
actively participated, but who also made no active effort to intervene (p. 579). All of these 
groups of people contribute to what the authors refer to as “social breakdown.” As there is no 
means by which to respond to how these “innocent bystanders” contributed to the events, the 
authors suggest that trials on their own are insufficient. They must go hand-in-hand with other 
capacity-building measures such as building rule of law, economic development, and other 
reform to achieve social reconstruction (Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002). Meernik, Nichols, and 
King (2010) explore the impact of trials on peace in post-civil war states by addressing the 
competing claims that trials undermine peace and governance versus trials have positive benefits.  
 Huntington (1993, p. 231), one of the earliest opponents of trials in the third wave 
transitional justice period, argued that the costs of trials would outweigh any benefits, claiming 
that justice is a threat to democracy in transitional contexts and could lead to military coups. In 
the former communist states, for example, the extent to which people accommodated or 
collaborated with the old regime was well documented by secret police or the state security 
apparatus. Because the regime was so pervasive, there was a real fear that the disclosure of these 
files, in the pursuit of justice, would result in renewed conflict (Huntington, 1993).  
 While trials are an extremely visible event and often receive media attention, they are 
certainly not the only option for transitional justice. There are many claims for the positive 
impact of truth commissions on democracy. They have become a popular part of transitional 
justice practices and are largely viewed as a key component of the peacebuilding process. 
Mendeloff (2004) explains that truth-telling and truth-seeking, as he refers to it, strengthen 
democracy by promoting justice and the rule of law, settling disputes over history, and creating 
POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE AND LEGAL TRADITIONS 33 
 
consensus over past events. Further, he adds that by creating a historical record and consensus, 
those in power are then free to focus on governance rather than debating past contentious events 
(Mendeloff 2004, p.361).  
 Alternatively, there is some evidence that truth commissions can have a negative or 
negligible impact on peace and democracy. Using the Balkan experience as an example, Subotic 
(2009) suggests that truth commissions can exacerbate existing ethnic divisions, ultimately 
threatening prospects for peace. Olsen et al. (2010) find that truth commissions, when used 
alone, have a negative effect on human rights protections.  
 Reparations have also been shown to have both positive and negative impacts on 
transitional justice outcomes. While they can be symbolic, such as memorials, apologies, and 
commemorations, they can also take on material forms such as monetary payments to victims, 
survivors, and their families. Reparations are often the last implemented mechanism for 
transitional justice and the most under-funded, according to the International Center for 
Transitional Justice (2011). Generally, reparations are seen as having a positive impact by 
strengthening social trust, recognizing victims’ needs, and demonstrating support for ongoing 
societal transformation (deGreiff, 2006; Garcia-Godos & Sriram, 2013). On the other hand, 
reparations, when carried out ineffectively, can have a negative impact on peace and democracy. 
These negative impacts are related to the perceptions of victims and victim’s groups that efforts 
are unjust, insufficient, or delayed (Laplante & Theidon, 2007; Skaar & Malca, 2015).  
    Amnesties are, perhaps, the most controversial transitional justice mechanism. They 
fundamentally contradict the idea that impunity is not an option for the commission of atrocities. 
However, amnesties are the most frequently implemented mechanism in post-conflict situations 
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(Binningsbø et al., 2012). Similar to other transitional justice mechanisms, there are arguments 
both for and against the use of amnesties in light of peace and democracy.  
 Some argue that guaranteeing amnesties for members of the old regime eases the way for 
the transition to democracy and ensures that former political elites will step aside as there is no 
threat of punishment (Huntington, 1993). The possibility of criminal prosecutions may serve as a 
“bargaining chip” in political transitions, and amnesties are the agreement that facilities this 
process (Teitel, 2000, p. 51). Alternatively, allowing impunity through the granting of amnesties 
can undermine democracy and the rule of law (Thoms, Ron, & Paris, 2008).  
 Amnesties can help achieve short-term peace by facilitating cease-fires and getting 
combatants to the negotiating table in the hopes of securing a longer-term peace. Similar to 
Huntington’s (1993) argument, Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003) argue that amnesties provide an 
opportunity to remove those who might spoil peacebuilding prospects: “opportunistic ‘deals with 
the devil’ are at best a first step toward removing spoilers from positions of power so that 
institutional transformation can move forward” (p. 44). Alternatively, allowing for impunity can 
further reinforce victims’ grievances, allowing for renewed conflict. Dancy (2018) finds that the 
timing and framework in which amnesties are granted are important factors in securing peace. 
Amnesties that are embedded in peace agreements and implemented after the end of conflict are 
more effective than amnesties that are granted before the end of hostilities or outside of a broader 
framework for peace. Further, Dancy (2018) finds in cases of serious violations of human rights 
amnesties are ineffective. If anything, these types of amnesties are risky as governments must 
face civilian backlash. 
Lustration policies have also generated mixed results. In Central and Eastern Europe, 
lustration laws were instituted to vet public employees and determine any past collaboration with 
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the communist regime. In one analysis comparing and evaluating the stated aims of lustration 
against actual outcomes, lustration policies were found to have positive effects by preventing 
former regime members from threatening the newly democratic regime (David, 2003). In the 
Iraqi context, lustration policies had harmful effects, resulting in continued conflict and qualified 
personnel shortages to administer key public departments (David, 2006). While arguments in 
favor of lustration policies point to increased trust in public institutions, improved governmental 
performance through accountability, some of the pitfalls of lustration include further entrenching 
division in society through unemployment, collective blame, and “brain drain” in public 
administration when expertise is badly needed (Stan, 2017). Greenstein and Harvey (2017) show 
that lustration policies can contribute to the democratization process by preventing “pre-election 
manipulation” through the removal of old political elites from positions of power and 
minimizing the former regime’s influence, amounting to increased “electoral integrity” in the 
post-transition period.     
Increasingly, scholars are moving towards comprehensive analyses of transitional justice. 
For example, Olsen et al.’s (2010) study of over 900 different mechanisms for transitional justice 
in 161 countries that have adopted transitional justice in the wake of democratic transition asks 
several important questions aimed at the adoption and outcome of transitional justice. This is the 
first study to systematically examine the five main mechanisms for transitional justice: trials, 
truth commissions, amnesties, reparations, and lustration policies. The general findings are that 
mechanisms for transitional justice contribute to improvement in both democracy and human 
rights; however, the impact of specific mechanisms is inconclusive. 
The normative consensus is that transitional justice efforts, when successful, achieve 
desirable goals in line with liberal, democratic ideals: respect for human rights and the rule of 
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law, democratization, as well as peace and reconciliation in societies that were once divided or 
engaged in conflict. Despite the optimism that is commonly associated with transitional justice, 
recent scholarship has looked at the misuse of these justice efforts. The subversion of transitional 
justice can be used to advance political gains of elites or ruling parties and maintain power 
longer (Subotic, 2009; Grodsky, 2010). Loyle and Davenport (2016) refer to this intentional 
misuse of justice efforts as transitional injustice which aims to “promote denial and forgetting, to 
perpetrate violence and armed conflict, and to legitimize authoritarianism while increasing state 
repression” (p. 131).     
The Gap: The Inclusion of Legal Traditions in Choosing Transitional Justice 
Much of the scholarship on transitional justice is concerned with the effectiveness or 
impact of mechanisms for transitional justice, posing the question, “does it work?” The literature 
provides mixed results. One area the literature does not fully address is the choice of transitional 
justice mechanism. A related area that has not been adequately explored is the impact of 
domestic legal traditions on the choice of transitional justice mechanisms. Explorations of why a 
state chooses to adopt a truth commission over an amnesty or holds a criminal trial rather than 
institute reparations are limited in the literature to political, economic, and international 
influences.  
Mechanisms for transitional justice are not automatically adopted by states in the wake of 
conflict or during the peacebuilding process. Olsen et al. explain, “not all countries enjoy the 
freedom from constraints and have the political will to adopt transitional justice” (2010, p. 13). 
Specifically, when referring to political transitions, the legacies of highly repressive regimes do 
not disappear overnight and, as such will have lasting effects in the political and socio-cultural 
realms of life, potentially threatening efforts towards transitional justice. Further, the new regime 
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may be lacking the institutional capacity or legitimacy from citizens to carry out such 
processes.   
Previous studies assume that the decision to adopt transitional justice is a political 
decision that is also affected by economic factors and look at the decision to adopt versus not 
adopt transitional justice, examining the political context in which this decision takes place. 
Historically, transitional justice scholarship has emphasized the transition from authoritarianism 
to democracy, while more recent studies refocus the analysis of transitional justice towards civil 
war and armed conflict. As such, there are a variety of factors that influence the adoption of 
transitional justice: leadership, regime type and duration, degree of repression, conflict intensity, 
and transition type, to name a few. Given that several popular mechanisms for transitional justice 
are largely legal methods (trials, truth commissions) a logical extension is that the institutions, 
ideas, norms, and values of domestic legal systems would influence the adoption of transitional 
justice mechanisms when a state is dealing with a transition from conflict to post-conflict. Non-
legal methods of transitional justice, such as amnesties may also be influenced by norms and 
values associated with justice and reconciliation in a given society.  In this dissertation, I suggest 
that the legal environment in which states operate, or their domestic legal tradition, influence 
whether or not states pursue transitional justice and how states investigate, prosecute, and punish 
violations associated with conflict and whether these mechanisms are successful.  
 The question driving this dissertation is, how do domestic legal systems influence the 
choice to adopt specific transitional justice mechanisms and the efficacy of these mechanisms in 
the post-conflict period? While there are many factors that explain why states choose not only to 
adopt transitional justice, but also which mechanisms they utilize, I propose that domestic legal 
traditions are one explanatory factor for the adoption, choice, and efficacy of transitional justice. 
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Characteristics associated with each of the major legal traditions in the world (civil law, common 
law, Islamic law) should ideally drive states to select a mechanism that is closely aligned with 
their domestic legal practices. There are many reasons why a state would want to adopt a 
mechanism that aligns with their domestic tradition. One reason is that practices that are similar 
to or part of the domestic legal tradition are accepted within a given society; they are perceived 
as being legitimate. Cultural understandings shape conceptions of justice. While Western legal 
traditions often look to specific legal processes and judicial punishment as a means to settle 
conflict, other traditions emphasize ideas such as reconciliation and harmony (Irani & Funk, 
1998; Zartner, 2012). However, states do not always choose methods for transitional justice that 
are aligned with their legal tradition, and herein lies the paradox. 
 Drawing from the literature that examines how domestic legal traditions influence states’ 
behavior in the international arena is an excellent entry point to bridging these literatures and 
better understanding the role of legal tradition in post-conflict justice. Several studies have 
demonstrated that the specific characteristics of legal systems explain how states prefer to settle 
disputes as well as why states make different commitments to international courts and treaties. 
Unique institutional features related to thoroughness of contracts, use of precedent, and the 
importance of keeping promises in legal systems indicate how states express their commitment 
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Powell & Mitchell, 2007).   
 Focusing specifically on the Islamic legal tradition, Powell (2013) shows that there is 
variation the attitudes of Islamic law states (ISL) toward (ICJ); finding that ISL that directly 
incorporate sharia into the national system are less likely to support the ICJ because of the “non-
reliance on Islamic principles” in the Court (p. 208). The ability to undertake dispute resolution 
mechanisms in a manner that matches domestic practices is important to states at the 
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international level. For some Islamic law states, the close connection between Islamic law and 
the Islamic faith is especially significant in their willingness to support or participate in binding 
international dispute resolution forums such as the ICJ and ICC are based on Western legal 
systems. Further, Islamic conceptions of settlement and variation in the extent to which Islamic 
law is implemented speaks to preferences in non-binding dispute resolution practices such as 
negotiations or mediation (Powell, 2020). For example, when it comes to territorial disputes, 
“international nonbinding third-party venues such as mediation and conciliation allow traditional 
Islamic law states to fulfill their preferences by engaging in a brotherly solution approach to 
settlement and by enabling direct reference to sharia in dispute resolution” (Powell, 2015, p. 
803). Chapter 3 will provide a more detailed analysis of how conceptions of justice, settlement, 
and reconciliation inform state behavior through legal traditions.  
 Legal traditions tell us a lot about conceptions of justice and reconciliation in the 
domestic sphere. Distinctions between the restoration of individual rights and reconciliation 
within a fractured society highlight different conceptions of justice (Philpott, 2012). In Western 
traditions, for example, justice emphasizes what is “due” to both the offender and the victim. 
Reconciliatory concepts of justice focus on the restoration of broken relationships towards a 
“state of right relationship” (Philpott 2007, p. 97). While the liberal peace paradigm emphasizes 
demonstrated commitment to upholding human rights through accountability measures (such as 
trials), Philpott suggests that reconciliation as a form of justice is a more holistic approach to the 
restoration of right relationships (2012).                    
The limited, but critical, empirical analyses of the impact of transitional justice 
emphasize strengthening democracy and reducing human rights violations in post-conflict states 
as primary goals of transitional justice. Some studies even ask if there are negative consequences 
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to transitional justice (Gibson, 2004, 2005; David, 2006). I propose considering how the 
selection of a specific mechanism impacts the efficacy of transitional justice. Specifically, I 
expect states that adopt congruent post-conflict justice mechanisms to experience a longer 
duration of peace in the post-conflict period than states that adopt incongruent mechanisms. 
Zartner (2012) suggests that for transitional justice to be successful, more attention should be 
given to “local understandings of law” and “cultural understandings of justice.” Both of these 
concepts are expressed through domestic legal traditions. Thus, the examination of the effect 
domestic legal systems on the adoption and effectiveness of transitional justice is a timely and 
important contribution to the field. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Congruence and Post-Conflict Justice 
Introduction 
 The goal of this chapter is to explain the theoretical link between legal traditions and 
post-conflict justice mechanisms and outcomes using congruence theory to argue that legal 
tradition matters in the adoption of post-conflict justice; both in the decision to adopt transitional 
justice and the choice of mechanism. Further, I argue that states which adopt post-conflict 
measures that are congruent with their domestic tradition will experience more positive results in 
the peacebuilding process and contribute to achieving the goals of transitional justice. I 
hypothesize that legal traditions can give leaders, policy-makers, and other stakeholders in the 
post-conflict process clues about whether or not to adopt transitional justice, which mechanisms 
to implement, and the potential efficacy of various transitional justice mechanisms that are 
available to states. I define the link between legal traditions and their best-fit transitional justice 
mechanism as congruence. I identify congruence by examining the authority patterns of the legal 
traditions of particular country contexts and the distinct goals of the various mechanisms for 
transitional justice.  
 Congruence is broadly defined as agreement or compatibility, or “a condition of broadly 
corresponding to something or being in agreement with it in essentials” (Eckstein, 1997, p. 6). 
For the purposes of this study, congruence refers to the fit between inherent legal principles and 
practices that are held by a group (legal tradition or system) and a process by which justice is 
sought in a post-conflict setting (transitional justice). I argue not only that the importance of 
congruence between tradition and practice has been largely overlooked in the transitional justice 
literature, but also that congruence can help explain why and how states pursue transitional 
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justice. Congruence provides clues to states about transitional justice mechanisms that follow 
similar practices and procedures to the ones in their domestic legal traditions, thus providing a 
degree of certainty in times of transition, which are often defined by uncertainty.  
 This chapter will expand on the existing literature connecting legal traditions to state 
behavior and decision making by examining the role of congruence in transitional justice. Simply 
put, post-conflict or transitional states have congruent or ideal mechanisms for carrying out 
justice based on the principles and practices that constitute their domestic legal tradition. States 
seeking to adopt transitional justice would ideally utilize a mechanism that is closely aligned 
with their domestic legal tradition, as this mechanism reflects preferences and norms related to 
justice. However, states do not always choose transitional justice mechanisms that are congruent 
with their domestic systems, and herein lies the paradox. Zartner (2012, p. 298) suggests that 
when examining transitional justice more attention should be given to “local understandings of 
law” and “cultural understandings of justice.” 
 This chapter will begin with a discussion of congruence theory and several examples of 
past applications of congruence, primarily in the context of cultural values and democratization. 
A brief discussion of comparative legal traditions and the distinction between legal traditions and 
legal systems provide background for an in-depth examination of the major legal traditions in the 
world as well as the application of this concept in recent scholarship. An analysis of the 
interaction between law and culture provides additional context to the inclusion of legal 
traditions in post-conflict justice considerations. Next, the chapter describes retributive and 
restorative approaches to justice, followed by an overview of the post-conflict justice 
mechanisms used in this study. The chapter concludes with an introduction to the hypotheses 
generated from the preceding literature review and theoretical discussion.   
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Congruence Theory, Authority Patterns, and Political Culture 
 Agreement, compatibility, or similarity between objects or ideas all describe congruence. 
Congruence signals a good fit between two or more concepts. First put forth by Harry Eckstein 
in the 1960s, congruence theory was originally an effort to explain democratic stability through 
the relationship between social and political life. Using Norway as a case study, Eckstein (1966) 
proposed that despite the social and political cleavages that might normally result in instability, 
congruence between authority patterns in government and social institutions can result in 
democratic stability. Stability, in Eckstein’s example, refers to a democratic regime that endures 
over a long period, exhibits effective decision-making, and is authentic. In summary, 
governmental performance depends on and is strongly associated with the congruence between 
governmental and social authority patterns (Eckstein, 1966, 1980).  
 Authority patterns.  
Authority patterns are a key element of congruence and refer to asymmetric relations that 
“occur in virtually all human relationships, everywhere and on all social levels” (Eckstein, 1973, 
p.1146). Authority then, “in its broadest and most conventional sense… denote[s] relationships 
of superordination and subordination among individuals in social formations, relationships in 
which some members of the formation take decisions, and others treat the decisions as binding” 
(Eckstein, 1966, p.233). Patterns of authority describe the regular, repeated actions and relations 
to power commonly accepted in all levels of society. According to Eckstein’s definition, 
authority patterns in social relationships do not exist where there are symmetric relationships. 
This is necessary to distinguish from asymmetric relations in which authority patterns provide 
direction for a social unit. Authority patterns do not exist in symmetric relationships because the 
participants in the relationship are on equal footing. In asymmetric relationships there is 
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hierarchy and participants look to those at the top for direction and providing information about 
right and wrong, acceptable and unacceptable behaviors. This is especially true in large social 
units such as the state. Authority patterns contribute to identifying the goals of social units and 
defining the appropriate conduct of its members and their specified and legitimate roles within a 
social group (Eckstein, 1973). This is perhaps best exemplified through the “institutional 
normative order” of law (MacCormick, 2008). MacCormick defines law in this manner as it 
prescribes human behavior under organized authority. Authority is often synonymous with 
political authority and law, as law comprises the system of rules through which authority is 
exerted over a particular group. Individuals that represent the law are believed to be authority 
figures, providing direction for individuals and the group and thus have permission and power to 
monitor and enforce compliance with the law (Eckstein & Gurr, 1975; Eckstein, 1997).  
Discourse on the congruence between the legal tradition and the nature of the human 
being is as old as political philosophy and has always been subject to changes. In ancient Greek 
and medieval times, the individual was seen unfit to make informed and responsible decisions. 
Subordination to a state ruled by a philosopher or clerical class therefore necessary, an idea 
which later experienced a revival under socialism. 
Legal traditions therefore evolved around legal codes that narrowed down individual 
freedoms and were motivated by Christian values. The predominant role of the Church in 
defining legal codes, however, was challenged during enlightenment and increasingly replaced 
by legal codes that were based on rules of reason. While these rules increasingly became more 
secular, the idea that the nature of the human being requires predefined rules persisted. 
While enlightenment changed the nature of civil law in continental Europe, 
enlightenment led to a completely different legal system in England. Because England was the 
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first country to detach itself politically from any control of the Church, individuals became 
considered to be informed and responsible citizens who are best able to present their case in legal 
disputes to a jury, which then will judge based on the evidence presented to it; the common law 
tradition is a bottom up process. 
Islamic law shows many similarities to the spirit of civil law. The way God sees the 
human being plays an important role in formulating legal codes. The emphasis on interpreting 
God’s will accordingly separates the Islamic tradition from today’s Western civil law tradition. 
While both have in common that individual citizens require predefined rules and codes of 
conduct, their concrete shapes today are reflected different evolutionary trajectories. 
 Congruence in the literature.  
A concept employed in the political culture and institutional design literature, congruence 
emphasizes the importance of “fit” between state institutions and the sociocultural setting in 
which politics occur. To better explain the compatibility between government authority and 
social authority, I highlight several studies that consider congruence in different contexts. Dalton 
and Ong (2005) use the World Values Survey to assess whether or not ‘Asian values’ that are 
predominately derived from the Confucian tradition are compatible with democratic values. 
Their study specifically emphasizes cultural values related to authority. This is relevant in the 
Confucian tradition where respect for family and authority is of particular importance, as well as 
where there is an emphasis on the community over individual rights. The results of their analysis 
find that authority pattern norms are not that different from those of Western democracies, 
contradicting the idea that ‘Asian values’ are somehow incongruent with democratic values 
(Dalton & Ong, 2005).  
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 In a later study, Dalton and Shin (2006) utilize congruence to examine democratization 
and economic liberalization in East Asia. Arguing against previous literature claiming again that 
Asian cultural values pose a roadblock to political and economic transformation, the authors 
assess congruence between public values and democratic institutions and market economies 
(Sullivan, 2008). They find that East Asia lacks “broad systemic congruence” as there seems to 
be resistance to democratic development that exists primarily in the political elite rather than 
reflecting broader cultural resistance to the idea (Dalton & Shin, 2006, p. 16). In another study, 
Gaylan (2017) applies congruence to peacebuilding in post-conflict societies arguing that 
institutions and social structures that share patterns of power distribution will be more successful 
in divided societies.  
 Another application of congruence is in political culture theory, in which the central 
thesis is that the political order of a society reflects the prevailing beliefs and values of the 
masses (Welzel & Inglehart, 2008). This is slightly different from the congruence thesis, which 
states that stability is dependent on political authority being consistent with social beliefs about 
authority. Political culture theory emphasizes norms, values, and ideas that comprise the political 
order of the state. The legitimacy of a political system is heavily dependent on the mass beliefs 
of society. That is, there must be shared beliefs and values among citizens about their authority 
patterns for the political order to be considered legitimate. I suggest a similar approach and 
application to post-conflict justice practices; that domestic legal traditions are one reflection of 
shared beliefs and values related to concepts of justice that can provide greater insight to the 
implementation of PCJMs. I also recognize that because this study is a state-level analysis, it 
does not consider variation in beliefs among citizens or various communities within the state, 
rather it assumes that legal traditions permeate the entirety of the state. As this study is a first 
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attempt at the broader question of legal traditions in post-conflict justice, this was a 
methodological choice aimed at generating generalizable results. Future research would certainly 
need to consider variation within the state.     
Comparative Legal Traditions 
The examination of the similarities and differences across legal systems constitutes the 
field of comparative law. The approach to comparative law can be both broad, classifying 
systems into legal families or traditions, and narrow by taking a comparative approach to a 
specific branch of law such as criminal law or constitutional law. The purpose of comparative 
law is not only to develop a greater understanding of how our lives are ordered but also to 
provide greater historical and cultural context to our now globalized world (Menski, 2006; David 
2019). Further, comparative law provides tools to social scientists seeking to understand and 
explain human behavior. The utility in this study is that it provides a key mechanism (and 
primary independent variable) by which to explore one avenue of conflict management.   
Comparative legal studies, as well as more recent scholarship exploring the influence of 
domestic legal systems on state behavior, rely on the broad classification of systems of law. 
Legal system, tradition, and even legal family are all concepts that are deliberated amongst 
scholars and used to operationalize complicated concepts. A legal system, for example, refers to 
“an operating set of legal institutions, procedures, and rules” (Merryman & Pérez-Perdomo, 
2007, p. 1). Legal systems exist not only at the state level, but also at the subnational level such 
as in federal systems. Further, all manner of organizations possess institutionalized rules and 
procedures that comprise a legal system. International conventions and treaties as well as custom 
have also developed into an international legal system. The legal system classification can be a 
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useful analytical tool in some contexts, such as comparing specific laws and statutes or 
understanding variations in how judicial institutions are structured.    
Legal traditions refer to the various ideas, doctrines, and institutions of a state. These 
components endure over time and through political changes. Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo 
provide an often-cited definition of a legal tradition (2007, p. 2):  
it is a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, 
about the role of law in the society and the polity, about the proper organization and 
operation of a legal system… The legal tradition relates the legal system to the culture of 
which it is a partial expression. It puts the legal system into cultural perspective. 
 
The definition incorporates the system into the tradition. Legal systems, then, identify the 
processes and procedures that are utilized to carry out the ideas and doctrines of tradition; it is 
the interpretation and enforcement. Systems allow for changes in these processes and procedures 
as an adaptation to a changing world is often necessary. So while both legal system and legal 
tradition refer to similar concepts, the enduring norms, ideas, and doctrine of legal tradition is 
what is most significant in determining the congruence between domestic legal traditions and 
transitional justice mechanisms. Further, the tradition is the broadest categorization that can be 
used to examine the influence on state behaviors and policies. Comparative legal scholars 
traditionally have emphasized “detailed, historical analysis and descriptions of the characteristics 
of contemporary legal traditions, rather than applying legal tradition as an explanatory variable to 
address empirical questions” (Zartner, 2017, p. 23). For example, Valcke (2004, p. 714) laments 
that “the great bulk of the comparative law scholarship produced over the course of the last 
century indeed consists of cross-jurisdictional catalogues of legal rules on a given topic, the 
larger purpose or direction of which is often unclear.” Other comparative legal scholarship is 
concerned with the translatability or transplantation of law, which is the transfer of rules or laws 
across jurisdictions. This can occur through cooperation or conflict. The European Union is one 
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example in which legal harmonization has been required across national jurisdictions. While 
some have argued that these cooperative arrangements are weakening the boundaries between 
legal traditions in this context, others have argued against this proposition (Legrand, 1996). 
Conflict can also raise the issue of legal transplantation. The spread of the civil and common 
legal traditions was, in part, due to colonization by European powers. In both contexts, the 
translation or interpretation of law is a key issue. Legrand (1997, p. 115) describes the issue of 
interpretation as: 
a subjective product and that subjective product is necessarily, in part at least, a cultural 
product: the interpretation is, in other words, the result of a particular understanding of 
the rule that is conditioned by a series of factors (many of them intangible) which would 
be different if the interpretation had occurred in another place or in another era (for, then, 
different cultural claims would be made on interpreters). 
 
In the context of transitional and post-conflict justice, this issue highlights the need to consider 
interpretations of justice and whether particular mechanisms from the transitional justice toolbox 
may or may not meet those needs. For example, in the wake of a political transition, the structure 
and institutions of the state may change, and with it new laws enacted and new procedures 
instituted. However, changing the normative values and beliefs associated with the law do not 
change as quickly; the spirit of the law and what is deemed appropriate and inappropriate remain 
intact. The ideas, values, and beliefs endure. Thus, in many transitional justice settings where 
there may be regime change from the pre-conflict to the post-conflict setting, the legal system 
and institutions may change, but the legal tradition remains the same. 
 There are important aspects of both legal traditions and legal systems when determining 
congruent transitional justice mechanisms. Mechanisms for transitional justice are certainly the 
enforcement and interpretation of norms, ideas, and doctrines of what justice means in a post-
conflict or transitional period. Given that many of the crimes and issues that necessitate 
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transitional justice in the first place are grave and extraordinary, it is vital to consider what the 
spirit of justice is for various legal traditions around the world. Certainly, murder on a genocidal 
scale is not comparable to a single case of murder. That is to say, the murder of one single person 
is generally accepted to be a horrible act that can, in some cases, result in capital punishment. 
However, instances in which hundreds of thousands of people are murdered and/or subject to 
degrading and inhumane treatment are extraordinary. While many countries have laws 
prohibiting the crime of genocide and have provisions regarding the punishment for such an 
offense, ordinary mechanisms for justice seem insufficient, given the scope and gravity of the 
crime.  
Legal tradition versus legal system 
 Many of the studies on how states are influenced by their domestic legal institutions refer 
to “legal systems.” Further, the concept of a legal system is often used interchangeably with legal 
tradition. In this study, I prefer the use of the term “legal tradition” as more appropriate. Legal 
traditions, again, refer to the various ideas, doctrines, and institutions of a state. These 
components endure over time and through political changes. Zartner (2014, p. 27) describes a 
legal tradition as the “set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature of 
law, the role of law in society and the polity, and the proper organization and operation of a legal 
system in existence within a state.” The definition incorporates the system into the tradition. 
Legal systems, then, identify the processes and procedures that are utilized to carry out the ideas 
and doctrines of tradition; it is the interpretation and enforcement. Systems allow for changes in 
these processes and procedures as adaptation to a changing world is often necessary. So while 
both legal system and legal tradition refer to the same general idea, it is my position that the 
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enduring norms, ideas, and doctrine of legal tradition is what is most significant in determining 
the congruence between domestic legal traditions and transitional justice mechanisms. 
Further, the tradition is the broadest categorization that can be used to examine the 
influence on state behaviors and policies. For example, in the wake of a political transition, the 
structure and institutions of the state may change, and with it new laws enacted and new 
procedures instituted. However, changing the normative values and beliefs associated with law 
does not change as quickly; the spirit of the law and what is deemed appropriated and 
inappropriate remain intact. The ideas, values, and beliefs endure. Thus, in many transitional 
justice settings where there may be regime change from the pre-conflict to the post-conflict 
setting, the legal tradition remains the same. To capture legal tradition in the data, I follow the 
coding established by Mitchell and Powell (2011, p. 21), who describe legal traditions as “a basic 
legal culture that underlies a family of laws.” 
 There are important aspects of both legal traditions and legal systems when determining 
congruent transitional justice mechanisms. Mechanisms for transitional justice are certainly the 
enforcement and interpretation of norms, ideas, and doctrines of what justice means in a post-
conflict or transitional period. Given that many of the crimes and issues that necessitate 
transitional justice in the first place are grave and extraordinary, it is important to consider what 
the spirit of justice is for various legal traditions around the world. Certainly, murder on a 
genocidal scale is not comparable to a single case of murder. That is to say, the murder of one 
single person is generally accepted to be a horrible act that can, in some cases, result in capital 
punishment. However, instances in which hundreds of thousands of people are murdered and/or 
subject to degrading and inhumane treatment are extraordinary. While many countries have laws 
prohibiting the crime of genocide and have provisions regarding the punishment for such an 
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offense, ordinary mechanisms for justice seem insufficient, given the scope and gravity of the 
crime.   
Domestic legal traditions of the world.  
Following Mitchell and Powell (2011), this study limits the scope of examination to 
“major legal traditions,” or legal traditions that have a substantial geographical reach and have 
been long-lasting.8 As such, the three legal traditions of interest are the civil tradition, common 
tradition, and Islamic tradition. Domestic legal traditions encompass the nature of law and its 
implementation within states and are based on the historical and cultural development of the 
state. There are three major legal traditions in the world today: civil law, common law, and 
Islamic law. Although these are the three predominant traditions, many states implement some 
combination of tradition and are described as having mixed traditions. Again, this is due to 
historical interactions among states and peoples over time. Some research programs, such as 
JuriGlobe (2008) identify additional legal traditions, including customary law. Each legal 
tradition has specific characteristics and features that define it from other traditions.  
Civil law tradition.  
The civil legal tradition predates both the common and Islamic traditions and originates 
in the laws of ancient Rome. Similar to its common and Islamic counterparts, the expansion of 
the Roman Empire contributed to the spread of the civil law tradition. The rise and fall of 
empires in the first millennia is linked to the spread of the major legal traditions of the world. 
Found primarily in Europe and Latin America, the civil tradition is the most widespread in the 
world. States have adopted their own versions of the civil tradition over time; however, the basic 
 
8 Powell and Mitchell rely on Badr’s 1978 definition of major legal tradition – “those legal systems whose 
application extended far beyond the confines of their original birth places and whose influence, through reception of 
their principles, techniques or specific provisions has been both widespread in space and enduring in time” (p. 187). 
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principles remain. The main contribution of the civil legal tradition is the codification of law. 
Laws are written out in codified form making them accessible to legal scholars and civilians 
alike.  
Unlike religious traditions, the civil tradition cannot pinpoint its beginning or emergence 
to a singular event, text, or revelation. Early Europeans primarily practiced a chthonic tradition.9 
Over time, the Romans recognized the need for something more to assist in ongoing debates. As 
a result, public participation and institutional frameworks helped gradually develop the roman 
legal tradition (Glenn, 2014).   
 The main feature of civil law is the codification of law. All laws are written into code, 
which then can be referenced as the source of law. Statutory law, or written law, is then the 
primary focus of law, and judges make their decisions based on codes. It should be noted that the 
“rediscovery” of Roman law in Europe during the 12th through 14th centuries  did not fill a legal 
vacuum, rather legal scholars and jurists of the day that were trained in Roman law were able to 
transfer many significant concepts, principles, and institutions to the existing common and 
customary laws (Glendon, Gordon, & Osakwe 1994). After the reception of Roman law into 
these existing systems and the rise of the modern nation-state system in the 16th century, many 
significant legal codes followed that modeled Roman law or were heavily influenced by it. These 
codes existed in Prussia, France, and Germany and their legacies continue to this day. 
 The civil law system is inquisitorial in nature, meaning that investigation of fact is an 
active and essential part of the judicial process. This is different from the adversarial nature of 
 
9 The oldest of all legal traditions, the chthonic tradition simply is the law of the tribe. It is a tradition transmitted 
through memory and orality that emphasizes the sacred character of the cosmos (Glenn 2014). Thus, while even the 
early Romans were Chthonic, the development of the civil law tradition was a slow and developing process. 
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the common law system in which two opposing sides must present evidence in support of their 
respective positions (Merryman & Pérez-Perdomo, 2007). 
Common law tradition.  
The common law tradition originates from the British Isles after the conquest of Britain 
by the Normans in the eleventh century. The common law tradition spread alongside the British 
Empire and today is found in areas that were within the Empire’s sphere of influence. Because 
the reach of the British Empire was so vast at some point, the common legal tradition is the 
second most widespread in the world.   
 Like its continental neighbors in Europe, the British Isles went through a series of legal 
traditions before the birth of the common law tradition (Baker, 2019). The chthonic tradition first 
was the law of the land, followed by Roman law, and then a return to the chthonic tradition again 
(Glenn, 2014). Thus, the common law tradition did not develop in a legal vacuum; there was in 
fact, limited (legal) space for the Normans to initiate change in their new territories. According 
to Glenn (2014), the only means for the Normans to create any type of legal order was through a 
“loyal judiciary” (p. 238). This judiciary could not be comprised of the Norman nobility, as they 
were foreign to the British Isles; additionally, there was no religious tradition from which to 
draw religious scholars or revelation to dictate law. In this case, the judiciary would need to 
come from those who could read, write, and transcribe efficiently - priests. Additionally, a 
literate judiciary could be controlled to some extent, as a paper trail would now exist (Glenn, 
2014).  
A distinguishing feature of the common law system is the principle of precedent or stare 
decisis. Essentially, judges are bound to precedent set in previous cases and decisions. In contrast 
to civil law, common law courts are highly adversarial in nature in that two sides present their 
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case to a judge that is deemed to be neutral (Glenn, 2014). The role of juries varies from country 
to country in the common law tradition. The United States, for example, provides citizens the 
right to a trial by jury in the constitution. Russia introduced juries in the early 1990s for specific 
offenses such as terrorism and armed insurrection (Pashin, 2001). Characterized by an 
independent judiciary, a legal profession, the use of jury trials, and liberty under the rule of law, 
the common law tradition is judge-made law (Carrese, 2003). The common law tradition also 
incorporates custom and legislative decisions, which ultimately create a system that “balances 
continuity and adaptability” (Carrese, 2003, p. 244).   
Islamic law tradition.  
Islamic law, also known as sharia, is inherently religious and coincides with the birth of 
Islam in the Arabian Peninsula in the 7th century. Unlike civil and common traditions, the 
Islamic tradition is bound by the Islamic faith. Islam has the second largest number of adherents 
in the world and is the world’s fastest-growing religion (Lipka & Hackett, 2017). As Islam 
translates to “submission to God” it is not only a religion but also dictates a way of life for its 
believers and thus constitutes a legal tradition. One of the key distinctions of the Islamic legal 
tradition and Islam more generally, is the emphasis on the practice in daily life. It is not enough 
for one to proclaim their belief, but rather adherents must demonstrate practice in their everyday 
life. The emphasis here is not on the correct doctrine but rather on correct action; it is a matter of 
orthopraxy, not orthodoxy (Esposito, 2011, p. 85). Faith and practice are heavily intertwined in 
the Islamic tradition. Therefore Islam incorporates belief, practice, and law into one way of life 
or path. Law in the Islamic tradition does not just represent the difference between right and 
wrong or consequence for wrongdoing, but according to Esposito is the “concrete expression of 
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God’s guidance for humanity” (2011, 92). While religious doctrine plays a role in other legal 
traditions, none are so deeply intertwined than in the Islamic tradition.  
 The development of the Islamic legal tradition began with the revelation to the Prophet 
Muhammad, however, under the various Islamic Caliphates was when it began to take shape. 
First, under the Umayyad Caliphate (661 - 750 AD), the office of qadi or judge was established. 
Qadi were initially used to deal with provincial matters and administration and was also 
responsible for making sure laws were carried out. Additionally, the qadi had significant 
independence as they relied on their personal judgment in addition to local Arab custom and the 
Quran for guidance and decision-making. Over time, a legal code developed; however, it had 
regional variation because of the cultural and geographic diversity of the Caliphate.  
 This diversity drew criticism during the Umayyad Caliphate, as there was a sense that 
Islamic law was too subjective. Critics argued that “if all Muslims were bound to submit and 
carry out God’s law, then Islamic law ought to be defined clearly and more uniformly” (Esposito 
2011, 93). As a result, more inquiry and scholarship developed in the various centers of the 
Caliphate. Great legal scholars of the day began to review existing law, and law centers were 
established throughout the Caliphate. These hubs for the study of law eventually would be the 
source of the different legal schools of thought in the Islamic tradition (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, 
and Hanbali). Each of these schools of thought is named after an influential legal scholar.  
 Following the Umayyad Caliphate, the Abbasids came to power. During the Abbasid 
Caliphate, the Islamic legal tradition began to take on a uniform shape, although significant 
conflict still existed. The Abbasids, being great patrons of the study of law, believed that the 
study of law should be left to jurists and legal scholars, not the government. During this period, 
the principle of community consensus began to emerge as an important characteristic of the 
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Islamic tradition. As scholars and jurists worked to “discover, interpret, and apply God’s will to 
life’s situations,” consensus developed and has continued to this day (Esposito, 2011, p. 94).  
 Despite consensus on some matters, disputes remained over others and between the 
various legal schools of thought. Efforts towards uniformity were challenged, as two dominant 
ideas emerged focused on the role of reason in the Islamic tradition. One side believed that the 
use of reason should be restricted to the traditions of the Prophet, while the other side asserted 
that the right to reason given new and changing social and political contexts.  
 During this period, Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafii emerged and is known as the father of 
classical Islamic jurisprudence. Al-Shafii traveled and studied Islamic law extensively before 
settling in Egypt. Al-Shafii determined that the Quran, Sunna, Ijma, and Qiyas were the sources 
of law in Islam. The Quran and Sunna are the only material sources of law. More importantly, 
the Sunna should be restricted to the Prophet, and his examples are normative, as Muhammad 
was a man who was divinely inspired. Al-Shafii also reinforced the idea of community 
consensus as a source of law by transferring authority for legal interpretation to the community. 
And finally, under Al-Shafii, personal reasoning was also restricted, leaving legal scholars and 
jurists to seek analogy in the Quran and Sunna and using deductive reasoning to apply Islamic 
law to more contemporary situations (Hallaq, 2005).  
 Many of the sources of Islamic law are religious texts. The Quran is the main source of 
law that details the revelations of the Prophet Muhammad over the course of his life. The Quran 
is the formal, written, revelation of God to the Prophet Muhammad. It is the main and most 
important source of Islamic law and the primary religious text of the Islamic faith. Revealed to 
the Prophet Muhammad by the Angel Gabriel starting in the 5th century, the Quran is a guide to 
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the way of life as told through various historical events and prescribes the appropriate conduct 
for the lives of Muslims, including legal matters (Reichel, 2008, p. 125).  
Additionally, the Sunnah constitutes the second major source of law after The Quran 
(Hallaq, 2009). While not contained in a single text that is agreed upon by all Muslims or Islamic 
scholars, the Sunnah contains an account of the life of the Prophet and his companions (Abou El 
Fadl, 2014). It provides a model of life and conduct for followers as Muhammad is thought to be 
the best example for believers. The hadith provides the concrete details of the Sunnah, the 
specific sayings, deeds, and approvals (or disapprovals) of the Prophet Muhammad. Hallaq 
(2009, p. 16) provides an excellent example of how the Sunnah and hadith work together to 
constitute part of the body of Islamic law: 
the Sunna of the Prophet generally promotes the right to private property, but the precise 
nature of this right was not made clear until the pertinent hadiths became known. Thus, 
we learn in one such hadith that when the Prophet once hear that someone had cultivated 
plants on the land of his neighbor without the latter’s knowledge, he said: ‘He who 
plants, without permission, in a lot owned by other people cannot own the crops although 
he is entitled to a wage [for his labor.’ 
 
Because both the Sunnah and hadith were not recorded immediately but transmitted over time, 
the reliability of the sources is of vital importance. As such the reliability can, in part, determine 
the legal applicability or effect. That is to say that a hadith from an unreliable source could not 
be called upon for any legal reasoning. As one can imagine, this contributes to the complex body 
of Islamic law. Khaled Abou El Fadl (2014) notes that “the late documentation of the Sunna 
means that many of the reports attributed to the Prophet are apocryphal or at least are of dubious 
historical authenticity. In fact, one of the most complex disciplines in Islamic jurisprudence is 
one which attempts to differentiate between authentic and inauthentic traditions.”  
Analogical reasoning and judicial consensus comprise other sources of Islamic law. 
Judicial consensus, or ijma, is agreement among Islamic scholars on religious issues. This did 
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not develop as a source of law until after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, as during his 
lifetime, he was able to provide direct guidance on legislative matters (Esposito, 2011, p. 101). In 
classical Islamic jurisprudence, consensus is restricted to legal and religious scholars and 
authorities to guide the Muslim community. The last source of Islamic law is analogical 
reasoning or qiyas. As Islamic law has developed over time, so has humanity. Thus, the other 
sources of Islamic law do not clearly explain nor have provisions for new issues and problems 
that have arisen over time. The purpose of analogical reasoning is to apply a known injunction to 
a new circumstance.  
Together all these sources, as well as the pillars of Islam dictate a way of life for Muslims 
and extend to the administration of the state. While purely Islamic law states are few in the 
international system, the influence of Islamic law extends to many parts of the world in which 
Muslims live. According to Powell (2020, 199) Islamic law states “do not operate in a binary 
manner: Islamic or non-Islamic. Every ILS’ domestic legal system amalgamates religious law 
with secular law in a distinct way.”10 Often one can observe Islamic law having precedent in 
family or personal matters in states where perhaps Islamic law does not administer state 
business. The existence of qadi courts in many areas also demonstrates the significance of 
Islamic law in the world. 11 Powell (2020, p. 108) notes that while the role of qadi began as an 
administrator of law, by “the end of the seventh century, qadis were expected to know the Quran. 
Judgments were directly based on the Quran, traditions of the Prophet, local custom, and, in the 
event of legal lacunae, judicial discretion.” These courts remain a vibrant part of ILS and have 
contributed to the inclusion of local customs to the Islamic legal tradition. Customary practices 
applied as law is permissible in the Islamic tradition so long as it falls within “limits established 
 
10 The term Islamic law states (ILS) is attributable to Powell 2015 and 2020. 
11 Qadi refers to a judge in the Islamic tradition who makes decisions based on the sharia.  
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by God” and is viewed by many ILS “not as separate from sharia, but as a locally acceptable 
variation or usage of sharia” (Powell, 2020 pgs. 116-117). 
 Some applications and interpretations of Islamic law receive much criticism as it relates 
to human rights, the status of women, and democracy. This makes it a ripe study in the wake of 
post-conflict justice as violations of human rights and civil rights are often the major focus in the 
peacebuilding process. Additionally, the treatment of women during conflict and in the post-
conflict period is often an area of major concern. Because of the unique sources of law and the 
fact that Islamic law is bound with the Islamic faith, the comparison to civil and common legal 
traditions is important as much of international law, and post-conflict justice mechanisms are 
based on Western conceptions of justice. Understanding the Islamic perspective would be 
important, especially as many Islamic law states are now facing the decision of how to deal with 
post-conflict justice, specifically the North African and Middle Eastern states that were impacted 
directly by the recent Arab Uprisings.  
The Islamic Conception of Justice 
 The conception of justice in the Islamic tradition deserves special attention when 
comparing transitional or post-conflict justice practices as one of the core arguments of this study 
is that a distinction exists in the way states seek to right the wrongs of armed conflict that is 
rooted in the domestic legal tradition. Khadduri (1984, pp. 1-2) differentiates between positive 
justice in which humankind is capable of determining right action and public order and Divine 
Justice in which a higher power is “invoked to provide either the sources or the basic principles 
of the public order under which a certain standard of justice is established.” In the Islamic 
tradition, Divine or natural justice originates from the revelation of God to the Prophet 
Muhammad and is expressed in the body of Islamic law or sharia. This is not to suggest that 
Christian, Hebrew, or other religious traditions do not recognize a natural justice as some 
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expression of a divine will12. However, the extent to which the conception divine justice has 
developed to “encompass a vast domain of relations and interactions, from taking care of one’s 
body to international law” is a distinguishing feature of the Islamic legal tradition and how this 
manifests in the behavior of states (Kalin, 2010, p. 6).   
 Justice, or adl, is an obligation in the Islamic tradition and is connected both to earthly 
existence, including relations with non-Muslims, and the afterlife (Bassiouni, 2013; Salmi, 
Majul, & Tanham 1998). Faith and law cannot be separated in the Islamic tradition and are, as 
such “the expressions of God’s Will and Justice, but whereas the aim of Religion is to define and 
determine goals – justice and others – the function of Law is to indicate the path…by virtue of 
which God’s Justice and other goals are realized” (Powell, 2015; Khadurri, 1984, p. 135).       
 Domestic legal traditions in the literature.  
Recent scholarship has turned its attention to the impact of the domestic legal traditions 
and systems of states on state behavior in the international arena. There are very few “pure” legal 
systems implemented within states as most employ a mix of the major traditions of the world. 
The unique sources of law within each system influence not only the behavior of states in the 
international system but also the compatibility of different traditions within international law and 
specialized forms of justice, such as transitional justice.  
 Several recent studies explore the role of domestic legal systems in influencing state 
behavior. Domestic legal systems not only influence states’ participation in international 
organizations but also in international courts (Powell & Mitchell, 2007; Mitchell & Powell, 
2011). Specifically, findings suggest that civil law states are more likely to accept the jurisdiction 
 
12 M. Cherif Bassiouni (2014, p. 102) notes that the major prophets of the Abrahamic traditions, Moses, Jesus, and 
Muhammad, were all proponents of justice. However, the Christian and Judaic approaches are framed through 
love and consequence for disobedience respectively. Islam, he states explicitly however, “is essentially about 
justice” (p. 102).    
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of the International Court of Justice, while Islamic law states demonstrate the most durable 
commitments to the court and common law state are the most likely to place reservations of their 
commitments to the court (Powell & Mitchell, 2007). These behaviors are a result of the ideas 
and doctrines of each legal tradition.  
 Civil law states are the most likely to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice primarily because it was designed by civil law states. These states share similar 
institutional features and legal principles. In the Islamic tradition, the principles that promises 
must be kept is vital because God is witness to all contracts (Zahid & Shapiee, 2010). The lack of 
emphasis on the principles of contracting in good faith, or bona fides, and the nature of thorough 
contracting in the common law tradition results in a high number of reservations on the 
commitments common law states make to the Court (Powell & Mitchell, 2007).  
 Legal systems influence the formation of military alliances and ratification of human 
rights treaties (Powell & Staton, 2009; Powell, 2010). Military alliances are created through a 
negotiation process that requires some understanding between contracting parties. Legal systems 
influence how states create and enter into contracts. Powell and Staton (2009, p. 167) find that a 
state’s willingness to violate their obligations under human rights treaties is linked to the 
effectiveness of their domestic legal systems. Specifically, the costs of treaty ratification depend 
on the effectiveness of judicial systems. Strong domestic enforcement of state obligations may 
prevent treaty obligations, but also deters adopting additional behavioral constraints; ultimately, 
“the factor that encourages compliance prevents states from ratifying” (Powell & Staton, 2009, p. 
167). This is significant because, as the authors note, the domestic legal systems are the primary 
enforcement mechanisms of all of the legal obligations of the state.  
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 In another study, domestic legal traditions have been shown to affect how states attempt 
to resolve territorial disputes. Powell and Wiegand (2009) suggest that states prefer to use 
dispute resolution mechanisms that most closely resemble those of the principles and rules that 
are inherent in domestic systems because they are considered more trustworthy and predictable. 
More recently, Zartner explores the role of domestic legal traditions on how states respond to 
international human rights and environmental law. She argues that the cultural and institutional 
characteristics that comprise a state’s legal tradition have both direct and indirect effects on 
states' behavior (Zartner, 2014, p. 9). 
 Each legal tradition has important characteristics and principles that, according to the 
literature, influence state behavior in various situations. Shared or similar legal traditions signal 
common legal language and understandings of relevant legal concepts. These commonalities are, 
in essence, a congruence between authority patterns, which are a factor in how states behave in 
the international system and interact with one another. The primary contribution of this study is 
not only the examination of the role of legal traditions in transitional justice but also the 
application of congruence theory to this field, which to date, has been largely absent from the 
literature.  
Law and Culture 
 The relationship between law and culture is complicated and deserves some attention in 
the larger discussion of the role of legal tradition in transitional justice. Culture is one of the most 
complex concepts to articulate, yet most people have some inherent understanding of what 
comprises culture, whether it be concrete and tangible or abstract. Borofsky, Barth, Shweder, 
Rodseth, and Stolzenberg (2001) observe the complexities in defining culture that there is no 
singular definition that works for everyone and every situation. They suggest that not being 
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bound to a singular definition allows for a broad use of the concept across a variety of 
disciplines. Law, on the other hand, is a much easier concept to grasp. We can point to specific 
codes regarding what is appropriate and what is not; we know we can take legal action when 
necessary. Law is one method in which wrongs, whether by our own doing or that of others, are 
made right. It is a system of justice that regulates human behavior and interaction.  
 Thinking about these two concepts together becomes a more daunting task. Mezey (2001) 
points out that the two ideas appear easier to comprehend when considered in opposition to one 
another. However, law occurs in an “unavoidable social context,” and thus it is critical to analyze 
these concepts as being constitutive of one another (Mezey, 2001, p. 35). Thinking about law as 
culture and culture as law, or the role of legal traditions more specifically, is one way in which 
we can begin to gain a greater understanding of the role of culture and law in the transitional 
justice process.  
 One view is that laws reflect culture and thus enforce the “common decency, propriety 
and morality” of a given culture (Chiu, 2006, p. 232). As a result, the agents of law (judges, 
legislators, enforcement personnel, etc.) are reinforcing culture and tradition, but also giving new 
meaning to culture (and systems) at the same time (Mezey, 2001). Law is a cultural actor in and 
of itself. Not only does law contribute to the production of cultural meaning, but it is also a 
product of the culture in which it is situated. This notion is articulated in the mirror thesis. The 
mirror thesis posits that law is a mirror of society which works to preserve social order 
(Tamanaha, 2001). This idea is no better summarized than by Lawrence Friedman: “Legal 
systems do not float in some cultural void, free of space and time and social context; necessarily, 
they reflect what is happening in their own societies. In the long run, they assume the shape of 
these societies, like a glove that molds itself to the shape of a person’s hand” (1996, p. 72). It 
POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE AND LEGAL TRADITIONS 65 
 
becomes necessary then to begin to think about a synthesis of culture and law when dealing with 
transitional justice. This idea is derived from a constitutive theory of law in which “people create 
meaning as they engage in social practices, and at the same time, the social practices in which 
people engage gain legal meaning and force as they calcify into familiar and repeated forms” 
(Mezey, 2001, p. 149). 
Both law and culture make meaning and reinforce that meaning at the same time. An 
excellent example of this is Moudawana reform in Morocco. Moudawana refers to Moroccan 
personal status law that originates from Islamic law. At the time of Moroccan independence in 
1958, the Moudawana legitimized practices that were oppressive to women.13 After decades of 
calls for reform, in 2004 the parliament ratified a new version of the code under the leadership of 
King Mohammed VI. Under the new personal status code, women possess greater equality in 
both public and private life as many of the previous provisions have been repealed or updated. 
Hanafi (2002, p. 515) describes the novelty of the 2004 code as it “admits the principle of 
equality in marriage and does this by redefining the notion of authority in the family within an 
Islamic framework.”    
It is not sufficient to discuss the law as a singular body. If law and culture are one and the 
same or closely related it is necessary to look beyond law as a whole and dig deeper into the 
differentiation of legal traditions in the world. Zartner (2012) describes legal traditions as “the 
set of deeply-rooted, historical-conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, the role of law in 
society and the polity, and the proper organization and operation of a legal system in existence 
within a state or community” (p. 302). Legal traditions are inherently linked to the cultural 
 
13 Men were permitted to practice polygamy without consent from their wives and could initiate divorce unilaterally 
while at the same time women’s rights to divorce were restricted. Women were legally obligated to obey their 
husbands and required to have approval from their guardian to marry. The Moudawana also limited women’s rights 
to inheritance and child custody (Center for Public Impact, 2016). 
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contexts in which they developed. It is difficult to separate one from the other. However, 
distinguishing among legal traditions in the world allows us to acknowledge law as a common 
feature of all societies and provides a common factor for analysis (Glenn, 2014, p. 3). Examining 
legal systems through a cultural perspective can provide new insights into state behavior and also 
a new basis for comparison.  
 One way in which the analysis can be made is through the examination of legal 
documentation and texts. Rozbicki (2013) describes the necessity of understanding cultural 
contexts that give meaning to legal texts and documents such as constitutions. The disconnect 
between constitutional law and social reality needs to be considered, especially when thinking in 
terms of conflict resolution and post-conflict justice. Not all cultural spaces are the same, and the 
meanings are interpreted differently. The tension between the desire to preserve and the necessity 
to adapt is at the center of culture, law, and conflict. Rozbicki argues that “cultures and 
constitutions share a similar raison d’etre. To operate as engines that organize people’s lives, 
they both depend on imagined reality. They both rest on the fiction that their provisions are 
timeless, stable, true, even absolute” (2013, p. 455). This assumption is false. Culture and law are 
both fluid and adaptive. The relationship between the two is dynamic and interactive; they 
cannot help but change and evolve as their evolution is mutually informed (Mezey, 2001, p. 40).  
 This evolution is well documented in Colonizing Hawai’i: The Cultural Power of Law, in 
which Sally Merry (2000) describes how the incorporation of foreign legal traditions transformed 
the society of Hawai’i in the 19th century. The transplantation (or perhaps the exportation or 
imposition) of law was merely one aspect of the colonization process. This practice continues 
into the contemporary world. As a result, legal systems adapt and change just as the cultures in 
which they are situated adapt and change as the processes of globalization occur.  
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 The intersection of different systems of meaning shape social and political 
transformations. Law is one way in which this process occurs. In the case of Hawai’i, indigenous 
leaders adopted aspects of what was deemed “civilized society” as a strategy to achieve 
legitimacy and autonomy in the international system. Ultimately, it can be argued that the 
incorporation of Western legal traditions paved the way for Hawai’i achieving statehood in the 
United States. Merry (2000) traces the transformation of the legal system and its impact on the 
community, family, and even individual sexuality and morality. Law, she argues, as a potent 
marker of civilization, is a complex set of signs, practices, and bodily management (Merry, 2000, 
p. 8). As these new meanings become reinforced by state institutions they also become part of 
popular consciousness. The sociocultural transformation is two-sided and is dependent on “direct 
imposition of sanctions and on the production of cultural meanings in an authoritative arena” 
(Merry, 2000, p. 17).  
 Merry’s exploration of the legal transformation of Hawai’i provides necessary insight 
into the cultural development of law, specifically in the context of colonization, and as a result, 
speaks to the development of the mixed legal traditions that are so prominent in the world today. 
Perhaps the most significant lesson to be gained here is regarding the transferability of law 
across cultures. Merry points out that law’s transformative power comes from texts; however the 
transferability of legal texts is much easier than their interpretation and administration in a new 
cultural context. This is often a painful, and at times violent, process and is related to the issue of 
concept versus structure in post-conflict justice, which will be discussed in a later section. 
 Zartner (2012) argues that effective post-conflict justice can be more effectively achieved 
by giving due attention to local understandings of law. Just as culture shapes the law, it also 
shapes our conceptions of justice. While Western legal traditions often look to specific legal 
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processes and judicial punishment as a means to settle conflict, other legal traditions emphasize 
ideas such as reconciliation and harmony (Irani & Funk, 1998; Zartner, 2012). Domestic legal 
traditions then not only shape the mechanisms through which law and justice are applied, but 
also the cultural understandings of what justice is and how it is achieved. This is critical as legal 
systems go beyond the institutions and processes that comprise law but also includes the concept 
of legal culture which is comprised of “social attitudes about law, such as the understanding of 
the purpose of law within a society and the role that law plays in daily life” (Zartner, 2012, p. 
303).  
The cultural role of domestic legal traditions in conflict resolution and transitional 
justice.  
If culture is the lens through which we give meaning and make sense of our surroundings, 
and it is closely related to law and legal traditions, then culture is also applicable to analyzing 
conflict and post-conflict justice. Thus, a greater understanding of other legal systems and the 
inherent cultural values may provide new insight into complex conflict and peacebuilding 
situations. Scholars and practitioners working in the field of post-conflict and transitional justice 
must be especially sensitive to these understandings and be aware of how the framework through 
which others view culture and law may differ from their own understanding.  
 The 20th century witnessed a proliferation in the establishment of international 
organizations and legal institutions, as well as the exportation of Western transitional justice 
strategies. The majority of these institutions were created by Western states and thus are modeled 
after the domestic legal traditions of their creators. As a result, states that employ non-Western 
legal traditions are hesitant to participate in these institutions because of the incongruity with 
their own legal principles and norms (Mitchell & Powell 2011; Powell, 2013). Additionally, as 
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discussed in Chapter 2, the long-term efficacy and impact of Western approaches to transitional 
justice garner mixed results.  
 If we consider transitional justice under the larger umbrella of conflict resolution, Yarn 
(2002) suggests that we have a lot to learn when it comes to exporting conflict resolution, 
specifically regarding the transferability of North American models. Arguably, it is assumed as 
the exporters of conflict resolution models that they are applicable across time and place. 
However, an often-cited criticism of the application of North American models of conflict 
resolution in other parts of the world is the lack of sustainable conflict resolution institutions 
(Yarn, 2002). This is because just as culture cannot be uniformly applied across time and place, 
neither can conflict resolution models. The best advice Yarn gives in this circumstance is to “not 
confuse the concept with structure” especially when it comes to transferability (2002). The 
concept of a third-party intervention can be transferable across cultures, but the structure that it 
takes is very much dependent on the context to which it is being applied. All cultures have some 
mechanisms in place to handle conflict situations, yet they are not defined the same way nor do 
they include the same processes and procedures. Simply put, we need to take culture into 
consideration when attempting to export and implement Western-oriented models of conflict 
resolution.  
 Cultural appropriateness is key in the application or transferability of conflict resolution. 
Conflict resolution practitioners need to keep in mind the lens or framework through which the 
disputing parties perceive conflict (Avruch, 1998).  Not all cultures share the same orientation to 
conflict, and Western and North American practitioners. In some contexts, conflict is a normal 
part of existence and is a healthy part of human interaction, while in other contexts conflict is 
avoided. Cultural appropriateness is dependent on the lens through which conflict is perceived. 
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The ritual of sulh in the Islamic tradition is an excellent example of the role of cultural 
appropriateness in conflict resolution. Sulh acknowledges that conflict is an inherent part of 
human interaction yet seeks reconciliation for the benefit of society. According to Othman 
(2007, p. 65): 
sulh, or amicable settlement, is the ethically and religiously superior way for disputants 
faced with conflict. What is rarely noted is the fact that sulh is a legal instrument intended 
not only for the purpose of private conciliation among individuals and groups in lieu of 
litigation; it is also the procedural option that could be resorted to by a qadi within the 
context of his courtroom, for judges can defer disputants to mediation before trying their 
case or at any stage of trial.   
 
 Beyond the role of culture in the transferability of conflict resolution models and how 
cultural appropriateness impacts sustainability is the specific mechanisms of conflict resolution, 
and more specifically, transitional justice. Some forms of transitional justice may be preferred 
because they are inexpensive, non-binding, and accessible. There may be many people available 
to act as negotiators or mediators. On the other hand, more formal processes may be expensive, 
time-consuming, and “foreign” to a particular culture or situation, especially if imposed by an 
external actor. 
 Transitional justice as a Western concept.  
The origins of contemporary transitional justice are rooted in the post-World War II era 
as the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East; more commonly known as the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals respectively. These 
tribunals convened to try high-ranking military and political officials for war crimes. Both 
tribunals were conducted as criminal prosecutions, a form of legal proceedings found in both 
common and civil law systems. However, long before the wars of the 20th century, transitional 
justice was carried out in ancient Athens. The overthrow of the Athenian democracy by oligarchs 
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in 411 B.C. and the political transitions between democracy and oligarchy that followed marks 
the beginning of transitional justice (Elster, 2004).  
 Transitional justice, as it is known today remains a byproduct of Western legal traditions 
(civil and common law). This is evident not only in the forms transitional justice commonly 
takes but also in how justice is conceived. According to Lambourne (2009, p. 3) “the western, 
liberal tradition of accountability for crimes promotes an adversarial, retributive model of formal 
justice.” Further evidence of this includes ad hoc tribunals and international courts that have 
been established in the last 30 years. The key distinction between Western and non-Western 
systems regarding approaches to transitional and post-conflict justice is between retributive and 
restorative justice. Where Western conceptions of justice tend to focus on retribution or 
proportionate punishment, non-Western systems such as Islamic law emphasize a restorative 
approach aimed at peacebuilding and reconciliation.  
Retributive & Restorative Justice 
Retributive justice emphasizes accountability through punishment. Punishment serves 
several purposes. First, punishment will set right the wrongdoings of the past and restore balance 
where there once was an imbalance (Maiese, 2003). Second, punishments serve to deter future 
transgressions as potential future offenders are dissuaded by fear of punishment. Retributive 
justice focuses on the individual perpetrator. Individuals have violated the laws of the state, and 
thus and criminal offense is considered as such.  
Western conceptions of justice as related to criminal matters often focus on retribution. 
Consider the consequences of breaking the law. One would be subject to the local jurisdiction’s 
procedure for ensuring accountability. In many instances, the authorities would have to establish 
whether the accused is guilty of committing a crime through the collection and presentation of 
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evidence. This may or may not include a trial in which two sides present arguments trying to 
prove guilt or innocence. If an accused is found to be at fault then the system must determine the 
appropriate form of punishment. It is important to emphasize appropriate because one of the core 
principals of retributive justice is punishment in-kind. That is not to imply that legal systems 
inflict the same crime onto the accused. Rather, the idea is that the punishment should be of 
commensurate significance to the committed crime. For example, if one were to break a traffic 
law by running a stop sign, the legal system cannot replicate the breaking of that law as a 
significant punishment, especially if no one was hurt. Rather, the system has established that a 
monetary fine will be adequate restitution and perhaps prevent the offender from running a stop 
sign in the future. In some systems, the crime of murder, however, may warrant capital 
punishment, and the cost to the offender is their very own life. The point is not to inflict more 
suffering than has already been caused, but rather, to establish accountability, deterrence of 
future crime, and ultimately behavior changes.  
Restorative justice emphasizes accountability through repairing harm to both the victim 
and the community. Similarly, crimes are viewed as violations against people and the community 
rather than against the state as in retributive justice. Restorative justice is victim-oriented with 
victims taking an active role in the resolution of the offense. Resolution is achieved through 
direct contact between the offender and the injured parties or community. The late M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, a prominent scholar of international criminal law, noted that “perhaps the most 
important aspect of the sharia, though, is the impulse toward reconciliation” (2014, p. 242). 
Allowing for the participation of all parties, including victims in justice processes, and the use of 
reparations to restore balance and right relationships are all features of restorative justice and are 
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present in the Islamic legal tradition. As such, according to Ammar (2001, p. 178) “restorative 
justice is not alien to Islam and Muslims, neither at the theoretical nor at the practical level.”   
The following section will outline the various post-conflict justice mechanisms, situating 
them in either a retributive or restorative justice paradigm based on the particular goals of each 
mechanism. In the methodology chapter, this distinction will serve as a means for determining 
congruence with legal traditions.   
Goals of Transitional Justice 
The goals of transitional justice are idealistic, broad, and often context dependent (ICTJ). 
Much like the abundance of definitions of the concept of transitional justice, the list of goals is 
lengthy. The goals of transitional justice are both forward and backward-looking, meaning they 
seek to address the needs of victims and establish the truth about past wrongdoings, but 
transitional justice also aims to facilitate a more peaceful future by preventing future abuses and 
promoting reconciliation. Some goals of transitional justice are stated in broad and idealistic 
terms. For example, “restoring dignity to victims” or “hold[ing] perpetrators accountable” (Van 
Der Merwe, Baxter, & Chapman, 2003, p. 3; USIP, 2008). Others provide more concrete and 
measurable goals for transitional justice. Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (2010) emphasize stronger 
democracy, deterrence of future human rights violations, and restitution for victims. The 
International Center for Transitional Justice identifies three constant features of the goals of 
transitional justice regardless of the context. They are 1) recognizing the dignity of individuals, 
2) redressing and acknowledging violations, and 3) preventing future violations (ICTJ). Leebaw 
(2008, p. 117) suggests that “understanding how transitional justice approaches can evolve in 
ways that are responsive to local political context means recognizing that transitions are defined 
by disputes over the values, practices, and memories that will define the ‘local’ or ‘national.’ 
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Linking goals to mechanisms.  
States must consider several factors when determining which mechanism(s) for 
transitional justice will be most appropriate and effective. One factor is which goal(s) a particular 
mechanism is best suited to achieve. For example, an amnesty policy would not be a good option 
if individual accountability was desired for a particular incident and there were small number of 
perpetrators. An amnesty policy may be a viable option if there is an immediate need to end 
violent and widespread conflict. 
Criminal trials.  
Criminal trials or prosecutions are perhaps the most commonly understood and easily 
recognizable mechanism for post-conflict justice. However, there is variation in the structure, 
procedures, and roles of the actors in trials across legal traditions. Criminal trials are a form of 
retributive justice that emphasizes resolving an accusation of a crime and the punishment of the 
offender. The outcome of trials results in finding that the accused is guilty of the commission of 
a crime or exonerates the accused. In an ideal case, if found guilty, punishment is determined and 
implemented that is proportionate to the crime; retributive justice reflects the notion that 
perpetrators should get what they deserve. This is not to be confused with the idea of vengeance, 
which is provoked by anger, but rather it is reflective of the notion that it is morally good for 
punishment to be handed down from bodies that we entrust to serve justice. It is generally agreed 
that “formal institutions with trained judiciaries are best equipped to carry out just retribution” 
(Maiese 2004).  
Criminal trials or prosecutions are aimed at direct individual responsibility for criminal 
actions during a conflict. This is often the most expensive mechanism for transitional justice, as 
trials require lengthy investigations, analysis, and experts with knowledge of detailed rules of 
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court procedure and evidence. Trials require political commitment to sustain the duration of the 
investigation and proceedings that can be challenging, depending on the political context. 
Further, prosecutions require credible courts, meaning no sham trials. If the national courts are 
unable or unwilling to hold criminal prosecutions, there are international or hybrid options for 
states. Trials can do little in the way of preventing future abuses unless viewed as a deterrent 
mechanism. Although, one could argue that these trials do little for effective deterrence if they 
take a long time to implement. However, legitimate criminal prosecutions that are not sham trials 
or a form of victor’s justice can serve as a signal about acceptable and unacceptable behavior. It 
is also important to note that trials focus on the perpetrators rather than the victims, whose 
primary role is to serve as a witness and provide testimony. In the context of transitional justice, 
this may not meet the goal of acknowledging the suffering of the victims or restoring their 
dignity.  
War crimes trials or tribunals are specifically for individuals charged with violating laws 
of war and breaching international norms during periods of armed conflict. Violations of the 
laws of war and the commission of international crimes are considered especially heinous 
because of the scope and gravity of the crimes. Consider the act of homicide in which one person 
kills another, a serious violation of human life and in many circumstances, a criminal act. The act 
and crime of genocide is the destruction (or intent to destroy) an entire people and their way of 
life has a much larger scope and has long-lasting effects on entire communities.   
The common nature of trials within domestic jurisdictions and the increase in the number 
of criminal trials and ad hoc tribunals to address conflict-related injustices over the course of the 
20th century culminated in the establishment of a permanent court dedicated to international 
criminal law. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was established in 
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2002 and has jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression. 
The ICC is tasked with prosecuting individuals for violating international criminal law and 
utilizes trials as a mechanism to hold perpetrators accountable. The Court operates on the 
principle of complementarity; it does not have automatic jurisdiction over all international 
crimes.14 Situations must meet a high threshold to fall under the jurisdiction of the Court. This 
allows national jurisdictions to maintain their ability and right to deal with these crimes first.   
Criminal trials or prosecutions are often the most expensive mechanism for transitional 
justice as trials require lengthy investigations, analysis, and experts with knowledge of detailed 
rules of court procedure and evidence. Trials require political commitment to sustain the duration 
of the investigation and proceedings, which can be challenging, depending on the political 
context. Further, prosecutions require credible courts, meaning no sham trials. If the national 
courts are unable or unwilling to hold criminal prosecutions, there are international or hybrid 
options for states. Trials can do little in the way of preventing future abuses unless viewed as a 
deterrence mechanism. Criminal prosecutions can serve as a signal about acceptable and 
unacceptable behavior. Finally, trials are mainly focused on the perpetrators rather than the 
victims, whose primary role is to serve as a witness and provide testimony. This may not fulfill 
the goals of acknowledging the suffering of victims or restoring their dignity. 
Truth commissions.  
Truth commissions are investigative bodies most suitable for providing a historical record 
and report of past wrongdoings by determining the causes and facts of widespread patterns of 
abuse. Truth commissions generally have a mandate that identifies the conflict and time period to 
 
14 The principle of complementarity guides the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. It acknowledges that 
states and their national jurisdictions have the primary right and responsibility to deal with crimes that would 
otherwise fall under the jurisdiction of the Court. That is, the ICC may only prosecute a case if the state is unable or 
unwilling to do so. Complementarity is one of several jurisdictional standards that the court must consider cases.  
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be investigated and is led by a group of independent experts. During this process all sides of the 
conflict, victims, and perpetrators can provide their account of what happened. In an ideal case, a 
truth commission is perhaps the most accessible mechanism for transitional justice as it 
emphasizes public engagement and can incorporate marginalized groups in the justice process. 
Accessibility and engagement, however, can depend on the mandate of a truth commission, 
which can be limited to specific time periods or crimes. Additional complications can arise when 
multiple jurisdictions are involved. For example, the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission did not have access to the testimony of former President Charles Taylor, who was 
responsible for atrocities in Liberia and neighboring Sierra Leone. Taylor was indicted by the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and found guilty on eleven counts of various war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. Because the Liberian government agreed to turn Taylor over to the 
SCSL, there were significant issues of access to Taylor. Without his testimony to the Liberian 
TRC or access to his testimony from the SCSL, some have argued that Liberian history is 
incomplete and prevents a complete truthful account of the Liberian Civil War (Sirleaf, 2009).      
The ultimate goal of truth commissions is to acknowledge abuse and the suffering of victims in 
an official capacity. As such, truth commissions follow a restorative justice model. While truth 
commissions typically provide a final report and recommendations to prevent future abuse, there 
is little individual responsibility. 
Reparations.  
Reparation or compensation programs can be powerful mechanisms for achieving victim-
oriented goals of transitional justice. Reparations are typically either monetary or in-kind 
compensation for harm to oneself or family member have suffered during the course of a 
conflict. The goal of reparations is to acknowledge harm and restore dignity, and thus reparations 
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follow a restorative justice model. It is also very important to note that in many cases there is no 
payment that can fully compensate for the atrocities experienced by victims and their families. 
Additionally, it is often unrealistic for governments to be able to afford such payments to 
thousands of victims. Beyond monetary compensation, there are other types of reparations that 
can be made including restitution, rehabilitation, and symbolic measures. Some of the challenges 
of reparations include identifying victims (or their survivors) and inadequate resources or 
political support to provide reparations. Overall, reparations can help achieve the victim-oriented 
goals of transitional justice and, ultimately, promote healing and reconciliation. 
Amnesty.  
Amnesties are by far the most frequently used mechanism for transitional justice. From 
the Greek amnestia, or forgetfulness, amnesty is “a pardon extended by the government to a 
group or class of persons, usually for a political offense; the act of a sovereign power officially 
forgiving certain classes of persons who are subject to a trial but have not yet been convicted” 
(Garner & Black 2009, p. 99). At face value, the concept of amnesty raises many questions 
related to justice. Is justice served through pardoning offenders? Amnesties in the aftermath of 
an atrocity raise even bigger questions of peace versus justice. Specifically, that often those 
directly involved in the conflict are establishing the post-conflict political arrangements while 
those who are arguably more invested in peace are excluded from the post-conflict negotiations.  
Freeman (2001) provides a functional definition of amnesty as “an extraordinary legal 
measure whose primary function is to remove the prospect and consequences of criminal liability 
for designated individuals or classes of persons in respect of designated types of offenses 
irrespective of whether the persons concerned have been tried for such offenses in a court of 
law” (13). Amnesties in the wake of human rights crimes and violations are very different from 
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amnesties for lesser crimes. Amnesties can also highlight tensions between national and 
international institutions and normative values.  
Scholars and practitioners are divided on the inclusion of amnesty as a mechanism for 
transitional justice. The United Nations, The International Center for Transitional Justice, and 
The United States Institute for Peace do not specifically include amnesty in the scope of 
transitional justice. Some comprehensive studies (Olsen et al., 2010; Van Der Merwe, Baxter, & 
Chapman, 2009) include amnesties in their evaluation of transitional justice practices. Critics of 
amnesties argue that they protect oppressive regimes (Roht-Arriaza & Mariezcurrena, 2006). 
Others view amnesties as a practical mechanism to neutralize spoilers in the efforts towards 
democratization (Synder & Vinajamuri, 2003). Olsen et al. (2010) suggest that amnesties are a 
form of accountability because "if an amnesty for a crime is issued, the crime must exist" (p.36). 
Amnesties are often used in conjunction with other mechanisms for transitional justice, 
such as truth commissions. In examples like the South African case, a "truth for amnesty" was 
offered to gain cooperation from perpetrators and ultimately uncovering the truth about the 
abuses of the past and "advance the cause of reconciliation" (Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development, Republic of South Africa 1995). Amnesties, then, are primarily 
aimed towards achieving peace rather than justice like other mechanisms for transitional justice. 
Purges and Exiles.  
The removal or exclusion of people from public office that were once linked to or 
directly involved in past abuses or the state apparatus responsible for abuses has multiple names 
in the transitional justice literature. Purges, lustration, and vetting are forms of “personnel 
transitional justice” (Bates, Cinar, & Nalepa 2017). Often treated the same way in the literature, 
they are administrative practices that limit who can hold positions in public offices, be it political 
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office, a military post, or the judiciary. Popularized in the post-communist transitions in Eastern 
Europe in the 1980s and 1990s, the goal of purges and lustration is to restore public trust in state 
institutions through the elimination of perpetrators from positions of power. These administrative 
purges can contribute to the prevention of future abuse and the establishment of accountable 
institutions.  
The practice of purges works directly with the broader transitional justice goal of 
establishing (or re-establishing) a functional government in which citizens not only trust the state 
institutions but also of recognizing that the government exists to serve, not oppress, its people 
(Eisikovits, 2017). Purges lend themselves to these goals by working towards establishing 
legitimacy by removing members of the previous regime and also providing a “psychological 
break with the past and marks a new chapter in the nation’s history” (Brahm, 2004).  
Exiles refer to “forced or voluntary absence from one’s home country” in which 
perpetrators are by default removed from their ability to have any influence in the post-conflict 
period (Binningsbø et al., 2012, p.736). Exiles can be temporary or permanent and often are 
presented as alternatives to more grave punishments. In this study, exiles refer specifically to 
members of the conflict parties. This is an important distinction as many conflicts produce 
refugees or internally displaced persons who are forced from their homes as a result of conflict 
rather than as a means to address past wrongdoings. Considered together, purges and exiles are a 
form of retributive transitional justice specifically deny perpetrators' permission to return to their 
employment or home states.  
Introduction of Hypotheses 
 There are three questions motivating this study: 1) Does the domestic legal tradition of a 
state affect whether transitional justice is used in the post-conflict period? 2) Do domestic legal 
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traditions influence the choice of transitional justice mechanism(s)? and 3) Does the adoption of 
congruent post-conflict justice mechanisms lead to efficacy, as defined by the duration of peace, 
outcomes in the post-conflict period? By asking what factors can help explain the adoption and 
choice of transitional justice, this study differs from previous studies (Olsen et al., 2010, 2013) in 
that is delves deeper than simply the decision to adopt versus not adopt transitional justice and 
offers a new explanation regarding the type of transitional justice that is utilized. First, I 
hypothesize that the domestic legal tradition influences the decision to pursue transitional justice 
in the post-conflict period. If transitional justice is pursued, I hypothesize that states will adopt 
transitional justice mechanisms that are congruent with their domestic legal traditions.  
 Hypotheses.  
HYPOTHESIS 1: Western legal traditions will be more likely than non-Western systems 
to adopt transitional justice mechanisms in the post-conflict period. 
 Mechanisms for transitional justice are specialized forms of justice. That is to say that 
because the nature of the violations committed is so severe and widespread, the existing justice 
system is not equipped to deal with it adequately. As a result, over time, there have been many 
international and ad hoc bodies such as the ICC, ICTY, and ICTR that were designed to deal 
with issues related to transitional justice. While these mechanisms take place at or are imposed 
by the international community, it points to very important differences between legal traditions 
as many transitional justice mechanisms (at the international level) were born out of civil and 
common law states.  
 The negotiations over the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court are a perfect 
example of the distinction between the Islamic law tradition and Western legal traditions. Arab 
Islamic states presented very specific concerns over issues such as forced pregnancy as being 
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included as a substantive crime under the court’s jurisdiction. During negotiations, Arab states 
and some Catholic countries proposed changing “forced pregnancy” to “forcible impregnation.” 
At face value these do not appear to be all that different. However, the nuances reveal significant 
cultural norms that are then reflected in national law and domestic preferences. Steains (1999) 
explains that the difference between forced pregnancy and forcible impregnation is the “broader 
concept of involving keeping a woman pregnant” versus an act of forcing a woman into 
pregnancy. The proposal was rejected in negotiations but revealed that the “Arab states feared 
that the permanent inclusion of forced pregnancy would force them to adopt national laws 
legalizing abortion” (Roach, 2005, p.148). Challenges such as this help explain why some states 
have ratified the Rome Statute, while others have not. States with a non-Western legal tradition 
are hypothesized to be less likely to adopt transitional justice mechanism as transitional justice 
are by-and-large the product of Western, or civil and common law states. As such, the 
unfamiliarity and lack of legitimacy from citizens will create hesitation to adopt seemingly 
unknown mechanisms for transitional justice in the post-conflict period.  
 HYPOTHESIS 2: States will be more likely to adopt post-conflict justice mechanisms that 
are congruent with their domestic legal tradition. 
 After a state chooses to pursue transitional justice in a post-conflict period, they must 
decide which mechanism or combination of mechanisms is the most appropriate to use. Because 
domestic legal traditions embody the norms, ideas, and values related to justice, it seems that 
states should choose mechanisms that are congruent with their domestic tradition. By selecting 
congruent mechanisms for transitional justice, states have predictability in process, procedure, 
and outcomes and, more importantly wide acceptance from the citizenry. As such, a state 
pursuing transitional justice should ideally choose a mechanism that is congruent with their 
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domestic tradition. A method that is incongruent, on the other hand, may be seen as illegitimate 
and could risk opposition from stakeholders.  
 HYPOTHESIS 3: The adoption of congruent post-conflict justice mechanisms are more 
likely to lead to longer peace. 
 I have chosen the dependent variable of peace duration as the outcome to measure 
efficacy for post-conflict justice. This measure is part of the wide range of goals that transitional 
and post-conflict justice attempts to accomplish in post-conflict societies. There are also 
established measures in the existing transitional justice literature.  
 Post-conflict societies are often left with legacies of authoritarian rule, massive human 
rights violations, and violence. As the goals of transitional justice include respect for and 
protection of human rights and the creation of democratic political order (Van der Merwe et al., 
2009), examining changes in levels of democracy and human rights abuses are measurable ways 
to observe the efficacy of post-conflict justice. An improvement in the level of democracy is 
widely accepted as one of the objectives of transitional justice because often transitional justice 
is taking place in the wake of political repression. Additionally, a reduction in violations of 
human rights may be a sign that accountability of perpetrators through transitional justice is 
deterring future violations and abuses. In recent years, transitional justice has been identified as a 
vital component of the peacebuilding process in post-conflict settings (Zelizer & Oliphant, 
2013). Observing peace duration upon the conclusion of transitional justice will also provide 
insight into the efficacy of transitional justice in the post-conflict period.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter introduced congruence theory to explain the relationship between domestic 
legal traditions and transitional justice. While congruence theory was first used to explain 
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democratic stability in societies with socio-political cleavages, the idea that similar authority 
patterns between legal traditions and transitional justice mechanisms can provide signals for best 
practices is a new approach to post-conflict justice. More specifically, by examining how the 
goals of transitional justice are achieved through the various mechanisms, we can compare them 
to the norms and goals of justice in domestic traditions to see where the best fit occurs. 
 Congruence matters because it identifies the inherent preferences of the state in how to 
pursue justice. Existing literature exploring the connection between domestic systems and how 
states behave in international courts and dispute resolution processes provide further insight into 
the congruence variable. Based on domestic legal traditions, one can predict how different states 
will behave in various situations. The same idea applies here; only it should help guide states 
experiencing a transition in their decision-making process. In a very broad sense, it should help 
states identify which mechanism for transitional justice is right for them. Which mechanism will 
be accepted as legitimate by the population and allow for a more peaceful and ultimately more 
successful transition from conflict to peace and democracy. 
 
  
POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE AND LEGAL TRADITIONS 85 
 
Chapter 4 
Research Design and Methodology 
 Having laid out the conceptual framework for congruence between legal traditions and 
post-conflict justice mechanisms, the following chapter presents the methodology for testing the 
hypotheses derived from the previous discussion. Drawing from both the transitional justice and 
domestic legal tradition literature, this study bridges the gap by acknowledging the importance of 
legal culture in post-conflict scenarios and presents a preliminary test of the role that domestic 
legal traditions play in the post-conflict justice process. While other scholars have acknowledged 
the importance of including legal traditions in post-conflict justice practices, this study is the first 
to directly link traditions to specific PCJMs (Zartner, 2012). The following research questions 
drive this study: 
1. Are states with certain legal traditions more likely to adopt post-conflict justice 
mechanisms in the aftermath of conflict?  
2. Do states adopt post-conflict justice mechanisms that are congruent with their domestic 
legal tradition? 
3. Does the adoption of congruent post-conflict justice mechanisms lead to longer peace in 
the post-conflict period? 
 The general relationship between legal traditions and post-conflict justice practices are 
presented in Figure 4.1 below. Legal traditions are linked to specific post-conflict justice 
mechanisms through either retributive or restorative justice paradigms, specifically, that civil and 
common law traditions emphasize a retributive justice framework that lends itself to trials, 
purges, and exiles. On the other hand, the Islamic legal tradition emphasizes a restorative justice 
framework, which lends itself to truth commissions, reparations, and amnesties. While the figure 
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provides a broad overview of the conceptual framework of this project, more specifically it 
demonstrates the relationship between the key variables in this study and how congruence 
between legal tradition and post-conflict justice mechanisms is determined.     
 
Figure 4.1 Relationship between Legal Tradition and Post-Conflict Justice Mechanisms 
 
Hypotheses 
 There are three hypotheses in this study. The sequencing of the hypotheses is important 
as each hypothesis builds upon the previous. Before testing hypotheses regarding congruence or 
the efficacy of post-conflict justice mechanisms, it is important to ask which states adopt 
transitional justice. Both Teitel (2003) and Sikkink (2011) point to the normalization of PCJ, 
calls for an end to impunity, and regional and global treaties and institutions aimed at 
accountability are evidence of the norm diffusion surrounding transitional justice. While one 
might assume that post-conflict justice is automatic in the wake of conflict and recalling that not 
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all states have the capacity or will to carry out justice mechanisms, this study begins with a basic 
question regarding which states adopt justice mechanisms in the first place. 
 Transitional justice, as it is generally practiced and promoted around the world is derived 
from civil and common legal traditions. Further, permanent international institutions, for 
example the ICC, that were established to ensure accountability and serve as a deterrence 
mechanism for future crimes are based in civil and common legal traditions. The first hypothesis 
is derived as such: 
 Hypothesis 1: States with civil and common legal traditions are more likely to adopt post-
conflict justice mechanisms than states with an Islamic legal tradition.  
 Once states have decided to pursue post-conflict justice, there are a variety of justice 
mechanisms to choose from. How, then, do states determine which mechanism is best suited to 
achieve their justice goals? The preferences expressed by the domestic legal tradition embody 
norms, ideas, and values related to justice. Identifying congruent mechanisms can provide states 
with predictability in process, procedures, and outcomes. As such, states would want to choose 
mechanisms that are congruent with their legal tradition. Incongruous mechanisms may not 
receive support from the population, may be perceived as illegitimate, and could risk opposition 
from stakeholders. Chapter 3 developed an argument for why congruence in post-conflict justice 
is important, but also outlined a congruence matrix based on legal traditions, justice mechanisms, 
and justice paradigms.  
 Hypothesis 2: States will adopt post-conflict justice mechanisms that are congruent with 
their domestic legal tradition. 
 Hypothesis 2a: States with civil and common legal traditions will adopt post-conflict 
justice mechanisms that emphasize retributive justice. 
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 Hypothesis 2b: States with an Islamic legal tradition will adopt post-conflict justice 
mechanisms that emphasize restorative justice.  
 While I present an argument for the consideration of domestic legal traditions in the 
adoption of post-conflict justice and the importance of congruence, a more interesting and 
perhaps important question is why congruence matters at all. The exercise of post-conflict justice 
is aimed at dealing with the past to achieve a more peaceful future. To that end, it is important to 
inquire whether or not implementing congruent post-conflict justice mechanisms is ultimately 
more effective than adopting incongruent mechanisms. Otherwise, the mechanism selection is 
irrelevant. This is not to suggest that congruence is the only relevant factor in the post-conflict 
justice process, but it is certainly worthy of attention and further exploration. To test the efficacy 
of congruence, I hypothesize the following. 
 Hypothesis 3: The adoption of congruent post-conflict justice mechanisms is more likely 
to be effective in the post-conflict period than the adoption of incongruent post-conflict justice 
mechanisms.  
 To measure and test efficacy, I examine the duration of peace in the post-conflict period. 
In cases specifically related to armed conflict, the absence of violence or negative peace is the 
desired outcome, and one would expect a successful post-conflict period to experience an end to 
armed conflict. Comparing the duration of peace (in years) in cases that used congruent PCJMs 
and incongruent PCJMs is one way to measure the influence of legal traditions on post-conflict 
justice as well as the extent to which congruence influences the outcomes of justice mechanisms.   
 Hypothesis 3a: States that adopt congruent post-conflict justice mechanisms are more 
likely to experience a longer duration of peace in the post-conflict period. 
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 Testing the efficacy hypotheses will not only show if congruence has any effect on post-
conflict outcomes, but comparisons can also be made between states that adopt post-conflict 
justice and states that do not. This contributes to the broader transitional justice literature that is 
concerned with whether or not transitional justice works by approaching the question from a 
different perspective. By taking a closer look at the role of legal traditions in transitional justice 
and introducing the congruence variable, this study not only bridges two previously distinct 
literatures, but also presents an innovative approach to broader questions regarding how societies 
come to terms with legacies of conflict and abuse.    
Methodology & Research Design   
Research design: large-N and secondary data analysis. 
This study implements a large-N, secondary data analysis approach using the Post-
Conflict Justice Dataset to test the hypotheses presented (Binningsbø et al., 2012). This research 
design serves several purposes. First, it narrows the scope of the investigation to justice practices 
specifically related to armed conflict. Thus, it allows for a more specific examination of the role 
of legal traditions in the broadening field of transitional justice. Second, this approach 
contributes to the broader post-conflict and transitional justice literature as existing studies 
primarily take a case study approach or examine a single mechanism. In this study, I attempt not 
only to take a broad view of post-conflict justice practices but also assess relationships across a 
variety of mechanisms over time. Third, this large-N approach examines multiple post-conflict 
justice mechanisms. Many existing large-N analyses of transitional justice practices are limited 
in scope to a single mechanism.  
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Description of the data and dependent variables.  
The primary dataset used in this study is the Post-Conflict Justice (PCJ) Dataset, which 
provides information on how countries engaged in conflict have addressed any wrongdoing 
associated with the conflict (Binningsbø et al., 2012). Using the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset to provide information on armed conflicts from 1946 to 2006, the PCJ Dataset then 
offers an overview of six specific justice processes that are often found in post-conflict and 
transitional contexts: trials, truth commissions, amnesties, reparations, purges, and exiles. In the 
first hypothesis, the dependent variable is the existence of any PCJ mechanism. The data 
indicates the presence of any PCJ process using a “1” to show that a PCJ mechanism was 
implemented and a “0” if no mechanism was implemented. The data also includes indicators for 
the presence of each specific PCJM (trials, truth commissions, etc.) and whether it was 
implemented in the post-conflict period. The dependent variable in the second hypothesis is the 
adoption of congruent PCJMs. To determine whether states adopted congruent PCJMs based on 
their domestic legal tradition, I examined only cases in which PCJ was adopted. Cases were then 
coded as congruent or incongruent based on which PCJMs were adopted. For example, civil and 
common law states that adopted trials, purges, exiles, or any combination of the three, were 
coded as congruent. While Islamic law states that adopted truth commission, amnesties, 
reparations, or any combination of the three were coded as congruent. Alternatively, states that 
adopted only incongruent PCJMS or a mixed approach (a combination of congruent and 
incongruent mechanisms) were coded as incongruent. All coding for congruence is dichotomous. 
The data for the third hypothesis is replication data from Loyle and Appel (2018) and is 
also based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and includes many of the same indicators 
from the PCJ Dataset. I included my indicators for legal tradition and congruence to be able to 
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test the effects of congruence on peace duration in the post-conflict period. In hypothesis three, 
the dependent variable is the number of peace years in the post-conflict period, which is 
measured as a continuous variable in years.        
Temporal domain. 
 The temporal domain of this study is 1946 to 2006 and is based on the Post-Conflict 
Justice Dataset. There are two reasons for using this time-period. The first is the availability of 
data. The second is that 1946 marks the first year after the end of World War II, and, more 
importantly, is that it is the beginning of modern approaches to transitional justice. The most 
prominent example is the October 1946 Nuremberg Tribunals, and a lesser-known example is the 
Bucharest People’s Tribunal15. The PCJ Dataset includes any justice processes that have 
occurred within five years of the post-conflict peace period (Binningsbø et al., 2012). For the 
purposes of this study, having 2006 as the last year of observation allows for ample time to 
observe the post-conflict effects of justice mechanisms such as the duration of peace. 
Unit of analysis. 
 The three hypotheses and corresponding data structure for each hypothesis test result in 
different units of analysis. The unit of analysis for the first hypothesis, the adoption hypothesis, 
is the post-conflict peace period. This is a period of time up to five years after the conflict 
termination and is the same as in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and Post-Conflict 
Justice Dataset (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Solenberg, & Strand, 2002; Binningsbø et al., 
2012). The second hypothesis regarding congruence also utilizes the post-conflict peace period 
as the unit of analysis. Because I code post-conflict justice mechanisms as either congruent or 
 
15 The Bucharest People’s Tribunal was one of two post-war tribunals in Romania to try those suspected of war 
crimes under the fascist government of Ion Antonescu. The tribunal was mandated under the armistice agreement 
between Romania and Allied Powers.  
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incongruent based on their implementation as coded in the original dataset, there was no need to 
transform the data to complete this analysis. To test the third hypothesis, I have constructed a 
panel dataset, which uses the state-year as the unit of analysis to test changes in peace duration, 
the dependent variable of interest, over time. 
Primary Independent Variables: Coding Legal Traditions and Congruence 
 This study examines the three major legal traditions of the world and their relation to 
post-conflict justice. Established by Badr (1978, p. 178), for a legal tradition to be considered 
“major” it must be one “whose application extended far beyond the confines of their original 
birth places and whose influence, through reception of their principles, techniques or specific 
provisions has been both widespread in space and enduring in time.” By this standard only the 
civil, common, and Islamic legal traditions qualify as major legal traditions of the world. Glenn’s 
(2014) influential work on legal traditions of the world identifies the Talmudic, Hindu, Asian, 
and Chthonic along with the civil, common, and Islamic traditions. Other scholars identify 
Socialist law as one tradition or legal family. However, these traditions, where still practiced, are 
limited in their influence across space and time. As a preliminary examination of the influence of 
legal traditions on post-conflict justice practices, this study adopts the widely accepted 
convention of “major legal traditions” as a jumping off point. 
To determine legal tradition, I have adopted the Mitchell and Powell (2011) coding, 
following Badr (1978), which classifies states as belonging to either the civil, common, or 
Islamic traditions. While other classifications, such as JuriGlobe, include the customary tradition, 
I exclude this tradition from this analysis for two reasons. First, according to JuriGlobe, there are 
only three customary law monosystems, that is, a political entity that operates strictly under a 
single legal system. Those states/territories are Andorra, Guernsey (UK), and Jersey (UK), none 
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of which are included in the PCJ dataset. Second, all other states that employ customary legal 
systems are mixed with other legal systems. Because customary legal systems vary based on 
“wisdom born of concrete daily experience or more intellectually based on great spiritual or 
philosophical traditions” the variation is much more extensive than the scope of this project, but 
would be one area to expand upon in future research (The University of Ottawa Faculty of Law, 
JuriGlobe, 2008). The Islamic legal tradition is not treated in the same way as customary legal 
traditions in this study, despite having few monosystems (Afghanistan, Maldives, and Saudi 
Arabia). Because the Islamic legal tradition is rooted in the Islamic faith, it serves to unify core 
beliefs across otherwise different states. This is not to ignore the variation among Islamic law 
states. In fact, there is variation within each of the major legal traditions of the world, as well as 
many combinations of legal traditions. The scope of this study necessitates taking broad view of 
legal traditions. To test the hypotheses presented while keeping in line with current literature on 
the role of domestic legal traditions in state behavior, this study is limited to the three major legal 
traditions in the world today.    
 Chapter 3 detailed the rationale for developing a congruence variable to test the 
hypotheses of this study. First, I included dummy variables to indicate the domestic legal 
tradition, collapsing the civil and common tradition into a “western” dummy variable. I then 
created an Islamic dummy variable to indicate legal traditions that are Islamic or have an Islamic 
component. Next, I indicate congruence for each post-conflict justice mechanism based on the 
justice paradigm that is emphasized in each legal tradition. For example, states coded as civil or 
common that also held a trial would be coded as congruent. I repeat this procedure for the 
remaining mechanisms. Cases that implemented multiple PCJMs were only coded as congruent 
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with all of the PCJMs were congruent; cases in which a combination of retributive and 
restorative PCJMs was coded as incongruent.  
 The civil and common legal traditions are collapsed into a single variable for two 
reasons. First, these are considered to be western legal traditions because they originate in states 
in west. Second, they both emphasize a retributive justice approach. Because there is no variation 
on this, I collapse them into a single variable that can be juxtaposed to the Islamic tradition, 
which emphasizes restorative approaches to justice.  
Control variables. 
State age is an important variable as younger states may lack the institutional capacity 
and legitimacy for carrying out transitional justice. Additionally, transitional justice mechanisms 
may be imposed by more powerful states resulting in the use of less congruent mechanisms in 
newer states. State age is measured by the length of time a state has been recognized in the 
international community as found in the Correlates of War project. I expect older states utilize 
more congruent mechanisms of transitional justice as their domestic legal systems should not 
only have institutional capacity but also legitimacy.     
Regime type is important to consider when evaluating post-conflict justice practices. 
Though transitional justice in its early days commonly referred to political transitions from 
authoritarianism to democracy, over time, it has become broader to include transitions from 
armed conflict to peace. Regime type is important to consider, especially as related to religious-
based legal systems like Islamic law states. Many civil and common law states are democracies. 
Democracy is associated with “respect for the judicial process, the rule of law, and consideration 
for constitutional constraints” (Mitchell & Powell, 2011, 118). Alternatively, many Islamic law 
states are authoritarian in nature, yet not all authoritarian states implement Islamic law. States 
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that utilize Islamic law in their national systems represent a variety of government systems from 
republics to constitutional monarchies to absolute monarchies such as Saudi Arabia. Islamic law 
states that operate as presidential or parliamentary republics have often experienced instability, 
alternating between periods of democracy and authoritarian rule. Some examples include 
Pakistan and Egypt. While recognizing that there is variation among political systems within 
autocratic and democratic regimes, to capture regime type I use the Polity IV data which 
measures the extent to which democracy is institutionalized within the state on a scale of -10 to 
10 through political participation, election of executives, and constraints on the executive 
(Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2019). I expect higher Polity scores to be associated with PCJ 
adoption.    
Mechanism senders or whether post-conflict justice mechanisms are imposed from an 
external actor or initiated from within the state could have an important impact on the justice 
process. If there is opposition to the imposing power or the mechanism is not considered 
legitimate by citizens within the state, the process may fail. This information is indicated within 
the PCJ data as the “sender” of each mechanism. The sender can refer to the government or 
official representative of either side of the conflict, both sides of the conflict, an international 
actor, or an “other” category when the previously mentioned options do not apply. This is coded 
as a categorical variable. I expect externally imposed transitional justice mechanisms to be less 
effective than mechanisms initiated from within the state.   
Conflict termination or the mechanism by which the conflict ended is expected to 
influence post-conflict justice practices. Coded as a categorical variable, possible methods for 
conflict termination within the data include victory for one side of the conflict, bargained 
solutions which include peace agreements and ceasefires, and an “other” category that includes 
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low or no conflict activity (Kreutz, 2010, Binningsbø et al., 2012). I expect the conflict 
termination method to influence peace duration if the conflict is terminated through a bargained 
solution or a peace agreement. Specifically, because I expect to find less congruence in cases that 
were terminated through an agreement, negotiations may result in compromises related to justice, 
and there may be greater opportunity for external influence in the overall outcome of the 
solution. I expect there to be little to no effect for conflicts that end by a victory for either side of 
the conflict. Loyle and Appel (2017) find no relationship between conflict termination and peace 
duration. Further, armed conflicts are, more often than not, terminated through a means other 
than victory (Kreutz, 2010).   
Battle deaths are expected to be an important control variable in the adoption of post-
conflict justice mechanisms. Following Lacina and Gleditsch (2005), battle deaths are an 
indicator of conflict intensity and measures soldier and civilian deaths in combat. This is distinct 
from other fatalities related to conflict that may include unorganized violence or increased 
mortality as a result of conflict conditions (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005). I expect conflicts with 
higher numbers of battle deaths to be more likely to adopt post-conflict justice mechanisms than 
conflict with lower battle deaths. A higher number of battle deaths not only indicates increased 
conflict intensity but also has a broader impact on the population as more families suffer losses. 
This could be especially hard if the decedents were the primary wage earner in the home.   
Conflict type is expected to be a significant variable in the adoption of post-conflict 
justice. The data identifies each conflict as either extrasystemic, internal, or internationalized 
internal following the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data. Extrasystemic refers to a conflict 
between a state and non-state group that is located outside of the state territory. Internal conflict 
refers to conflict within a state, and there is no external involvement. Internationalized internal 
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conflicts refer to conflicts that are internal, but there is international involvement. I expect 
internal conflict to be significant in the adoption of post-conflict justice as the repair of fractured 
social relationships and rebuilding trust within society are significant in moving forward from 
conflict.    
Peace agreement and peacekeeping presence are both included as control variables in the 
survival analysis for hypothesis 3. Both of these variables indicate the characteristics of the post-
conflict period. The model takes into account whether or not a peace agreement was part of the 
conflict termination while the peacekeeping presence indicates the presence of peacekeeping 
operations in the post-conflict period. Both variables have been to be significant factors related 
to the duration of peace. I expect both peace agreement and peacekeeping presence to contribute 
to a longer duration of peace in the post-conflict period.    
Power-sharing agreements are another relevant factor to consider in the post-conflict 
period. Power-sharing agreements are used as a tool to in divided societies to achieve political 
stability and reduce violent conflict. Previous studies have shown the use of power-sharing 
arrangements, such as consociationalism, to have a positive effect on peace duration in the post-
conflict period (Hartzell & Hodie, 2003). I expect to find the same in the peace duration model in 
chapter 6.   
Ethnic incompatibility is included as a control variable in the third hypothesis to indicate 
the presence of ethnic issues in the conflict. Following Loyle and Appel (2017), it is coded as a 
binary variable to indicate that the conflict included ethnic issues. Ethnic incompatibility and 
division are related to increased risk for civil conflict and can lead to longer conflicts overall 
(Fearon & Laitin 2003, Collier, Hoeffler, & Soderbom, 2004). I expect the results of the duration 
analysis to show an increased risk for peace failure for conflicts that included an ethnic issue.   
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Models 
 I begin by employing a Chi-square analysis using crosstabs. The crosstab serves several 
purposes. First, it provides a comparison across categorical data that shows the relationship 
between the adoption of post-conflict justice practices and legal traditions. Because both the 
dependent and independent variables of interest in this test are categorical, the Chi-Square tests 
whether there is a statistical relationship between the two. Where the null hypothesis states that 
no relationship exists between the two variables of interest, the Chi-Square will show the 
observed frequency as well as the expected frequency of the relationship between the two 
variables of interest. In this case, the null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the 
adoption of post-conflict justice and legal tradition type. The Chi-Square analysis will test this 
claim to determine if a relationship exists. If the X2 value falls within the rejection region of the 
distribution plot, there would be sufficient evidence to continue with the claim that there is a 
relationship between the adoption of post-conflict justice and legal tradition type.  
 This test is appropriate for the first hypothesis because there is one dependent variable, 
the adoption of post-conflict justice, and the outcome is categorical – yes/adopt or no/adopt. For 
the first hypothesis, I use one predictor – the domestic legal tradition type, which is also a 
categorical variable – civil law, common law, or Islamic law.  
To further test the first hypothesis, I use a logistic regression model to determine if the 
hypothesis holds since the dependent variable (adoption of transitional justice) is binary. The 
predictor is also a categorical variable (legal system type). The logit model estimates the 
probability that adoption of post-conflict justice is determined by the legal tradition. This model 
controls for regime type and region, as I expect there to be a high correlation between these 
variables and legal system as well as transitional justice adoption. Additionally, this model 
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controls for participation in international courts and whether or not the adoption of transitional 
justice was imposed from an external source. These are important factors that point to a state’s 
willingness to participate in transitional justice processes. To better assess the substantive results 
of the model, I also employ predicted probabilities to determine the extent of the effect of 
domestic system type on the adoption of transitional justice.  
 The second hypothesis requires a logistic regression model, as well. In this model, the 
dependent variables are binary indicating whether or not retributive or restorative justice 
mechanisms were implemented in the post-conflict period. In the first model, the variable for 
civil and common legal traditions is the main independent variable of interest, and retributive 
justice is the dependent variable. The model controls for state age, conflict termination via 
victory, and a sender variable indicating whether both sides agreed to the PCJM. I expect each of 
these variables to influence the PCJM choice. In the second model the dependent variable is 
restorative justice, and the independent variable is the indicator for Islamic legal traditions. The 
same control variables are used in both models one and two.  
 The third hypothesis, or the efficacy hypothesis, states that congruence between legal 
tradition and mechanism choice will lead to successful transitional justice outcomes. Given that 
this study utilizes the Post-Conflict Justice data and is examining transitional justice practices 
specifically in instances of armed conflict, the first question one must ask is whether these justice 
mechanisms lead to peace. To test the first efficacy hypothesis, a duration model is appropriate. 
Duration models describe how much time passes between specific events. In this case, I am 
interested in how much time has elapsed since the initial end of the conflict to the next conflict 
outbreak. I hypothesize that the implementation of congruent post-conflict justice mechanisms 
leads to a longer post-conflict peace period. The duration or hazard model will estimate the effect 
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of congruence on the duration of peace. This model estimates the impact of the independent 
variables on the risk that peace will fail during the post-conflict peace period or if that risk is 
lower if congruent mechanisms are used in post-conflict justice efforts. 
Table 4.1   
Description of Variables of Interest  
Variable Description 
Conflict Incompatibility Indicates whether the conflict was over 
government, territory, or both. 
Conflict Type Indicates whether the conflict was 
extrasystemic, internal, or internationalized 
internal 
Post-conflict justice Indicates the total number of post-conflict 
justice mechanisms initiated in the post-
conflict peace period. 
Post-conflict justice dummy Dummy variable indicating the presence of 
post-conflict justice mechanisms in the post-
conflict peace period.  
Trial Dummy variable indicating that a trial was 
initiated in the post-conflict peace period. 
Truth Commission Dummy variable indicating that a truth 
commission was initiated in the post-conflict 
peace period.  
Reparation Dummy variable indicating that reparations 
were initiated in the post-conflict peace 
period. 
Amnesty  Dummy variable indicating that amnesties 
were initiated in the post-conflict peace 
period. 
Purge Dummy variable indicating that purges were 
initiated in the post-conflict peace period. 
Exile Dummy variable indicating that purges were 
initiated in the post-conflict peace period.  
Civil/Common Dummy variable indicating that the legal 
tradition of the state where the conflict is 
occurring is either civil law or common law.  
Islamic Dummy variable indicating that the legal 
tradition of the state where the conflict is 
occurring is Islamic law. 
Congruence Dummy variable indicating that congruent 
post-conflict justice mechanisms were 
adopted in the post-conflict period. 
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State Age Indicates the number of years the state has 
been a member of the international system in 
the episode year.  
Polity2 Combined score indicating the regime type of 
the state.  
Battle death Reports the number of battle-related deaths 
for the conflict episode 
Civil war Dummy variable indicating that the number 
of battle deaths reached a threshold of at least 
1,000.  
Termination Indicates the method of conflict termination 
as victory, bargained solution, or other. 
Retributive Dummy variable indicating that all of the PCJ 
mechanisms employed were retributive (trials, 
purges, exiles).  
Restorative Dummy variable indicating that all of the 
post-conflict justice mechanisms employed 
were restorative (truth commissions, 
reparations, amnesties).  
Peace Agreement Indicates the termination of conflict by a 
peace agreement.  
Peacekeeping Indicates the presence of peacekeepers in the 
post-conflict period. 
Ethnic Incompatibility Dummy variable indicating that the conflict 
included an ethnic incompatibility issue. 
Power Sharing Indicates the implementation of a power 
sharing agreement in the post-conflict period. 
GDP Per Capita Measure of standard of living calculated by 
dividing national gross domestic product by 
total population. 
GDP Per Capita Growth The growth rate of the GDP Per Capita 
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Chapter 5 
Quantitative Analysis Results – Post-Conflict Justice Adoption and Congruence 
 
Introduction  
The following chapter presents the empirical analysis and findings related to the adoption 
of post-conflict justice and congruence between legal traditions and post-conflict justice 
mechanisms. Before presenting the findings, it may be useful to restate the hypotheses generated 
from the literature and theoretical discussions in chapters 2 and 3.  
 In the aftermath of conflict, states are faced with legacies of violence, repression, and 
human rights abuses. Over the past 75 years, transitional or post-conflict justice practices have 
emerged as a regular course of action to help states and their people reckon with the past and live 
in peace. While seeking to address past wrongdoings is viewed as a favorable practice from the 
international community, not all states adopt these practices in the post-conflict period. Which 
states, then, adopt post-conflict justice? Further, which mechanisms do states implement given 
the variety of choices available? This study suggests that domestic legal tradition is an 
overlooked explanatory factor in the adoption of post-conflict justice. Post-conflict justice 
mechanisms, as they are practiced and promoted across the world today, are derived from 
Western legal traditions. This is evident in the establishment of a permanent International 
Criminal Court to prosecute specific conflict-related crimes as well as ad hoc trials and tribunals 
that have been developed for specific conflicts. As such, the first hypothesis states: 
 H1: States with a Western legal tradition (common and civil law traditions) are more 
likely to adopt post-conflict justice mechanisms than states with an Islamic legal tradition. 
 Once states make the decision to pursue post-conflict justice efforts, how do they go 
about it? In the early days of transitional justice, criminal prosecutions were the chosen method. 
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Over time, additional mechanisms such as truth commissions and reparations programs became 
popular. Today the transitional justice toolbox provides several mechanisms that may address 
past wrongdoings. Mechanism choice can be particularly important depending on the specific 
context and overall goals of the post-conflict justice efforts. The domestic legal tradition 
literature tells us that legal tradition matters when it comes to how states behave in the 
international arena, and more importantly, how states prefer to settle their disputes. We can then 
ask what influence legal tradition has on how states pursue post-conflict justice. I suggest that 
states have a preferred or congruent post-conflict justice mechanism based on their domestic 
legal tradition.  
 H2: States will adopt post-conflict justice mechanisms that are congruent with their 
domestic legal tradition.  
 More specifically, it is expected that states with civil and common legal traditions will be 
more likely than states with Islamic legal traditions to adopt retributive post-conflict justice 
mechanisms, while states with Islamic legal traditions will be more likely to than those with civil 
and common legal traditions to adopt restorative post-conflict justice mechanisms.  
Preliminary Data 
 Before proceeding with the empirical analysis and overall findings, it is useful to present 
a general overview of the data and scope of this study. The Post-Conflict Justice Dataset covers 
all armed conflict with at least 25 battle-related deaths between 1946 and 2006 (Binningsbø et 
al., 2012). In total, there are 357 episodes of armed conflict within this period. One hundred 
seventy-three of these conflict episodes saw some post-conflict justice mechanisms implemented 
within the first five-year peace period (Binningsbø et al., 2012). A total of 272 post-conflict 
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justice mechanisms were attempted; two or more mechanisms were attempted in the aftermath 
71 conflict episodes. 
 Amnesties were the most frequently implemented post-conflict justice mechanism during 
the period covered by the data, with a total of 92. Trials and exiles were the next most popular 
mechanisms employed with 78 and 58, respectively. Reparations, purges, and truth commissions 
were implemented the least frequently during post-conflict peace periods. Figure 5.1 presents an 
overview of the frequency with which post-conflict justice mechanisms were implemented.    
Figure 5.1 
Frequency of Post-Conflict Justice Mechanism Attempts, 1946-2006. 
 
 
  The frequency of legal traditions in the world should be noted to better understand the 
context of this study. To reiterate from Chapter 4, I code domestic legal tradition following 
Mitchell and Powell (2011) and Powell (2015) and then combine civil and common legal 
traditions into a single western legal tradition variable. As discussed in Chapter 4, customary 
legal traditions were excluded from this analysis for several reasons. First, there are very few 
states with purely customary legal traditions. Second, the variation among customary legal 
traditions is beyond the scope of this study. Finally, I have adopted legal tradition coding that is 
found in previous studies as an entry point to bringing these previously distinct literatures 
0 20 40 60 80 100
Reparation
Truth Commission
Trial
Purge
Exile
Amnesty
Frequency of PCJM Attempts 
1946-2006
POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE AND LEGAL TRADITIONS 105 
 
together and conducting preliminary analyses of the relationship between legal traditions and 
post-conflict justice practices. One hundred thirteen states are represented in the dataset. 
Seventy-eight of those states is coded as having a Western legal tradition (civil or common law). 
Twenty-one states are Islamic, and 14 states have a mixed legal tradition. Figure 5.2 presents an 
overall view of the frequency of legal traditions represented in the data.  
 
Figure 5.2 
Frequency of Legal Traditions in the World, 1946 – 2006 
 
 
 
 Having looked at both the frequency of legal traditions in the world and which 
mechanisms were most frequently adopted, I now turn to adoption and legal tradition. Western 
legal traditions are by far the most frequently observed legal tradition in the world. It would 
follow that states with Western legal traditions adopt post-conflict justice mechanisms more 
frequently than other legal traditions as there is greater opportunity for adoption. Figure 5.3 
presents the frequency with which the legal traditions contained in this study (Western, Islamic, 
and Mixed) adopt post-conflict justice during the first five years of the post-conflict peace 
period.  
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Figure 5.3 
Frequency of Adoption of Post-Conflict Justice by Legal Tradition, 1946-2006 
 
 
 
 When states adopt post-conflict justice, which mechanisms do they utilize? Do they adopt 
one mechanism or multiple mechanisms? In many instances, post-conflict justice mechanisms 
are not used in isolation. That is, states may employ combination of mechanisms to address the 
aftermath of a conflict. Figure 5.4 shows that the adoption of a single post-conflict justice 
mechanism is more frequent; many states adopt two or more post-conflict justice mechanisms 
after the end of a conflict. 
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Figure 5.4 
Adoption of Multiple Post-Conflict Justice Mechanisms by Legal Tradition 1946 – 2006 
 
 
 
 Because this study is also interested in the choices states make when adopting post-
conflict justice, it is important to note the frequency with which specific post-conflict justice 
mechanisms are adopted by each legal tradition. Figure 5.5 demonstrates that amnesties and 
trials are the most popular choices across both legal traditions of interest. However, it is 
interesting to note that truth commissions have only been implemented in states with western 
legal traditions.  
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Figure 5.5 
Post-Conflict Justice Mechanism Adoption by Legal Tradition, 1946 – 2006 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: Results and Analysis 
Crosstabs & Chi-square 
 I first employ crosstabs to describe the relationship between the adoption of post-conflict 
justice and legal tradition type. Because both variables are categorical, the contingency table 
records the frequency with which each combination of variables occurs. The Chi-square statistic 
determines whether the two variables of interest are independent. The results of the Chi-square, 
as reported in Table 5.1 indicate that the adoption of post-conflict justice and legal traditions are 
not independent of one another. The Pearson Chi-square test statistic is 0.505, and the p-value is 
0.477 which is greater than the significance level of p=0.05. Based on these results, there is 
insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis or suggest that there is a relationship between 
the adoption of post-conflict justice and legal tradition type.  
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Table 5.1 
 
Results of Chi-square Test and Descriptive Statistics for Post-Conflict Justice and Legal 
Tradition 
 Legal Tradition Total   
Presence of 
PCJ 
Islamic Law Civil/Common 
Law 
   
No PCJ 35 (32.4) 118 (120.6) 153   
PCJ Present 34 (36.6) 139 (136.4) 173   
Total 69 257    
Note. 2 = 0.505, Numbers in parentheses indicate expected values.  
 
Logistic Regression 
 To further test H1, I use logistic regression to model the probability that states will adopt 
post-conflict justice while observing other characteristics related to the state and conflict 
episodes. Logistic regression is the most appropriate test when the dependent variable of interest 
is binary. In the first hypothesis, I am interested in the adoption of post-conflict justice, which 
has two possible outcomes: the adoption of PCJ or no PCJ. In this model, I control for the 
following variables: number of battle-related deaths, regime type, and the type of conflict. I 
expect higher numbers of battle-related deaths to increase the probability of post-conflict justice 
adoption. I also expect internal conflicts to increase the probability of post-conflict justice rather 
than extrasystemic or internationalized internal conflicts. Finally, I expect the regime type to 
influence the adoption of post-conflict justice. Specifically, that states with democratic regimes 
will have a higher probability of adoption post-conflict justice than autocratic regimes.  
 The results of model 1, as reported in Table 5.2, are consistent with the crosstabs analysis 
in testing the relationship between PCJ adoption and legal tradition type. The p-value of 0.336 is 
statistically insignificant. In this model, only regime type is statistically significant, with a p-
value of 0.005. However, the odds ratio for regime type is 0.936 indicating that for every 1-unit 
increase in the Polity2 score, the odds of adopting post-conflict justice decrease by 0.07. In other 
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words, the more democratic a regime is, the odds of adopting transitional justice decrease by a 
factor of 0.07. While initially this appears to be counter-intuitive, it may indicate that 
democracies have less of a need to adopt post-conflict justice, as there are generally stronger 
institutions, respect for the rule of law, higher capacity for regular justice institutions to deal with 
conflict-related transgressions. 
Table 5.2 
Logistic Regression Results – Adoption of PCJ for Civil/Common Law States 
     
Variables B Se Z Ratio Odds 
Civil/Common 
Law 
0.336 .527 0.96 1.426 
Battle Deaths 0.537 1.75e-06 0.62 1.00 
Democracy 0.005** .0217 -2.82 0.936 
Internal 
Conflict 
0.381 .234 -0.88 0.764 
Constant 0.981 .391 -0.02 0.990 
     
Model X2 = 11.44    
Pseudo R2 = 0.039    
N =  323    
Notes: *p< .05, **p< .01, ***p< .001 
Hypothesis 2 
Crosstabs & Chi-square 
 The crosstabs analysis for H2 tests the relationship between the adoption of congruent 
post-conflict justice mechanisms and legal tradition type. That is when states adopt PCJ, are they 
adopting mechanisms that are congruent with their legal tradition? The results of the Chi-square 
tests indicate that there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis and move forward 
with the claim that there is a relationship between congruence and legal tradition. The Pearson 
Chi-square test statistic for the first analysis is 1.001, and the p-value is 0.317 as presented in 
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Table 5.3. In the second analysis, presented in Table 5.4, the Pearson Chi-square test statistic is 
0.767, and the p-value is 0.381.   
Table 5.3 
Results of Chi-square Test and Descriptive Statistics for Post-Conflict Justice Mechanism 
Type and Legal Tradition 
 Legal Tradition Total   
Type of 
PCJM 
Islamic Law Civil/Common 
Law 
   
Restorative 23 (20.4) 81 (83.6) 104   
Retributive 11 (13.6) 58 (55.4) 69   
Total 34 139    
Note. 2 = 1.00, Numbers in parentheses indicate expected values.  
 
Table 5.4 
Results of Chi-square Test and Descriptive Statistics for Post-Conflict Justice Mechanism 
Type and Legal Tradition 
 Legal Tradition Total   
Type of 
PCJM 
Civil/Common 
Law 
Islamic Law    
Retributive 96 (93.9) 20 (22.1) 116   
Restorative 44 (46.1) 13 (10.9) 57   
Total 140 33    
Note. 2 = 0.76, Numbers in parentheses indicate expected values.  
 
Logistic Regression 
To further test H2, logistic regression is used to model the probability that when states 
adopt PCJ, they adopt mechanisms that are congruent with their domestic legal tradition. 
Specifically, that states with civil or common legal traditions will adopt retributive PCJMs, and 
states with Islamic legal traditions will adopt restorative PCJMs. In the first model, the 
dependent variable is retributive PCJMs, and the independent variable of interest is 
civil/common legal traditions. In the second model, the dependent variable is restorative PCJMs, 
and the independent variable is Islamic legal traditions. For each model, the dependent variable 
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is binary with two possible outcomes, the adoption of retributive/restorative PCJMs or no 
adoption of retributive/restorative PCJMs.   
 In these models, I control for the following variables that I believe would influence 
congruence: state age at conflict onset, conflict termination method, and the group who initiated 
the PCJ process. I expect state age to positively influence the adoption of congruence PCJMs. 
States that have a longer tenure in the international system theoretically should have long-
established legal systems, and thus there would be less instability in the pursuit of justice. I 
predict that the method of conflict termination will also be significant to the adoption of 
congruence PCJM. Conflicts terminated via victory would be more likely to select congruent 
PCJMs rather than if the conflict was terminated through a bargained solution. One possible 
exception that future research would be well suited to address is cases of conflict termination via 
victory for the non-governmental side that may or may not adopt a new form of government and 
approach to justice. One would expect conflict victors to select PCJMs that are aligned with their 
perceptions of justice, which may or may not reflect the broader views of justice within a divided 
society. Finally, I expect congruence to be influenced by the initiators of post-conflict justice. In 
this model, I use a dichotomous variable to indicate whether both sides of the conflict agreed 
upon the PCJ process. This includes justice efforts initiated through peace agreements. PCJMs 
that are decided upon by both sides of the conflict are more likely to be congruent with the 
prevailing conceptions of justice within the state. While I would have expected PCJMs that were 
initiated by international actors to play a significant factor, there were only three instances within 
this universe of cases that had externally imposed or initiated processes. As such, they were 
omitted from the statistical models as this variable perfectly predicted the success of this model.         
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 The first model in Table 5.5 shows that the independent variable of interest, civil and 
common legal traditions, is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.056. The odds ratio of 
2.257 indicates that states with a civil or common legal tradition are 2.5 times more likely to 
adopt retributive post-conflict justice mechanisms such as trials, purges, and exiles. The control 
variables in model one are all statistically insignificant, and the control for sender of the 
mechanism was omitted from the analysis for perfectly predicting failure.  
 The second model in Table 5.6 shows the independent variable of interest, Islamic legal 
traditions, is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.014. The odds ratio of 6.113 indicates 
that states with an Islamic legal tradition are 6.1 times more likely to adopt restorative post-
conflict justice measures such as truth commissions, reparations, and amnesties. The control 
variables for state age, conflict termination via victory, and PCJM sender were all statistically 
significant with p-values of less than 0.001. The odds ratio for state age is 0.979, indicating that 
for each year a state has been a member of the international system, the odds of selecting a 
restorative PCJM decreases by 2%.  
Table 5.5 
Logistic Regression Results – Civil/Common Law and Retributive PCJMs 
     
Variables B Se Z Ratio Odds 
Civil/Common 
Law 
0.056* .962 1.91 2.257 
State Age 0.954 .004 -0.06 .999 
Victory 0.969 .361 -0.04 .986 
Sender .. .. .. 1 
Constant 0.206 .257 -1.26 .560 
     
Model X2 = 3.68    
Pseudo R2 = 0.020    
N =  134    
Notes: *p< .05, **p< .01, ***p< .001 
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Table 5.6 
Logistic Regression Results – Islamic Law and Restorative PCJMs 
     
Variables B Se Z Ratio Odds 
Islamic 0.014* 4.489 2.47 6.113 
State Age 0.000*** .005 -3.50 .979 
Victory 0.000*** .354 -3.81 .043 
Sender 0.000*** 5.747 4.64 11.081 
Constant 0.510 .518 0.66 1.300 
     
Model X2 = 40.91    
Pseudo R2 
= 
0.466    
N =  172    
Notes: *p< .05, **p< .01, ***p< .001 
Case Study Examples 
 To give additional context to the results described above, the following mini case studies 
present four different examples of how congruent and incongruent post-conflict justice 
mechanisms were implemented in states with civil, common, or Islamic legal traditions. The 
purpose of the cases is to highlight the usage of PCJMs in various conflict contexts. The 
incongruent cases illustrate why some mechanisms were implemented despite other more 
congruent options. The cases below represent congruent and incongruent examples within each 
legal tradition; cases were selected based on sharing similar attributes found in the data such as 
conflict incompatibility and conflict type.       
Incongruent Cases 
Croatia 1995 
 Shortly after Croatian independence from the former Yugoslavia in 1991, Serbian 
populated regions grew increasingly concerned with their position within the newly formed 
Croatian state. Despite having several Serbian Autonomous Oblasts (SAO), Serbs within Croatia 
were not recognized as constituents of the state, but rather a national minority. Through a 
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referendum in the Serb National Council, the SAO of Krajina declared itself the Republic of 
Serbian Krajina (RSK) and attempted to break away from Croatia entirely. With the support of 
Serbia, the RSK forces clashed with the newly formed Croatian army. A 1992 ceasefire 
eventually brought hostilities to a standstill for three years.  
 In 1995 the RSK rebelled against the Croatian government. Croatian offensives 
Operation Flash and Operation Storm helped Croatia to regain control of parts of RSK territory. 
In November 1995, the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and 
Western Sirmium, also known as the Erdut Agreement, was signed by Croatian and local Serbian 
authorities. Under the agreement, the parties agreed to a transitional administration and the return 
of refugees and displaced persons to their rightful homes. The agreement also recognized 
reparations for persons who lost property through either the restoration of said property or “just 
compensation” for property that cannot be returned or that requires reconstruction (United States 
Institute of Peace, Edrut Agreement, 1995). In October 1996, Croatia enacted a General Amnesty 
law for crimes against the state during the conflict. 
 As a state with a civil legal tradition, this case was coded as implementing incongruent 
post-conflict justice mechanisms as both reparations and amnesties are forms of restorative 
justice. Given the broad scope of those participating in the conflict through combat and rebellion, 
and those affected as refugees and displaced persons, PCJMs that are conducive to providing 
redress to large groups was an option that was both victim-oriented and aimed at repairing a 
deeply divided state. Further, amnesties, as discussed in previous chapters, can serve short-term 
political aims such as guaranteeing cease-fires. Amnesties can also be useful as a means not to 
overburden judicial systems. In states that have fully functioning court systems and strong 
judicial independence, prosecuting thousands of combatants is simply expensive, time-
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consuming, and unrealistic. In other instances, weak judicial systems could result in sham trials 
or a general lack of political will to commit to justice efforts. While the framework of this study 
points to trials, purges, or exiles in states with civil legal traditions, it does not account for scope 
and institutional capacity to carry out such mechanisms in states with weak political and legal 
systems. Future research should consider further the constraints of institutional capacity to 
conduct post-conflict justice.  
Comoros 1989 
 Comoros gained independence from France in 1975, and Ahmed Abdallah became the 
first president of the small island nation off the eastern coast of Africa.  Leadership in Comoros 
has been rocky, at best, and is marked by a series of coup d’états.  President Abdallah was 
deposed after his first month in office but was reinstated in 1978 with French and South African 
support. A French soldier, Bob Denard, played an active role in Abdallah’s removal from office 
and his subsequent reinstatement. Denard went on to become the head of President Abdallah’s 
Presidential Guard from 1978 to 1989 when a looming coup d’état threatened Abdallah’s 
presidency again. Abdallah was shot and killed by a member of his own guard, presumably 
under the direction of Denard. Denard was later evacuated from Comoros with the assistance of 
the French military. Upon his return to Comoros in 1995, Denard attempted yet another coup. 
This time, he was captured, surrendered, and returned to France. Mohamed Taki Abdoulkarim, 
now president of Comoros, denied Denard’s return to Comoros in 1998, effectively exiling the 
man who repeatedly worked to overthrow the government.  
 This case was coded as an incongruent application of post-conflict justice as Comoros is 
an Islamic law state and applied a retributive PCJM. The population of Comoros is 98% Sunni 
Muslim, and Islam is the official state religion. Under President Abdallah, Comoros was declared 
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an Islamic Federal Republic. The preamble of the current Constitution of Comoros refers to 
Islam as “the permanent inspiration of the principles and rules that govern the Union” 
(Constitution of Comoros, 2009). As such, according to the framework of this study, one would 
expect that the state takes a reconciliatory approach to this conflict episode. However, given the 
emphasis on the responsibility of a single individual (Bob Denard), an exile was perhaps the 
fastest and least expensive option to move forward from instability. Like the Croatia case 
discussed above, the framework of this study does not account for the scope of the conflict 
beyond time and battle-related deaths, nor does it account for the effect of colonial history or 
institutional capacity to carry out justice mechanisms. Justice mechanisms that are meant to be 
broad and inclusive such as truth commissions may not be justifiable in conflict episodes that are 
limited to a small number of political elites.      
Congruent Cases 
United States 2002 
 In the wake of the September 11th attacks, three members of Al-Qaeda were indicted on 
charges related to the attacks in which civilian commercial airplanes were deliberately flown into 
buildings in New York City and Washington, D.C. French national, Zacarias Moussaoui was 
indicted by a federal grand jury on six criminal charges of terrorism and conspiracy related to the 
attacks. Moussaoui was a member of Al-Qaeda that had trained at one of the group’s camps in 
Afghanistan and traveled to the United States to participate in the planned attack. In August 
2001, while completing his pilot training in Minnesota, Moussaoui was arrested by federal 
agents. He denied his membership in Al-Qaeda and any intention of using his pilot training to 
kill Americans (United States v. Moussaoui, 2005). Other members of Al-Qaeda continued with 
the planned hijacking of four airplanes, killing close to 3,000 people and injuring thousands 
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more. Moussaoui received six consecutive life sentences without the possibility of parole. Two 
members of an Al-Qaeda cell in Buffalo, New York, Mukhtar al-Bakri and Yahya Goba, were 
tried in court and received prison sentences. Members of this cell had attended Al-Qaeda training 
camps in Afghanistan and were found guilty of “providing material support or resources to a 
designated foreign terrorist organization” (Department of Justice, 2003).  
 This case is coded as congruent in the dataset. The United States has a common law 
tradition, and trials are a form of retributive justice. The criminal justice system in the United 
States emphasizes punitive measures as a response to wrongdoing. Given the magnitude of 
destruction and loss of human life in this conflict episode, this appears to be a justice mechanism 
that is aligned with the domestic legal tradition. While a criminal trial was carried out, it should 
be noted that during Moussaoui’s trial, there was controversy regarding a possible death penalty.    
Pakistan 1996 
 The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) is a political party founded in Pakistan in the 
1980s. First established as a student group, MQM was a secular party that represented the 
interests of the Urdu-speaking Mohajirs in the Sindh province. MQM soon became a popular 
political party, forming coalition governments at the national level. In the early to mid-1990s, 
political and ethnic violence escalated in Karachi, an MQM stronghold. The Pakistani military 
carried out operations to regain control and minimize crime and violence. MQM perceived these 
operations as specifically targeting their group as hundreds of group leaders, members, and 
supporters were arrested and detained. There were also reports of torture and extrajudicial 
killings while the government conducted raids and roundups (RefWorld, 1996). As conditions 
deteriorated throughout 1995, MQM rebelled, and the government effectively lost control of 
parts of Karachi and the Sindh province. The two sides began negotiations to end the conflict in 
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July 1995. In the beginning, the negotiations were a wash, as the two sides could not identify 
common ground to begin a settlement (RefWorld, 1996). By the following year, the situation and 
talks improved. In 1997, the two parties signed a peace agreement that stipulated that the 
families of MQM members who were killed or died while under arrest or detainment by the 
Pakistani government would receive reparations (Binningsbø & Loyle, 2012).  
 This case was coded as congruent within the dataset as Pakistan has an Islamic legal 
tradition, and reparations were implemented as the only form of post-conflict justice in this 
conflict episode. Reparations are a form of restorative justice and are part of the emphasis on 
making relationships right. In this case, the reparations were meant to foster reconciliation 
between the government and the MQM, specifically the families of MQM members who were 
killed as a result of the conflict. While reparations can never replace a family member, nor fully 
restore any lost income or earnings of that family member, the act of reparations can prove 
symbolic in many ways. It acknowledges a loss, harm, and suffering and signals the restoration 
of right relationship, an important factor in the Islamic legal tradition. Reparations are also a 
means for the state to make a statement about their commitment to reconciliation within society.  
Conclusion 
 
 The general findings of this chapter indicate that while there is no relationship between 
legal tradition and the adoption of post-conflict justice, states do have a tendency to implement 
mechanisms based on their domestic legal tradition as outlined in this framework. It should be 
noted that Islamic law states, in this universe of cases, have never adopted a truth commission as 
a method of post-conflict justice. Given the emphasis of reconciliation and the restoration of 
right relationship in the Islamic legal tradition and the intention of restoration in truth 
commissions, it is surprising that this is a seemingly unpopular choice for Islamic law states. One 
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could surmise that the mandates, structure, or implementation of final reports and findings would 
all be important factors in the decision to adopt a truth commission. This analysis, however, does 
not account for unofficial processes taking place at the local level. The inclusion of community 
efforts towards reconciliation would be one avenue for future research in this vein.  
 The results of the congruence hypothesis reveal that states with civil and common legal 
traditions are more likely to adopt retributive justice mechanisms than restorative justice 
mechanisms, while states with an Islamic legal tradition are more likely to adopt restorative 
justice mechanisms. While these findings support the congruence hypothesis and contribute to 
the broader transitional justice literature, perhaps a more intriguing question is what does this 
actually mean for transitional justice? The final empirical chapter of this dissertation attempts to 
answer this question by testing the impact of congruence on peace as one of the primary goals of 
transitional justice.  
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Chapter 6 
Quantitative Analysis Results – A Survival Analysis of Congruence and Peace Duration 
 
Introduction 
 Previous chapters have presented an argument for the consideration of legal traditions as 
an explanatory factor in post-conflict justice practices, presented the concept of congruence as a 
part of a conceptual framework linking legal traditions to post-conflict justice (PCJ), and offered 
an initial analysis of congruence. This chapter presents an analysis and findings related to the 
efficacy of post-conflict justice mechanisms. Specifically, whether the adoption of congruent 
post-conflict justice mechanisms have any measurable effect on how long peace lasts in the post-
conflict period. The third and final hypothesis of this study is stated as follows: 
H3: States that adopt congruent post-conflict justice mechanisms are more likely to experience a 
longer duration of peace in the post-conflict period.     
 The broader transitional justice literature is concerned with whether or not these practices 
work. Given that the scope of this study is limited to justice practices in post-conflict settings, I 
analyze how long peace lasts when congruent and incongruent post-conflict justice mechanisms 
are implemented. To examine how long peace lasts in the post-conflict period, I utilize a survival 
or event history model. The purpose of the survival analysis is to measure and compare if and 
when an event occurs considering the preceding history as well as other variables of theoretical 
interest or covariates (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). More specifically in this analysis, at 
what point do post-conflict states break peace and return to a state of conflict, and what 
covariates effect peace failure? In addition to survival or duration, the survival analysis also 
lends itself to considering the risk of an event occurring, or in this case, the risk of peace failing. 
The risk of peace failure is presented as a hazard ratio. The overall results of this analysis suggest 
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that the selection of congruent post-conflict justice mechanisms reduces the risk of peace failure 
or conflict recurrence in the post-conflict peace period. While this analysis is a preliminary test 
and does not account for all possible covariates related to post-conflict periods, it does suggest 
that the inclusion of congruence in post-conflict justice is an avenue for future research in this 
field.      
Preliminary Data and Data Sources 
 The universe of cases for this analysis is limited to post-conflict peace periods in which a 
post-conflict justice mechanism was implemented within five years. There are 3243 observations 
across 126 conflicts and 173 post-conflict peace periods. Congruent PCJMs are adopted in 71 
post-conflict peace periods, and incongruent mechanisms are adopted in 102 post-conflict peace 
periods. 
 This analysis is interested in how congruence influences how long peace lasts, given the 
implementation of varying post-conflict justice mechanisms. The average number of peace years 
in this universe of cases is 16.69 years. There is little difference in the average of peace years in 
which congruent and incongruent PCJMs were implemented with averages of 19.98 and 19.55 
respectively. To better understand the frequency distribution of post-conflict peace years, the 
following histograms, Figures 6.1 and 6.2, provide a visualization of how long peace lasted when 
congruent and incongruent PCJMs were used. The bins along the x-axis represent the number of 
peace years, and the y-axis represents the frequency.16 In both congruent and incongruent cases, 
 
16 Histograms are divided into bins which represent an interval of continuous data; in this example, the intervals are 
number of peace years after the conclusion of a conflict. The bins each contain the number of data points that fall 
within the range specified for the bin, with brackets signifying the range is inclusive and parenthesis being 
exclusive. For example, Figure 6.1 shows that just over 40 conflicts experienced between 1 and 14 peace years 
before the conflict either resumed or the data was censored.      
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most of the observations appear to the left of the graphs, meaning the histograms are skewed 
right, and the means are less than the median. 
What is more important, however, is that the histograms illustrate fewer cases of long-
lasting peace when incongruent PCJMs are implemented than when congruent PCJMs are 
implemented. The utility of the histogram rather than looking only at means is the distribution. 
While there is little difference in the average number of peace years between the two groups, the 
distribution shows that there are more cases of longer-lasting peace for the congruent group over 
time. This supports the idea that the adoption of congruent PCJMs can have positive long-term 
effects in the post-conflict period.   
Figure 6.1 
Histogram of Peace Years for Congruent Post-Conflict Justice Mechanisms 
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Figure 6.2 
Histogram of Peace Years for Incongruent Post-Conflict Justice Mechanisms 
 
Dependent Variable 
 In this analysis, the duration of peace upon the termination of an armed conflict is the 
dependent variable. Utilizing the Post-Conflict Justice Dataset, I measure the number of peace 
years after a conflict has ended. The count of total peace years starts over if conflict resumes in a 
given year and results in at least 25 battle deaths (Binningsbø et al., 2012). Because the measure 
of conflict recurrence is based on the resumption of violence, it does not take into account the 
possibility that a negative peace may exist, but a brutal or repressive regime may be in place.  
This hypothesis calls for a survival analysis and as such, analyzes the effect of congruent post-
conflict justice mechanisms is expressed as a hazard ratio or the probability of peace failure.    
Independent and Control Variables 
Congruence is the primary independent variable of interest and is coded as “1” if the 
mechanism or combination of mechanisms implemented align with the appropriate legal 
tradition. I expect the adoption of congruent PCJMs to experience a more durable peace in the 
POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE AND LEGAL TRADITIONS 125 
 
post-conflict period. States with a civil or common legal tradition that adopt trials, purges, and 
exiles, or some combination of the three, are coded as congruent for retributive post-conflict 
justice mechanisms. Islamic law states that adopt truth commissions, reparations, and amnesties 
or some combination of the three are coded as congruent for restorative post-conflict justice 
mechanisms. States that adopt incongruent or a combination of congruent and incongruent 
mechanisms are coded as “0” for congruence. 
The adoption of post-conflict justice mechanisms, however, do not occur in isolation. 
Additional control variables take into account characteristics of the conflict, the method by 
which the conflict was terminated, and characteristics of the post-conflict peace period. I 
consider the number of battle deaths and whether ethnic issues were part of the conflict as 
variables of theoretical interest related to peace duration. Battle death count is widely used in 
studies of armed conflict as a measure of conflict intensity as well as previous studies related to 
peace duration and post-conflict justice (Binningsbø et al., 2012; Loyle & Appel 2017; Fortna, 
2004). Ethnic incompatibility is also important to include when considering the risk of peace 
failure in post-conflict states. Ethnic incompatibility and division are related to increased risk for 
civil conflict and can lead to longer conflicts overall (Fearon & Laitin 2003, Collier, Hoeffler, & 
Soderbom, 2004).       
 The method in which conflicts are terminated should also be accounted for when 
considering peace duration. While conflicts are not always terminated through clear outcomes 
such as a victory or peace agreement, conflict recurrence has been linked to termination methods. 
For example, Kreutz (2010) finds that conflicts that are ended by a government victory or by the 
presence of peacekeeping operations are less likely to recur. This analysis considers if the 
conflict was terminated through a decisive victory for one side of the conflict, either the 
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government or rebels or if it was terminated by other means. Other means of conflict termination 
include a bargained solution or low/no activity17. This data originates from the UCDP Conflict 
Termination Dataset and is used across several conflict-related studies including the primary 
dataset used in this analysis (Kreutz 2010, Binningsbø et al., 2012). I also include a variable 
indicating the presence of peace agreements related to conflict termination. Peace agreements 
can take on many forms and range from ceasefire agreements to comprehensive agreements that 
address deep-seated grievances in conflict. Badran (2014, p. 213) shows that the design of peace 
agreements plays a significant factor in strengthening peace, noting that “how well peace is made 
determines how long it will last.” While others consider conditions in which governments may 
break such agreements. DeRouen, Lea, and Wallensteen (2009), for example, suggest that peace 
agreements will last longer if the cost of government concessions is lower.  
 This study also considers several characteristics of the post-conflict peace period 
concerning peace duration. Regime type is coded as democratic if a state has a Polity IV score of 
6 or higher in a given year (Marshall et al., 2019). While many of the control variables describe 
the nature of the conflict, the regime variable is an important characteristic of states and their 
ability to carry-out or inhibit policies that could strengthen or threaten peace in the post-conflict 
period. Regime type has been linked to peace duration through peace agreements and power-
sharing arrangements. For example, Mason and Greig (2017) find links between types of 
autocratic regimes and peace failure. In addition to democratic regimes, autocracy in the form of 
personalist and military regimes reduce the risk of peace failure in the post-conflict period 
(Mason and Greig 2017, p. 982). Their findings also indicate that specific types of autocratic 
regimes that implement peace agreements have a higher risk for peace failure. Jarstad and 
 
17 According to Kreutz (2010) conflict termination through low or no activity refers to conflicts that are continuing, 
but do not reach the battle death threshold of 25 as defined by UCDP.  
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Nilsson (2018) examine how regime type influences power-sharing arrangements in intrastate 
conflicts, finding that democracies commonly sign territorial pacts while autocracies sign 
political and military power-sharing agreements.      
I include a variable indicating the presence of peacekeepers during a post-conflict peace 
period. Fortna (2004, 2008) finds that peacekeeping presence is effective in creating lasting 
peace and reduces the risk of conflict recurrence in civil wars. The use of power-sharing 
institutions, such as consociationalism, have also been shown to increase the chances for 
effective and lasting peace (Hartzell & Hodie 2003).  Indicators for GDP are also included to 
measure economic growth overtime during the post-conflict period as economic development 
reduces the risk of renewed conflict (Collier et al. 2008).     
Results and Analysis 
 The final hypothesis of this study employs a survival analysis to test the effect of 
congruence on the duration of peace. A survival or duration analysis models the expected time 
duration to an event of interest. In this case, I am interested in how long peace will last given 
specific inputs related to PCJ. I expect peace to fail sooner when incongruent PCJMs are used 
than if congruent PCJMs are used. Duration models make no assumptions about how long peace 
will continue to last past the end of the available data. For example, if peace has held to the end 
of the data cutoff, in this case, 2006, the model does not assume that it will continue to hold. This 
is referred to as censoring and means that the event of interest, failure of peace, did not occur in 
the observed time period but may occur given a longer observation period. This data is “right 
censored” in that there is incomplete data regarding survival time past a certain point, in the case 
the data ends in the year 2006. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004, p. 16) describe right 
censoring as instances in which “the time-frame of a study or observation plan concludes prior to 
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the completion of termination or survival times.”18 In this analysis, peace lasts or “survives” until 
armed conflict resumes in the same conflict. If peace survives and conflict does not resume by 
the end of the observed time period in 2006, the data are censored. There is no certainty that 
peace will continue to survive past the censoring point, but the survival analysis provides an 
indication of the risk of peace failure. The data are organized by post-conflict peace period and 
not all conflict within a particular state. As such, there may be multiple conflicts occurring in a 
state in which peace lasts or does not last. The Soviet Union is an excellent example within this 
universe of cases. Between 1946 and 1950 there were four separate conflicts occurring within the 
Soviet Union related to what is now the Baltic States and Ukraine. Each conflict is considered 
separately within the dataset and has different end dates. The conflict between the Soviet Union 
and Latvian rebel groups was terminated in 1947, while the Ukrainian rebellion against the 
Soviet Union lasted until 1950. Peace has held in each of these conflicts since their termination 
and exiles were implemented in each case.  
 The Cox proportional hazard model or Cox regression is used when a model is interested 
in the effect of categorical independent variables on duration. In this model, the independent 
variable of interest is congruence, which is dichotomous and coded as 0 or 1. The Cox regression 
produces hazard ratios instead of coefficients. The hazard ratio is the risk or hazard of an event 
occurring within a given time. More specifically, in this analysis the hazard ratio will predict the 
hazard of peace failing (conflict resuming). Fortna (2008, pp.104-105) employs Cox proportional 
hazard models to test the effect of the presence of peacekeepers on peace duration and 
summarizes the interpretation of hazard ratios in a similar context: “ratios significantly less than 
 
18 Left-censoring on the other hand, refers to data that is unobserved during the history prior to the first observation 
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Whether data is right or left-censored depends on if the unobserved events take 
place before or after the first observation. 
POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE AND LEGAL TRADITIONS 129 
 
1 indicate that a variable is estimated to reduce the hazard, or the risk, of another war, while 
ratios significantly greater than 1 mark an increased risk of another war.” Hazard ratios can be 
expressed as a percentage because they are understood as being relative to 1. A hazard ratio of 
.50, for example, would be interpreted as reducing risk by 50%. Alternatively, a hazard ratio of 3 
means that the risk is tripled. The hazard ratios provide an interpretation of the risk of peace 
failing (or conflict recurring) given the presence of certain conditions. In this analysis, I am 
examining how the presence of congruent post-conflict justice mechanisms influences the risk of 
peace failure; or how long peace will hold in the post-conflict period.  
Table 6.1 
Survival Analysis Results – Congruence and Peace Duration 
Variables p-value Hazard Ratio Standard Error 
Congruence 0.045* .591 (.154) 
Ethnic Conflict 0.00*** 3.273 (.914) 
Termination – 
Victory 
0.264 .735 (.202) 
Peace Agreement 0.330 1.578 (.738) 
Peace Keeping 0.279 .561 (.299) 
Democracy 0.290 .685 (.245) 
Power Sharing 0.059 .139 (.145) 
GDP Per Capita 0.029* .999 (.000) 
GDP Growth 0.720 .589 (.869) 
Battle Deaths 0.405 1.09e+14 (4.22e+15) 
Notes: *p< .05, **p< .01, ***p< .001 
The results of Table 6.1 indicate that the implementation of congruent post-conflict 
justice mechanisms reduces the risk of peace failure by 41% (with a hazard ratio of .591). This 
result is statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.045. A p-value of less than 0.05 signals that 
there is strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the implementation of congruent PCJMs 
has no effect on the duration of peace. Ethnic issues and GDP per capita are also statistically 
significant in the analysis. Conflict with an ethnic incompatibility component is three times more 
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likely to experience peace failure in the post-conflict period. The presence of a power-sharing 
agreement reduces the risk of peace failure by 87%. And GDP per capita is statistically 
significant with a p-value of 0.029, but a hazard ratio of .999 indicates that peace failing is just as 
likely as peace holding.   
Conclusion 
 Based on the findings in Table 6.1, I find that we can expect longer-lasting peace in the 
post-conflict period when post-conflict justice mechanisms that are congruent with domestic 
legal traditions are implemented. Using secondary data to test this hypothesis presents both 
strengths and weaknesses in this study. The data are drawn from reliable sources that have been 
analyzed in prior studies in peer-reviewed journals and research programs. The data is available 
online, maintained by scholars and research centers, and made publicly available for replication; 
this contributes to higher measurement reliability. A significant weakness or limitation of this 
approach is overgeneralization and the possible exclusion of other independent or intervening 
variables. This could have the effect of decreased validity as other intervening variables may 
negate the results (Bryman, 2012). Generalization, however, can also be viewed as a strength in 
social science research. Scholarship that provides general explanations of social and political 
phenomena contributes to a body of knowledge that helps make predictions and provide 
explanations about the world. It is important, however, to bear in mind the practicality and of 
such work. For example, broad generalizations may be too abstract for any direct application to 
policy interventions. Overall, the initial results suggest that this is an area that merits further 
investigation with a more sophisticated operationalization of the congruence concept.     
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
Transitional justice seeks to deal with legacies of the most brutal conflicts and political 
transitions within states; however, there is no one-size-fits-all approach. Post-conflict justice, as 
a subset of transitional justice, is concerned with justice mechanisms in the wake of armed 
conflict. The use of transitional and post-conflict justice is not everyday practice, and as such, 
there are often no pre-designated strategies in place to turn to when faced with the aftermath of 
conflict. A growing literature has demonstrated that domestic legal traditions are an important 
state characteristic that influences conflict management behaviors ranging from dispute 
settlement preferences to organizational membership. 
Given that the norms and principles of justice are, in part, derived from legal traditions, it 
is necessary to investigate the relationship between legal traditions and transitional justice 
practices. How do legal traditions influence the adoption and mechanism selection of post-
conflict justice mechanisms? Further, do these choices have any effect on the broader goals of 
transitional justice? This dissertation has shown that domestic legal traditions should be 
considered in making decisions about implementing post-conflict justice mechanisms. The 
inclusion of legal tradition as an explanatory factor suggests that states have latent preferences 
for post-conflict justice that could ultimately lead to a more durable peace. This is based on 
existing principles of law and justice that are recognized as legitimate within the state as 
expressed by their domestic legal tradition type.   
The consideration of the role of legal traditions on post-conflict justice practices 
contributes to both the transitional justice literature and the literature on domestic legal 
traditions. This study provides new explanations for why and how states chose to pursue and 
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practice transitional justice, specifically, that domestic legal traditions are one component of state 
identity and provide a different lens through which to examine and explain state behavior. 
Further, this dissertation contributes a new theoretical understanding through the development of 
the congruence concept to the literature and research on transitional justice.  
Overview of the study 
 People and their governments have practiced transitional and post-conflict justice since 
the beginning of democratic governance in ancient Athens. The need for communities to remedy 
large-scale violence and oppression has been expressed through legal proceedings, punishment, 
truth-seeking, and reparative measures. Increased attention from scholars and policymakers 
continues to produce new understandings and frameworks for achieving the goals of justice, 
truth, and peace.  
 The literature is primarily concerned with the impact and efficacy of transitional justice. 
Given that the implementation of transitional and post-conflict justice mechanisms requires both 
human and financial resources, it makes sense that stakeholders are concerned with whether 
these mechanisms work. Single case studies investigating the impact of PCJ mechanisms provide 
mixed results when it comes to the overall efficacy of transitional justice (Gibson 2004, 2005; 
Meernik, 2005, David, 2006; Mayer-Rieckh, 2007). Comparative case studies and regional 
examinations provide more encouraging results. For example, truth-telling has a positive effect 
on peace and democratic strength in Latin America (Long & Brecke, 2003; Kenney & Spears, 
2005; Sikkink & Walling, 2007). Criminal tribunals in Europe and Africa have contributed to the 
emergence of political moderates who support coexistence in multiethnic societies while at the 
same time marginalizing former leaders responsible for fueling ethnic division (Akhavan, 2001; 
Stromseth, Wippman, & Brooks, 2006). The “quantitative-turn” in transitional justice 
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emphasizes “the need for basing claims about the impact of transitional justice on more solid 
empirical foundations” (Stewart & Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2017, p. 98). Many of these studies have 
assessed the impact of transitional justice on the status of human rights, peace, and 
democratization, while treating the presence of transitional justice as the independent variable of 
interest (Melander, 2009; Meernik, Nichols, & King, 2010; Lie, Binningsbø, & Gates, 2007; 
Olsen et al., 2010). Overall, the literature that emphasizes the impact and efficacy of transitional 
justice points to mixed results with little generalizable theory.  
 Adoption and mechanism selection in transitional and post-conflict justice is also a focal 
point in the literature. As such, it begins by addressing the question of whether certain legal 
traditions are more likely to adopt PCJ in the first place. This study does not assume that post-
conflict justice occurs in each case. The political context of a state, the extent of repression 
within authoritarian regimes, and economic constraints all play a part in the adoption of 
transitional justice mechanisms (Reiter, Olsen, & Payne, 2013). Further, international pressure in 
the form of pre-conditions for membership in international organizations and aid conditionality 
are also areas that can influence the adoption and mechanism choice of transitional justice 
practices. Decisions regarding adoption and mechanism selection are important, yet the bulk of 
the literature is concerned with impact and efficacy.  
 In this dissertation, I employ the concept of congruence as the theoretical link between 
post-conflict justice and domestic legal traditions. Congruence refers to the fit between inherent 
legal principles and practices that are held by a group (legal tradition) and a process by which 
justice is sought in a post-conflict setting (post-conflict justice mechanism). Understanding 
domestic legal traditions can give leaders, policymakers, and other stakeholders in the post-
conflict process clues about the adoption of post-conflict justice as well as which mechanisms 
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best serve the goal of peace in the post-conflict period. I classified both the legal traditions and 
post-conflict justice mechanisms according to the overarching justice type that is found in both 
variables. This approach allowed me to deal with complex independent and dependent variables, 
and carry out the first, to my knowledge, empirical test of the influence of legal traditions on 
post-conflict justice practices. Within the universe of cases of this study, congruence exists when 
a state with a legal tradition that emphasizes retributive justice, chooses retributive PCJMs, and a 
state with a legal tradition that emphasizes restorative justice chooses a restorative PCJM.    
 From this conceptual framework, I derive three sets of hypotheses related to the adoption 
of post-conflict justice, mechanism choice, and the impact of congruence. While transitional and 
post-conflict justice practices continue to evolve, contemporary understandings of transitional 
justice are rooted in the post-World War II experience, which was dominated by Western 
powers. As a result, international institutions such as the International Criminal Court and 
various international criminal tribunals have followed a Western-style justice model. The first 
hypothesis contends that states with a civil or common law legal tradition are more likely to 
adopt post-conflict justice than states with Islamic law legal traditions. However, the results 
show there is insufficient support to this claim and that the adoption of post-conflict justice 
mechanisms is independent of the legal tradition type.  
 The second set of hypotheses is related to mechanism selection and congruence. I claim 
not only that states will adopt post-conflict justice mechanisms that are congruent with their legal 
tradition, but specifically, that civil and common law states will adopt retributive PCJMs and 
Islamic law states will adopt restorative PCJMs. Results from the Chi-square test find that there 
is no support for the congruence claim; that mechanism choice is independent of legal tradition 
type. However, the results from the logit models find support for the claim. The results of the 
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first model show weak support (p = 0.056) that states with civil of common law traditions will 
adopt retributive post-conflict justice mechanisms. The second model finds stronger support (p = 
0.014) for the claim that Islamic law states are more likely to adopt post-conflict justice 
mechanisms that are restorative in nature.  
 Perhaps the more compelling question is why congruence matters at all? As much of the 
transitional justice literature is dedicated to the question of impact and efficacy, this study also 
seeks to address whether the consideration of legal tradition has any influence on the broader 
goals of transitional justice. The third hypothesis tests the claim that when states adopt congruent 
post-conflict justice mechanisms, peace will be more durable in the post-conflict period. Results 
from a survival analysis show that the adoption of congruent PCJMs reduces the risk of peace 
failure in the post-conflict period by 53%. Thus, choosing congruent mechanisms can increase 
peace, but in many cases we see that countries choose incongruent mechanisms. In fact, 38% of 
the cases in this sample chose incongruent mechanisms. Knowing that congruence between 
domestic legal traditions and post-conflict justice mechanisms can lead to longer-lasting peace is 
an important contribution to the literature and practice of transitional justice.       
 Testing three hypotheses related to post-conflict justice adoption, mechanism selection, 
and efficacy (as defined by peace duration) contributes to these same strands of transitional 
justice literature. Further, the introduction of legal tradition as the primary independent variable 
of interest brings together the growing literature of the influence of legal traditions on state 
behavior and transitional justice. Zartner (2012) asserted that legal traditions matter in 
transitional justice practices, however, this study is the first empirical test of this relationship. 
The overall results confirm that this area deserves additional attention from scholars, 
practitioners, and policymakers. 
POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE AND LEGAL TRADITIONS 136 
 
Limitations 
 This study was limited in scope to post-conflict justice, or justice mechanisms that were 
attempted in the first five years after an armed conflict as defined by UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset. The universe of transitional justice also includes political transitions (typically 
from a state of repression) that may or may not have occurred with armed conflict. The data is 
limited to justice efforts following an armed conflict with a minimum of 25 battle deaths per year 
between 1946 and 2006, and therefore does not include every justice mechanism implemented 
with the goals of truth, justice, peace, and dignity for victims. However, future research could 
expand the application of congruence to test the effect in other transitional contexts.  
 Another limitation concerns the classification of legal traditions. The broad approach 
taken in this study proved quite useful for a preliminary investigation. It not only allowed for 
hypothesis testing that included complex variables, but the results indicated that there are 
avenues for future research. Using broad classifications, however, did not account for the 
variation among states within each legal family; one could call it an oversimplification. Legal 
traditions and legal systems are complex, and no two are identical, and a more in-depth approach 
should recognize the internal diversity among states within each tradition.    
Applying a quantitative approach to the study of a social phenomenon assumes several 
limitations. This approach assumes that one can quantify and measure complex events, issues, 
and ideas. While there is increasingly available data that quantifies transitional justice efforts, 
scholars must continue to question their assumptions and continue to refine measurements for 
precision. This is especially true as new variables, such as congruence, are introduced. 
Quantitative approaches can obscure the broader context of the subject at hand and often can 
benefit from complementing qualitative approaches such as case studies or interviews. While 
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these methods were outside the scope of this study, future research would benefit from taking a 
mixed-methods approach to provide a richer understanding of how the relationship between legal 
traditions and post-conflict justice works.     
Related to the measurement limitations is the fact that perceptions of what is considered a 
legitimate post-conflict justice mechanism may vary between the government and the people. 
This is not reflected in the scope of this study due to the use of the broadest categories possible 
for the variables of interest. This disconnect would be especially problematic in deeply divided 
states and/or diverse states comprised of groups with different cultural heritages. Further, 
because this study uses the legal tradition of the state, it does not account for customary or 
traditional justice practices that are important parts of many communities, and future research 
would need to take this into account.         
Recommendations 
Policy Recommendations 
The results of this study have many implications for the transitional justice selection 
process. In particular, the findings provide key insights into important factors that should be 
considered during this process and can inform best practices when considering the adoption of 
post-conflict justice and mechanism selection. The transitional and post-conflict justice literature 
should move forward with a deeper understanding of the legal tradition. The literature does 
recognize the importance of the national or even local context but is leaving out this one key 
variable. Policy makers and practitioners should consult with legal scholars and experts as part of 
the decision-making process for a deeper understanding of the beliefs and norms related to 
justice, and attention should be given to the domestic legal tradition of the state as related to any 
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decision to implement specific PCJMs. States that have a history of conflict should consider the 
development of a broad policy framework to address post-conflict justice in the future.  
Some states have even included constitutional provisions for transitional justice to 
demonstrate commitment to the transitional justice process. Colombia, Egypt, and Tunisia have 
all put into place provisions dealing specifically with the issue of transitional justice based on 
their past experiences with conflict. Libya and Yemen currently have transitional justice 
provisions in the most recent drafts of their constitutions, although they have not been legally 
enacted at this time. The inclusion of legal provisions for such instances provides states with 
initial guidance in the event such measures become necessary.  
A 2006 report from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights designates the monitoring of legal systems as one tool for post-conflict states. Recalling 
the discussion of the distinction between legal traditions and legal systems from Chapter 3, it is 
the legal system – the institutions and policies - that has failed in protecting citizens from any 
abuses that may have occurred during the conflict. However, as argued in this study, the norms 
and values of the tradition remain constant. As such monitoring legal and justice systems for 
dysfunction, corruption, and compliance with both domestic and international standards is one 
method for understanding what is working and what is not, allowing transitional justice 
stakeholders to develop the most appropriate recommendations and policy frameworks in 
specific contexts (United Nations, 2006). 
The relevance of this study is not limited to the academic study of transitional and post-
conflict justice practices. The findings indicate that there are clear implications for how 
transitional justice works or could be improved to serve better those impacted by conflict and 
repression. Transitional justice processes should be inclusive and not limited to executives or 
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those in power. Consultations with judges, legal scholars, and community leaders would help 
engage with the population to gain acceptance of any processes that may be implemented. A 
more inclusive approach allows for community members to be invested in the process and 
therefore increase acceptance at local levels.   
Future Research 
 As this study provided an initial explanation and analysis of the link between legal 
traditions and post-conflict justice, the results indicate that there is more work to be done. 
Recognizing the limitations discussed above, future research would benefit from a more 
sophisticated operationalization of congruence. One approach would be to develop a typology on 
a state-by-state basis, acknowledging that there is variation within each legal tradition. It would 
also be critical to take into account customary law practices within states and how these impact 
the broader operation of the legal system within the state. Additionally, future research could 
also be expanded to include more religious traditions as well as take a closer look at mixed 
traditions and the effects of colonial history on legal traditions and post-conflict justice practices. 
More specifically, it would be important to consider the entire scope of justice systems at play 
within a state; the tradition that underpins the system at work at the state level, does not 
necessarily include or even recognize customary traditions that may be at work at the community 
level. These complex relationships between customary traditions and the state present questions 
of legitimacy at the local level, jurisdiction, and coordination of efforts. There is increasing 
scholarship exploring the unique contributions of customary justice and reconciliation practices 
of mato oput in Uganda and South Sudan, Gacaca courts in Rwanda, Fambul Tok in Sierra 
Leone, and tara bandu in East Timor, to name a few.  As the discussion in Chapter 3 pointed out, 
legal traditions often do not operate in isolation and have been influenced by other traditions 
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through historical events, colonization, and increased interaction and globalization. It would be 
imperative for future research to begin to untangle these influences.   
Future research should include considerations of who is leading a justice mechanism. 
This is particularly important for Islamic Law States (ILS), according to Powell (2020, p. 108) 
who notes, for example, the role of judges in religious courts, who “while making decisions, 
applies insights from God’s law to a particular case.” PCJ mechanisms that are alien to a context 
or are led by outsiders decrease certainty for states in already fragile situations. Considering who 
or what body leads or performs post-conflict justice would provide additional insight into the 
domestic acceptance of these practices as well as efficacy related to the broader goals of peace 
and justice.    
Future research should also examine the various combinations and sequencing of post-
conflict justice mechanisms. That is, what factors contribute to the adoption of multiple 
mechanisms and what effect does that have on the goals of peace, truth, and justice versus the 
implementation on a single mechanism. One important question to ask is, what are the effects of 
implementing a combination of congruence and incongruent post-conflict justice mechanisms? A 
deeper understanding of how the combination of PCJMs work concerning legal traditions would 
have even more meaningful implications for policy recommendations and implementation in the 
future.    
Another avenue for future research would be to expand this approach to include all 
transitional justice. While this study examined post-conflict justice as a subset of transitional 
justice, examining the influence of legal tradition across all instances of transitional justice could 
provide even greater generalizability. This could be of particular importance when considering 
political transitions from authoritarianism to democracy as there would be significant changes to 
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domestic institutions and power structures such as the legal system. The discussion of 
congruence as it relates to human nature and the design of the state in Chapter 3 highlights the 
importance of considering the political context of the state that occurs in regime change. Legal 
traditions in light of political transitions from authoritarianism to democracy motivate questions 
of the adaptability of traditions across time as well as how new political and legal norms may be 
accepted as legitimate under new institutional frameworks.      
Taking a case study or regional approach to give greater context to the overall findings of 
this study would provide a more in-depth understanding of how the influence of domestic legal 
tradition plays out in real-world examples. This approach may also present additional variables 
of interest to include in future studies. 
The findings of this dissertation have implications for future research not only in 
transitional justice but also in international conflict and international conflict management more 
broadly. Understanding the extent to which complex domestic characteristics, such as norms, 
beliefs, and values related to justice, manifest in different situations can help policymakers and 
leaders make well-informed decisions and better predict outcomes.    
Contribution to Knowledge 
 Zartner (2012) suggested that legal traditions should be considered in transitional justice 
practices. I build upon this idea by developing a new variable (congruence) to test hypotheses 
about the relationship between legal traditions and post-conflict justice practices. This 
dissertation is the first study to empirically test this relationship. Overall the results indicate that 
this could develop into a new strand of transitional justice scholarship. Further, it contributes to 
the existing legal tradition scholarship which explores how this important characteristic of states 
influences their behavior in the international arena.   
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 The congruence variable, as discussed above, requires additional refinement and testing. 
However, the initial results presented here indicate that further development of congruence could 
lead to a deeper understanding of how societies can best heal from conflict and work towards 
sustainable peace. With additional work, it would be possible that congruence could be applied 
in other ways to understand better how domestic characteristics and cultural norms influence 
transitional justice implementation and outcomes.  
 This dissertation contributes to the broader transitional justice literature in the 
methodological approach, as well. As previously discussed, much of the existing literature takes 
a qualitative approach to the study of transitional justice. Case studies and regional studies have 
provided in-depth accounts of varied approaches to transitional and post-conflict justice practices 
and are invaluable contributions to the broader understanding of transitional justice. Quantitative 
and large-N analyses have been less popular, but thanks to several data initiatives are beginning 
to emerge in the literature. The Transitional Justice Database, Transitional Justice Research 
Collaborative, Post-Conflict Justice Dataset, and During Justice (DCJ) Dataset have all collected 
information on transitional justice practices and are available for scholars to use to further the 
study of these unique justice mechanisms (Olsen et al., 2010; Dancy, Lessa, Marchesi, Payne, 
Pereira, & Sikkink, 2014; Binningsbø et al., 2012; Lolye & Binningsbø, 2018). This study 
utilizes existing data, the PCJ Dataset, and applies new variables related to legal traditions, 
congruence, and justice types to better understand the relationship between important domestic 
characteristics and transitional justice outcomes. Stewart and Wiebalhaus-Braham (2017, p. 120) 
note that critics of quantitative approaches to the study transitional justice “fail to account for 
‘changes in the [global] normative context’ over time and for ‘local contextual factors.’” This 
study, however, is a first step towards bridging this gap by including existing and previously 
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tested data in addition to explanatory factors that account for normative and cultural 
characteristics. The contributions of this dissertation to the study of transitional and post-conflict 
justice as well as the broader field of international conflict management include the inclusion and 
first empirical test of legal traditions as an independent variable of interest, a new application of 
congruence theory as important in the broader field of transitional justice, the development of the 
congruence variable, and the testing of the effect of congruence on one of the primary goals of 
transitional justice – the durability of peace in the post-conflict period. The overall results 
indicate that this is an important new area for future research with key insights into important 
factors that can inform policy and best practices when considering the adoption and 
implementation of post-conflict justice. 
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Appendix A 
Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis 1 
Variable Observations Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Polity2 Score 354 -0.522 6.704 -10 10 
State Age 355 52.552 49.189 0 189 
Battle Deaths 326 17519.28 81536.2 25 1200000 
 
Number of PCJ 
Mechanisms 
Frequency Percent  Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 153 46.93 46.93 
1 102 31.29 78.22 
2 47 14.42 92.64 
3 20 6.13 98.77 
4 4 1.23 100.00 
Total 326 100.00 100.00 
    
PCJ Dummy Frequency Percent  Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 153 46.93 46.93 
1 173 53.07 100.00 
Total 326 100.00  
 
Trial Dummy Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 248 76.07 76.07 
1 78 23.93 100.00 
Total 326 100.00  
 
Truth Dummy Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 317 97.24 97.24 
1 9 2.76 100.00 
Total 326 100.00  
 
Reparations Dummy Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 306 93.87 93.87 
1 20 6.13 100.00 
Total 326 100.00  
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Amnesty Dummy Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 234 71.78 71.78 
1 92 28.22 100.00 
Total 326 100.00  
 
Purge Dummy Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 311 95.40 95.40 
1 15 4.60 100.00 
Total 326 100.00  
 
Exile Dummy Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 268 82.21 82.21 
1 58 17.79 100.00 
Total 326 100.00  
    
Civil War Dummy Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 195 59.82 59.82 
1 131 40.18 100.00 
Total 326 100.00  
 
Termination Method Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percentage 
Victory 109 33.44 33.44 
Bargained Solution 76 23.31 56.75 
Other 141 43.25 100.00 
Total 326 100.00  
 
Civil/Common Law 
Dummy 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 76 21.29 21.29 
1 281 78.71 100.00 
Total 357 100.00  
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Islamic Law Dummy Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 285 79.83 79.83 
1 72 20.17 100.00 
Total 357 100.00  
 
Termination via 
Victory Dummy 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 248 59.82 59.82 
1 109 40.18 100.00 
Total 357 100.00  
 
Internal Conflict 
Dummy 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 69 19.33 19.33 
1 288 80.67 100.00 
Total 357 100.00  
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Appendix B 
Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis 2 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
State Age 172 53.796 52.370 0 185 
Polity 2 171 -2.082 5.697 -10 10 
Battle Death 173 22028.61 97902.49 25 1200000 
 
Post-Conflict Justice 
Number of 
Mechanisms 
Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
1 102 58.96 58.96 
2 47 27.17 86.13 
3 20 11.56 97.69 
4 4 2.31 100.00 
Total 173 100.00  
 
Trial Dummy Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 95 54.91 54.91 
1 78 45.09 100.00 
Total 173 100.00  
 
Truth Dummy Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 164 94.80 94.80 
1 9 5.20 100.00 
Total 173 100.00  
 
Reparations Dummy Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 153 88.44 88.44 
1 20 11.56 100.00 
Total 173 100.00  
 
Amnesty Dummy Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 81 46.82 46.82 
1 92 53.18 100.00 
Total 173 100.00  
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Purge Dummy Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 158 91.33 91.33 
1 15 8.67 100.00 
Total 173 100.00  
 
Exile Dummy Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 115 66.47 66.47 
1 58 33.53 100.00 
Total 173 100.00  
 
Civil/Common Law 
Dummy 
Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 34 19.65 19.65 
1 139 80.35 100.00 
Total 173 100.00  
 
Islamic Law Dummy Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 140 80.92 80.92 
1 33 19.08 100.00 
Total 173 100.00  
 
Congruence Dummy Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 65 37.79 37.79 
1 107 62.21 100.00 
Total 173 100.00  
 
Civil War Dummy Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 97 56.07 56.07 
1 76 43.93 100.00 
Total 173 100.00  
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Conflict Termination 
Method 
Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
Victory 79 45.66 45.66 
Bargained Solution 48 27.75 73.41 
Other 46 26.59 100.00 
Total 173 100.00  
 
Government 
Incompatibility 
Dummy 
Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 113 65.32 65.32 
1 60 34.68 100.00 
Total 173 100.00  
 
International Conflict 
Dummy 
Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 39 22.54 22.54 
1 134 77.46 100.00 
Total 173 100.00  
 
Victory Dummy Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 94 54.34 54.34 
1 79 45.66 100.00 
Total 173 100.00  
 
PCJ Initiator - Both 
Sides Dummy 
Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 135 78.03 78.03 
1 38 21.97 100.00 
Total 173 100.00  
 
Democracy Dummy Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 154 89.02 89.02 
1 19 10.98 100.00 
Total 173 100.00  
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Retributive Dummy Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 104 60.12 60.12 
1 69 39.88 100.00 
Total 173 100.00  
 
Restorative Dummy Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
0 116 67.05 67.05 
1 57 32.95 100.00 
Total 173 100.00  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
